3 ms·
> An NFC-enabled EMV card will happily reveal its entire account number and expiration date over NFC with no authentication whatsoever. EMV was enabled with th
by lxgr 4y ago
> An NFC-enabled EMV card will happily reveal its entire account number and expiration date over NFC with no authentication whatsoever.
EMV was enabled with the intention of replacing magnetic stripe payments quickly. Together with 3DS on the online payment side, this would have effectively made a card number by itself worthless. Unfortunately this hasn't happend (except for mobile wallets using tokenization like Apple and Google Pay), but given that (at the time entirely reasonable!) assumption, I'd cut the original designers some slack.
Another reason: How would you even implement authentication? There are millions of terminals out there, operated by at least hundreds of different service providers. What key would you use for authentication and how would you hide it in a way that wouldn't eventually be leaked from legitimate terminals?
> issuers accept transactions from EMV (chip)-capable readers that nominally originate from EMV-capable cards without requiring the chip to be
Some issuers do, some don't. That's not the protocol's fault.
> 3. The information leaked in #1 is enough to buy things online (as long as the CVV2 can be found or guessed). Wtf?
At merchants not using 3DS, that is true – but these merchants also bear the full liability for any fraud happening. In the end, it's a prototypical security vs. usability/conversion tradeoff, in the same way that US credit cards don't have PINs, while almost every other market does.
- amluto 4y ago> I'd cut the original designers some slack. I'm willing to cut the original designers some slack. I'm not really willing to cut the industry slack for not fixing it. It's been years. Heck, EMV had been widely deployed in Europe for years before it showed up in the US. > Another reason: How would you even implement authentication? There are millions of terminals out there, operated by at least hundreds of different service providers. What key would you use for authentication and how would you hide it in a way that wouldn't eventually be leaked from legitimate terminals? There's no need. Just have the chip have an entirely different account number that only works for EMV transactions. This wouldn't even need updates to existing card readers. > Some issuers do, some don't. That's not the protocol's fault. This is the payment card industry, which has an entire tome of moderately onerous requirements that everyone must follow. Surely there could be a new requirement for issuers to verify that the transaction is authenticated properly.
- p_l 4y agoI do not recall all details, but EMV implementation in USA was different in terms of configuration applied, especially in terms of what data was required to auth the transaction, mainly due to some intercorporate politics iirc
- lxgr 4y ago> Just have the chip have an entirely different account number that only works for EMV transactions. Issuers can certainly do that, and some do (e.g. Apple Card). Some use cases don't handle that very well, though, e.g. booking a hotel online and then presenting the physical chip card for verification, comparing the last four digits printed on the card with those printed on the receipt for a refund, and others. But there is already something that is different across all interfaces (chip, magnetic stripe, human-readable printed card number): The CVC. Practically, this makes "cross-channel skimming" pretty hard.
- jjeaff 4y ago>At merchants not using 3DS, that is true – but these merchants also bear the full liability for any fraud happening As far as I know, the merchant always bears the full liability for fraud, whether you use 3ds or not. The sales pitch for 3ds is simply to reduce the chances of fraud. Also, you do don't even necessarily need the CVV to buy with a cc online. Depends on the merchant.
- jwr 4y agoThe amount of misinformation in this thread is staggering.
- Deathmax 4y ago> As far as I know, the merchant always bears the full liability for fraud, whether you use 3ds or not. This is very much untrue. If a merchant initiates the 3DS flow, liability for fraudulent transactions shifts from the merchant onto the issuer. Here's documentation from Stripe[1] on the matrix of possible flows and the resulting liability shift, and docs from Adyen[2] on card networks that support liability shifting with 3DS. [1]: https://support.stripe.com/questions/liability-shift-post-sca-enforcement-%28uk%29 https://support.stripe.com/questions/liability-shift-post-sc... [2]: https://www.adyen.help/hc/en-us/articles/5091186681500-What-is-the-3D-Secure-liability-shift- https://www.adyen.help/hc/en-us/articles/5091186681500-What-...
- closeparen 4y ago>Another reason: How would you even implement authentication? Have the card sign a transaction using a captive secret vs. revealing its secret to the terminal?