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> In other words, the adversary in your threat model is the service provider - and in this case, Apple. And what good is that encryption, if Apple obviously can
by tshaddox 4y ago
> In other words, the adversary in your threat model is the service provider - and in this case, Apple. And what good is that encryption, if Apple obviously can do almost anything with your device?
The adversary in this threat model isn't the service provider. The adversary is someone attacking the service provider, like a hacker or a government with a warrant, and getting access to Apple's storage of your data.
Now of course it's not impossible for such an adversary to also defeat other systems at Apple and get your data another way, for example by controlling Apple's ability to send over-the-air updates to Apple devices. But I think that is a sufficiently distinct threat that it's not worth dismissing solutions to the first threat. That would be like dismissing the importance of a web server storing passwords salted and hashed, since attackers could just use a totally different attack to bypass the web server's database access control. Another way to illustrate this might be to point out that attackers can physically coerce you to hand over data regardless of any security measures any service provider could possibly make, but that doesn't mean we should dismiss all such security measures.
- Terretta 4y agoWe used to call this "NSL-proof". If your provider is architected to be NSL-proof, then the warrant has to get served to you. This is now possible to achieve in AWS, for example.
- stevewatson301 4y agoCan you please elaborate? I haven't seen any info from AWS to that end, and with KMS they control the keys.
- acdha 4y agoI’m assuming they’re referring to this new feature: https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2022/11/aws-kms-external-key-store/ https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2022/11/aws-kms-e...
- acdha 4y agoI think the right way to advocate for this really is to focus on the warrant aspect. It’s not about preventing law enforcement but keeping it above board where there’s at least the possibility of oversight and targets can exercise their rights to things like legal representation.
- rsync 4y agoI disagree - the service provider should be considered an adversary and their service - and your tooling - should make it possible to obfuscate every single bit of data and metadata that you store there. If only such a service existed. If only …
- cbm-vic-20 4y agoI've used such a service for at least a decade. End-to-end encrypted. All open source. ;)
- rsync 4y ago... username checks out - our target demographic :)
- AnonC 4y agoOff topic. Could you please update your website as promised (about three months ago) [1] on the pricing comparison and clarity for rsync.net? [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32768182 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32768182
- rsync 4y agoWorking on it. It's complicated ... However, as with all things here, you can just email and discuss with a real person and we'll set you up the way you need to be set up wrt billing and pricing, etc.
- nonameiguess 4y agoI don't get it. If you don't trust Apple, then you don't take photos with an iPhone. There is no possible service they could offer that assures you every bit of data and metadata is obfuscated end to end in any sense of before Apple software has a chance to see it. At bare minimum, the camera app has to put together a file before there is anything to encrypt. A malicious Apple could just keep a second copy of that file, and even if you used a different backup service, they'd still have it.
- leeoniya 4y ago> a government with a warrant remember Lavabit [0]? will Apple choose to shut down rather than to comply [1]? if the government comes with a warrant, it will be with a gag order, and they will be compelled to silently update your phone to extract whatever the govt needs over the course of a few months. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pen_register#Pen_Register_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pen_register#Pen_Register_Act
- tshaddox 4y ago> will Apple choose to shut down rather than to comply Apple will probably comply, just like I would probably comply rather than go to jail or suffer injury to myself or my loved ones. But I think it's fair to treat that as a distinct threat.
- curmudgeon22 4y agoIt seems like they are willing to fight such requests: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI%E2%80%93Apple_encryption_dispute https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI%E2%80%93Apple_encryption_d...
- leeoniya 4y agothe details of exactly what they were disputing matters: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI%E2%80%93Apple_encryption_dispute#Apple_ordered_to_assist_the_FBI https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI%E2%80%93Apple_encryption_d... in this case it could have set a dangerous (and expensive) precedent for them. that does not mean they will fight any and all requests.
- buzzerbetrayed 4y agoWhat is your actual point here? It feels like we’re just playing a game if hypotheticals that are no longer based in reality. Sure Apple could update your device to send all your photos unencrypted to them. They could also remotely turn on the mic and spy on all of us. They could also add key word detection to iMessage and flag law enforcement if you text out the wrong words. I think everyone here understands what Apple could do. Which is why it’s a good thing that signs point to Apple not wanting their customer data. And why Apple refusing government orders that they feel violate their customers is unequivocally a good thing (even if they’re doing it for selfish reasons)