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a closer look maybe, but unless they break Tor they'll only have a close look at your timing traffic. if you're worried, you could use a popular VPN to connect
by sterlind 4y ago
a closer look maybe, but unless they break Tor they'll only have a close look at your timing traffic.
if you're worried, you could use a popular VPN to connect to Tor - using a VPN is less interesting. also, P2P app developers could consider running non-exit nodes in their clients for popular apps. there shouldn't be legal risks unless you're running an exit node, and this adds more noise to the signal of Tor users.
- godelski 4y agoWhy are exit nodes more legally perilous than non-exit nodes?
- sterlind 4y agothey shouldn't be, but there's a practical difference in how often your house gets raided by FBI agents. if a Tor user uses your exit node to email a bomb threat or access child porn, it's your source IP that shows up. the FBI should check your IP against the registry of exit node IPs, but if they don't it's still your door getting kicked in.
- bombcar 4y agoExactly - and I've noticed there aren't very many exit nodes at all, small enough that I can start to recognize them by name.
- HackerNCoder 4y agoYea, there is only about 1000 (actually 1300, I just checked) exits - out of only ~6000 nodes total, the Tor network is actually kinda small.
- bluesttuesday 4y agoUsing a VPN to connect to Tor can decrease anonymity. The Tor wiki has a whole page about the topic https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlu...
- sterlind 4y agothe scenario I'm describing is "You -> VPN/SSH -> Tor" and your link says it's a fine idea.
- anonym29 4y agoJust keep in mind that your VPN/SSH provider now has the same visibility your ISP did.
- INeedMoreRam 4y agoUsing a reputable VPN who claims no logs is much better than an ISP who gladly hands over logs.
- anonym29 4y agoUsing a reputable VPN who claims no logs still places immense trust in that VPN provider. If you're a journalist or political dissident, it's possible your life is resting on that trust. Alternatively, You -> ISP -> Tor -> VPN and paying with Monero obtained over Tor without ever having disclosed your ID or any revealing info means: • Your ISP knows who you are, but not what you're doing (no anonymity, yes privacy). The connection to tor establishes privacy from ISP. • Your Tor exit node sees you're connecting to a VPN, but does not know who you are, or what you're doing (yes anonymity, yes privacy). The routing of Tor establishes anonymity, but not privacy from the exit node. The connection to the VPN establishes privacy from the exit node. • Your VPN provider knows a bit about what you're doing, but not who you are (yes anonymity, less privacy) This offers additional protection if your VPN provider is compromised / lying about logging (you have no way to verify at any given moment, only that they weren't in past incidents that have gone to court, but this is no guarantee they can't be compelled to start logging your connections). This also offers additional protection if your guard node and exit node are compromised, which is sufficient to deanonymize tor users. What it does not offer protection against is all ISP's involved selling netflow metadata to a single party who uses timing and packet sizes to correlate traffic across all of these connections, like Team Cymru does with their Pure Signal Recon product (formerly called Augury). If that scares you, I'd encourage you to look up what company actually owns and operates torproject's website, and how many contracts they have with governments, too.
- veeti 4y agoI once tried running a non-exit node and quickly found that a lot of sites would blacklist my IP regardless. Can't recommend.