4 ms·

If your secure hardware doesn’t have a display, how do you know what you’re signing? You can’t, so you’re forced to trust that the software talking to the HSM

If your secure hardware doesn’t have a display, how do you know what you’re signing? You can’t, so you’re forced to trust that the software talking to the HSM isn’t lying to you about what data it’s asking to be signed, and at that point you’re only marginally more secure than not using an HSM at all. (Sure, it’s harder to steal the long-term key material, but if I compromise your software, I get a signing oracle, and that might be good enough.) This is actually something that the blockchain ecosystem gets right: every hardware wallet has a secure display of some kind, to avoid blind signing, because it’s a context where security actually matters (unlike, e.g., “signing git commits with a yubikey”, which nobody cares enough about to attack).

bonestamp2 4y ago
Not to mention, you already trust github if your code is there, and you can typically get that code back from the git history, so it's not usually a big risk to authenticate with a yubikey.
schmuelio 4y ago
> unlike, e.g., “signing git commits with a yubikey”, which nobody cares enough about to attack I'm not so sure about this one, there's plenty of damage you could do if you were a malicious actor who could send trusted commits to a git repo. Especially if said repo were for some important software (like Linux, wget, glibc, etc. I know they're not necessarily on public repos but we're assuming at least somewhat targeted attacks here).
woodruffw 4y ago
> If your secure hardware doesn’t have a display, how do you know what you’re signing? I might be missing what you mean, but with a normal security module I control the inputs and outputs: the device only signs what I tell it to sign, and I can test it for honesty by verifying that any signature(s) I get back are actually signatures over the inputs I put in. That still requires me to trust that my interface to the hardware is the only interface, but that's the point of the parsimony (no bluetooth to worry about!). HSMs have plenty of problems (and I've encountered a good share of them from designing trust ceremonies), but I don't think adding a screen addresses any of them. If I was an attacker, the pins on an e-ink display would probably be much easier to tamper with than the secure hardware itself.
- kiratp 4y ago
  The only way to be sure that your HSM is about to sign what you told it to is if it shows you what was sent to it to sign. Otherwise you’re trusting that something didn’t MITM between your computer and the HSM (eg: driver) such that you see one thing but end up signing something else.
  - woodruffw 4y ago
    I don't think this is true: I can be certain that my HSM signed what I wanted it to sign by verifying the signature against my known input. I know what I asked it to sign, so this is trivial. A screen doesn't eliminate the necessity of this check; it's a pure convenience. And that's not to say that it's a bad one, per se, just one that is in tension with the normal key management desiderata (as few moving pieces as possible, as little code as possible, etc.).
    - lxgr 4y ago
      > I can be certain that my HSM signed what I wanted it to sign by verifying the signature against my known input. But what if, after checking, you realize that instead of "send $50 to $friend for dinner", you signed "send my life savings to $fraudster"? That's the main attacker model of cryptocurrency wallets.
      - woodruffw 4y ago
        That's the kind of attacker model I wouldn't invite in the first place! But more seriously: I've never fully understood why this is such a common issue with cryptocurrencies. My understanding of how Bitcoin works is that you need to actually submit your transaction for inclusion in a block, meaning that you have ample opportunity to verify the transaction's correctness before offering it for submission. Why aren't hardware wallets encouraging that?
        jallen_dot_dev 4y ago
        > you have ample opportunity to verify the transaction's correctness before offering it for submission I think the idea is malware on your computer could submit the signed, fraudulent transaction against your will.

bonestamp2 4y ago

Not to mention, you already trust github if your code is there, and you can typically get that code back from the git history, so it's not usually a big risk to authenticate with a yubikey.

schmuelio 4y ago

> unlike, e.g., “signing git commits with a yubikey”, which nobody cares enough about to attack I'm not so sure about this one, there's plenty of damage you could do if you were a malicious actor who could send trusted commits to a git repo. Especially if said repo were for some important software (like Linux, wget, glibc, etc. I know they're not necessarily on public repos but we're assuming at least somewhat targeted attacks here).

woodruffw 4y ago

> If your secure hardware doesn’t have a display, how do you know what you’re signing? I might be missing what you mean, but with a normal security module I control the inputs and outputs: the device only signs what I tell it to sign, and I can test it for honesty by verifying that any signature(s) I get back are actually signatures over the inputs I put in. That still requires me to trust that my interface to the hardware is the only interface, but that's the point of the parsimony (no bluetooth to worry about!). HSMs have plenty of problems (and I've encountered a good share of them from designing trust ceremonies), but I don't think adding a screen addresses any of them. If I was an attacker, the pins on an e-ink display would probably be much easier to tamper with than the secure hardware itself.

kiratp 4y ago
The only way to be sure that your HSM is about to sign what you told it to is if it shows you what was sent to it to sign. Otherwise you’re trusting that something didn’t MITM between your computer and the HSM (eg: driver) such that you see one thing but end up signing something else.
- woodruffw 4y ago
  I don't think this is true: I can be certain that my HSM signed what I wanted it to sign by verifying the signature against my known input. I know what I asked it to sign, so this is trivial. A screen doesn't eliminate the necessity of this check; it's a pure convenience. And that's not to say that it's a bad one, per se, just one that is in tension with the normal key management desiderata (as few moving pieces as possible, as little code as possible, etc.).
  - lxgr 4y ago
    > I can be certain that my HSM signed what I wanted it to sign by verifying the signature against my known input. But what if, after checking, you realize that instead of "send $50 to $friend for dinner", you signed "send my life savings to $fraudster"? That's the main attacker model of cryptocurrency wallets.
    - woodruffw 4y ago
      That's the kind of attacker model I wouldn't invite in the first place! But more seriously: I've never fully understood why this is such a common issue with cryptocurrencies. My understanding of how Bitcoin works is that you need to actually submit your transaction for inclusion in a block, meaning that you have ample opportunity to verify the transaction's correctness before offering it for submission. Why aren't hardware wallets encouraging that?
      - jallen_dot_dev 4y ago
        > you have ample opportunity to verify the transaction's correctness before offering it for submission I think the idea is malware on your computer could submit the signed, fraudulent transaction against your will.