2 ms·
> I can be certain that my HSM signed what I wanted it to sign by verifying the signature against my known input. But what if, after checking, you realize that
by lxgr 4y ago
> I can be certain that my HSM signed what I wanted it to sign by verifying the signature against my known input.
But what if, after checking, you realize that instead of "send $50 to $friend for dinner", you signed "send my life savings to $fraudster"? That's the main attacker model of cryptocurrency wallets.
- woodruffw 4y agoThat's the kind of attacker model I wouldn't invite in the first place! But more seriously: I've never fully understood why this is such a common issue with cryptocurrencies. My understanding of how Bitcoin works is that you need to actually submit your transaction for inclusion in a block, meaning that you have ample opportunity to verify the transaction's correctness before offering it for submission. Why aren't hardware wallets encouraging that?
- jallen_dot_dev 4y ago> you have ample opportunity to verify the transaction's correctness before offering it for submission I think the idea is malware on your computer could submit the signed, fraudulent transaction against your will.
- lxgr 4y agoWhere would you verify the transaction and potentially choose to not submit it? If it's on your computer or phone, this means that you trust it enough to not need a hardware wallet in the first place. If your computer is compromised, you can trust the attacker to take care of the submission for you.
- IanCal 4y agoHow is the rest of the network supposed to tell the difference between you signing and submitting a transaction and you signing and then a malicious program on your machine submitting the transaction?