rsync.net is great and I've always appreciated the exposed ZFS capability, even if at this point 3x the cost per gb for a small scale users vs B2 is a lot more

rsync.net is great and I've always appreciated the exposed ZFS capability, even if at this point 3x the cost per gb for a small scale users vs B2 is a lot more painful. Having encryption, including for transfers, also be part of the filesystem (which is open source) is great. Pity but for a small turn of history ZFS didn't become the native FS for Apple. And I think backups in particular is one of the focused completely unambiguous areas where Apple really has behaved in textbook anticompetitive fashion, and they should be required to allow people to point their iOS devices at any 3rd party service (including their own!) they wish that implements the right API (which Apple should have to document and follow themselves). Still with all that said: >I disagree - the service provider should be considered an adversary and their service - and your tooling - should make it possible to obfuscate every single bit of data and metadata that you store there. If you're using Apple devices at this point then I think they do unavoidably form some part of your core trust foundation. With current hardware Apple is everywhere in the stack right down to the CPU level, heck arguably below that since they have a special license with ARM and can implement their own custom extensions. If you really think they're an adversary to the point of doing custom backdoors explicitly going after you, then the hardware just can't be trusted. It's not unreasonable though to look at both Apple's incentives and the state of American law at least and see distinctions between Apple being compelled (or hacked) to provide something they have passive access to on their side anyway vs being compelled to engage in non-consensual active work and feature development (or having that slipped in and make it into general deployment) on things that necessarily must go out to end user devices. The former is both bog standard warrant/subpoena territory and not inherently detectable outside of Apple and the government, since it doesn't directly involve the user as a party at all. The latter is very arguably illegal and provokes far more public response, and involves deploying in ways that make it far harder to keep concealed (and open up other avenues of challenge).