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Google just wants to push their format so they can read people's messages and get control away from the carriers. I've twice now had my phone switch to this for

Google just wants to push their format so they can read people's messages and get control away from the carriers. I've twice now had my phone switch to this format without my permission. Personally I don't want anything it offers. There are lots of existing message services (messenger, WhatsApp) that offer the same functionality, it's just Googles slimy attempt to insert themselves somewhere else. I noticed the article said end-to-end encryption is "available". I'd be curious to know what that means in practice. Obviously again there are existing apps if you want this. What I want the least is having google involved in any of my communications, even if it's just scraping metadata or whatever other evil intent they have for this. It certainly isn't being pushed to help any users.

smoldesu 4y ago
Frankly, people just want text messaging to exit the stone age. If Apple doesn't want to adopt RCS, they should open iMessage for the good of the whole. Both RCS and iMessage are horribly insecure platforms with verified backdoors(!!!) so it's not like you're choosing the lesser of two evils. Most people just want the cross-platform evil to win.
- version_five 4y ago
  Everyone already has options if they think SMS is too primitive. I see this as removing an existing option, and forcing people to use more "big tech" products than they already do. And obviously google wants that, or they wouldn't be pushing it. It's overall a loss for consumers, even if RCS has more features and can work across platforms.
  - smoldesu 4y ago
    I don't follow. The status quo is already forcing people to use big tech products (SMS routes through telco, iMessage routes through Apple), and RCS is a protocol that Apple can implement however they like. Can you point directly to the privacy concern you have?
- alwillis 4y ago
  Please explain what’s “horribly insecure” about iMessage [1]. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/web https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/...
  - smoldesu 4y ago
    The fact that the FBI can attain lawful access to anyone's encrypted messages [1]? [1] https://news.yahoo.com/fbi-gain-limited-access-private-145441680.html https://news.yahoo.com/fbi-gain-limited-access-private-14544...
    - alwillis 4y ago
      A nitpick: the iMessage protocol isn’t insecure, which was implied. We know the FBI doesn’t have unlimited access to iMessage content from the San Bernardino shooter case where they needed NSO to hack the shooter’s iPhone when law enforcement couldn’t buy their own copies of those tools years ago. The FBI needs a search warrant (probable cause required) to search a device and to get backed up messages from iCloud. Anyone concerned shouldn’t use iCloud and certainly not for iMessage backup. That’s very different from being “horribly insecure” since it’s end-to-end encrypted.
      - smoldesu 4y ago
        End-to-end encryption means very little when the FBI can ask for a copy of your encryption keys and attain it with little effort. If anyone besides you has that power, your system is not secure. Not your keys, not your crypto.
        alwillis 4y ago
        Except that the FBI can’t ask Apple for the private keys because they don’t have them; they never leave the device, which is the whole point [1]. Knowing they can’t get the private keys, the FBI wants to confront a suspect and grab the unlocked iPhone out of his/her hand. If you think you’re going to have your iPhone taken by law enforcement, there’s a quick way to lock it [2]. When a user turns on iMessage on a device, the device generates encryption and signing pairs of keys for use with the service. For encryption, there is an encryption RSA 1280-bit key as well as an encryption EC 256-bit key on the NIST P-256 curve. For signatures, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 256-bit signing keys are used. The private keys are saved in the device’s keychain and only available after first unlock. The public keys are sent to Apple Identity Service (IDS), where they are associated with the user’s phone number or email address, along with the device’s APNs address. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/web https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/... [2]: “How to Temporarily Disable Face ID or Touch ID, and Require a Passcode to Unlock Your iPhone or iPad”— https://daringfireball.net/2022/06/require_a_passcode_to_unlock_your_iphone https://daringfireball.net/2022/06/require_a_passcode_to_unl...
jvolkman 4y ago
> I noticed the article said end-to-end encryption is "available". I'd be curious to know what that means in practice. If both sender and receiver are using Google Messages, the clients will negotiate an end-to-end encrypted session. This happens automatically.

smoldesu 4y ago

Frankly, people just want text messaging to exit the stone age. If Apple doesn't want to adopt RCS, they should open iMessage for the good of the whole. Both RCS and iMessage are horribly insecure platforms with verified backdoors(!!!) so it's not like you're choosing the lesser of two evils. Most people just want the cross-platform evil to win.

version_five 4y ago
Everyone already has options if they think SMS is too primitive. I see this as removing an existing option, and forcing people to use more "big tech" products than they already do. And obviously google wants that, or they wouldn't be pushing it. It's overall a loss for consumers, even if RCS has more features and can work across platforms.
- smoldesu 4y ago
  I don't follow. The status quo is already forcing people to use big tech products (SMS routes through telco, iMessage routes through Apple), and RCS is a protocol that Apple can implement however they like. Can you point directly to the privacy concern you have?
alwillis 4y ago
Please explain what’s “horribly insecure” about iMessage [1]. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/web https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/...
- smoldesu 4y ago
  The fact that the FBI can attain lawful access to anyone's encrypted messages [1]? [1] https://news.yahoo.com/fbi-gain-limited-access-private-145441680.html https://news.yahoo.com/fbi-gain-limited-access-private-14544...
  - alwillis 4y ago
    A nitpick: the iMessage protocol isn’t insecure, which was implied. We know the FBI doesn’t have unlimited access to iMessage content from the San Bernardino shooter case where they needed NSO to hack the shooter’s iPhone when law enforcement couldn’t buy their own copies of those tools years ago. The FBI needs a search warrant (probable cause required) to search a device and to get backed up messages from iCloud. Anyone concerned shouldn’t use iCloud and certainly not for iMessage backup. That’s very different from being “horribly insecure” since it’s end-to-end encrypted.
    - smoldesu 4y ago
      End-to-end encryption means very little when the FBI can ask for a copy of your encryption keys and attain it with little effort. If anyone besides you has that power, your system is not secure. Not your keys, not your crypto.
      - alwillis 4y ago
        Except that the FBI can’t ask Apple for the private keys because they don’t have them; they never leave the device, which is the whole point [1]. Knowing they can’t get the private keys, the FBI wants to confront a suspect and grab the unlocked iPhone out of his/her hand. If you think you’re going to have your iPhone taken by law enforcement, there’s a quick way to lock it [2]. When a user turns on iMessage on a device, the device generates encryption and signing pairs of keys for use with the service. For encryption, there is an encryption RSA 1280-bit key as well as an encryption EC 256-bit key on the NIST P-256 curve. For signatures, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 256-bit signing keys are used. The private keys are saved in the device’s keychain and only available after first unlock. The public keys are sent to Apple Identity Service (IDS), where they are associated with the user’s phone number or email address, along with the device’s APNs address. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/web https://support.apple.com/en-nz/guide/security/secd9764312f/... [2]: “How to Temporarily Disable Face ID or Touch ID, and Require a Passcode to Unlock Your iPhone or iPad”— https://daringfireball.net/2022/06/require_a_passcode_to_unlock_your_iphone https://daringfireball.net/2022/06/require_a_passcode_to_unl...

jvolkman 4y ago

> I noticed the article said end-to-end encryption is "available". I'd be curious to know what that means in practice. If both sender and receiver are using Google Messages, the clients will negotiate an end-to-end encrypted session. This happens automatically.