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> why would you suddenly trust their unverifiable claim that the data is now E2EE > It's a useless PR tactic. Maybe because a single whistleblower would bring
by brookst 4y ago
> why would you suddenly trust their unverifiable claim that the data is now E2EE
> It's a useless PR tactic.
Maybe because a single whistleblower would bring down the mother of all class action lawsuits?
Hardcore anti-corporate types like to imagine that these companies are evil geniuses, where all 100,000 employees are operating in perfect alignment, with no mistakes or disagreements, and all secrets are kept perfectly.
It just doesn't work like that. Threat model it for a second: how many more phones is Apple going to sell with this? Maybe a 1% increase, to wildly overestimate it? And what would be the financial harm from a single engineer popping on HN and saying "it's all BS, phones send the keys to the cloud, I worked on the system to store them."?
> There's absolutely no _technical_ thing they could do to gain any trust.
Well, that's true. But there's also no non-technical thing they could do. It is literally impossible to prove perfect technical compliance on an ongoing basis using any combination of technical and non-technical means.
That goes for open source too. Evil compilers, etc, can turn perfectly solid source into malicious binaries. The compiler's source can even be perfectly secure.
At some point you have to think about probabilities and motivations, and move away from this "anything not 100% perfect, which BTW is not possible, is 100% useless" world view.
- AshamedCaptain 4y ago> Maybe because a single whistleblower would bring down the mother of all class action lawsuits? Sure, like that is going to happen. I mean, "Facebook can read your supposedly-encrypted Whatsapp messages" will raise how many eyebrows exactly? > But there's also no non-technical thing they could do No, that's untrue. For starters, release the source. Allow me to run my own backup software on their servers. Allow me to transparently run my own encryption before I upload stuff to their servers. And a very long etc. > anything not 100% perfect, which BTW is not possible, is 100% useless This is 100% useless not because it is not 100% perfect (it very well could be), but because it is 100% useless by conception. What threat model does this protect against exactly? The scenario where Apple servers get compromised? I'm quite sure this risk does not even enter the mind of the target audience here, and if it did, the hacker could very well push the silent update anyway. The scenario where Apple itself has access to the data? This does absolutely nothing to prevent it. The scenario where someone can social engineer an Apple employee to give your iCloud key to someone else? It was already not possible.
- brookst 4y ago> What threat model does this protect against exactly? Two big threats: 1) insider attacks like the Saudi Twitter infiltration[0], and 2) Overreach by legitimate government process like subpoena[1]. > release the source Useless. How do you know it's the exact source running on-device? > Allow me to run my own backup software on their servers Useless. How do you know your own backup software isn't compromised via a secret deal with Apple? > Allow me to transparently run my own encryption before I upload stuff to their servers. Useless. How do you know the OS isn't grabbing the raw files? How do you know your own encryption isn't compromised? How do you know that Xcode isn't inserting backdoors in the encryption you compiled from source? > And a very long etc. All useless. Tell me your perfect solution and I promise I can show it's useless (by your standards). [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_infiltration_of_Twitter https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_infiltration_of_Twitter [1] https://ijunkie.com/your-icloud-data-phenomenal-law-enforcement-agencies/ https://ijunkie.com/your-icloud-data-phenomenal-law-enforcem...
- AshamedCaptain 4y ago> Two big threats: 1) insider attacks like the Saudi Twitter infiltration[0], and 2) Overreach by legitimate government process like subpoena[1]. This does not prevent any of these threats, it does not even necessarily make them more difficult whatsoever. "Insiders" will still have access to the source code doing the encryption and communications, and it is just not possible to protect against government overreach that can literally force you to do anything and keep quiet about it, even in otherwise relative sane countries. Search for NSA letter. I actually don't expect any corporation to be above the government, fwiw, but this is off-topic. > Useless. How do you know it's the exact source running on-device? Because you built it yourself? > Useless. How do you know your own backup software isn't compromised via a secret deal with Apple? Because it's YOUR OWN backup software? > Useless. How do you know the OS isn't grabbing the raw files? How do you know your own encryption isn't compromised? How do you know that Xcode isn't inserting backdoors in the encryption you compiled from source? Because I have the source of the OS and I built it myself? Because I have literally used the same compiler I use for other platforms and not Facebook's? Because I can then actually monitor the actual communications between the device and the mothership? etc. etc. The point of this entire thing was to show that _there is_ non-technical policies they can do to actually increase the trust level (or at least have a discussion about it -- as you are), but there is very few technical stuff they can do to increase it, and that's because it would miss the entire point. It's not about "trusting trust perfection" or whatever you think you are trying to argue here. You are trying to protect stuff from Alice by trusting Alice without even being capable of verifying it. It just can't academically work. You need to either be able to verify it or at the very minimum separate both roles.