3 ms·
"only takes a pencil and a piece of paper" The attacker: - controls the host - can communicate with the PCI card
by NovemberWhiskey 4y ago
"only takes a pencil and a piece of paper"
The attacker: - controls the host - can communicate with the PCI card
- gjsman-1000 4y agoI wasn't saying you could just steal it as though it was on paper - you'd need to run terminal commands on even the least-secured system. I'm more talking about how, if you were an insider at a company (or managed to sneak in), you could potentially attack the HSM on-premises and dump the key, then smuggle it out with pencil and paper instead of having to sneak out the entire HSM (which would be quite bulky, likely to be detected as stolen)... If Apple was using that HSM model (which is only FIPS-2 Level 3, which is still bad but maybe not as secure as a FIPS-4 they would use), an employee could potentially acquire a similar model at home, discover the vulnerabilities, and then exploit it on-premesis under the guise of a firmware update or maintenance. After that, jot the key down on an index card and put the HSM back like nothing happened. Sleep on it for 3 years so nobody remembers, and then wreak havoc.
- NovemberWhiskey 4y agoOK, but even then ... an offline root CA should be powered down and locked inside a safe. An online CA should be inside a data-center that has specific staff with badge access, audit trails, surveillance video and probably be in its own separately locked cage.