3 ms·

I would also like to add to this the recent paper documenting the attacks on the 4K Blu-ray ecosystem for another reason this could happen. It was actually rea

I would also like to add to this the recent paper documenting the attacks on the 4K Blu-ray ecosystem for another reason this could happen. It was actually really secure, until... PowerDVD. It included the AACS 2.0 Copy-Protection Scheme as an encrypted, obfuscated DLL. Which would've been fine - except they accidentally were shipping an unencrypted, unobfuscated DLL containing all the algorithms alongside it. Big oops there. As for the key material itself - it used SGX [a Secure Enclave for Intel CPUs], but it turns out it didn't check for known old insecure hacked SGX firmware, any SGX firmware would do despite Intel strongly warning that isn't safe. So for pirates, Inadvertently unencrypted DLL + bad SGX provisioning = Ripping movies ~1 year after release despite completely new DRM. There's always the possibility for stupidity to leak a key.

AdmiralAsshat 4y ago
One engineer's "stupidity" is another engineer's "plausible deniability". ;)
banana_giraffe 4y ago
Similar to how Bethesda shipped the DRM-free version of Doom Eternal alongside the download for the DRM version.
fomine3 4y ago
AACS is designed to expect some keys will leak, so they have revocation mechanism for new titles.
- gjsman-1000 4y ago
  Right... but here's the hilarious (for a pirate) bit. AACS knew player keys would leak and hardened their system against it... but they didn't realize that BDXL readers, which existed before 4K Blu-ray was released, could actually read 4K discs with modified firmware. Also, said BDXL readers had no Secure Boot and could be easily modified. With a modified player (which they didn't expect), you can read directly from the disc the data, which is (at the end of the encryption chain) encrypted with a per-disc key that is unchangeable. Normally this wouldn't matter because you can't read the disc directly - but with the modified player, you can. The player key goes through a long, complex process to end up with that unchangeable, unrevokable unique disc key. The pirates solution? Keep the drive keys when they discover them secret, and just generate the disc-unique keys and post them online for every disc. Then, with the modified drives, every disc in the list is permanently broken, and AACS LA has no idea what drive key is leaked and can't revoke it. And so here we are... AACS LA doesn't know which drive key the pirates are using, and when disc keys are generated, the disc is cracked forever. Worst of all worlds for AACS...
bokohut 4y ago
A passing thank you to gjsman-1000 as his words resurfaced some history. As one with many years behind the curtain I recall an old trick that many glanced over since only 'advanced developers' long ago understood the impact: Compiling public releases as debug. Many a software would fail to strip the debug symbols from their code and so the games began. Using Softice and ollydbg along with ones favorite hex editor capable of sprinkling a few nop nops where needed and boom. The really bad ones were the companies that failed to comprehend what the pdb file was and shipped that with releases in debug mode - OOPS, there goes the i.p.

AdmiralAsshat 4y ago

One engineer's "stupidity" is another engineer's "plausible deniability". ;)

banana_giraffe 4y ago

Similar to how Bethesda shipped the DRM-free version of Doom Eternal alongside the download for the DRM version.

fomine3 4y ago

AACS is designed to expect some keys will leak, so they have revocation mechanism for new titles.

gjsman-1000 4y ago
Right... but here's the hilarious (for a pirate) bit. AACS knew player keys would leak and hardened their system against it... but they didn't realize that BDXL readers, which existed before 4K Blu-ray was released, could actually read 4K discs with modified firmware. Also, said BDXL readers had no Secure Boot and could be easily modified. With a modified player (which they didn't expect), you can read directly from the disc the data, which is (at the end of the encryption chain) encrypted with a per-disc key that is unchangeable. Normally this wouldn't matter because you can't read the disc directly - but with the modified player, you can. The player key goes through a long, complex process to end up with that unchangeable, unrevokable unique disc key. The pirates solution? Keep the drive keys when they discover them secret, and just generate the disc-unique keys and post them online for every disc. Then, with the modified drives, every disc in the list is permanently broken, and AACS LA has no idea what drive key is leaked and can't revoke it. And so here we are... AACS LA doesn't know which drive key the pirates are using, and when disc keys are generated, the disc is cracked forever. Worst of all worlds for AACS...

bokohut 4y ago

A passing thank you to gjsman-1000 as his words resurfaced some history. As one with many years behind the curtain I recall an old trick that many glanced over since only 'advanced developers' long ago understood the impact: Compiling public releases as debug. Many a software would fail to strip the debug symbols from their code and so the games began. Using Softice and ollydbg along with ones favorite hex editor capable of sprinkling a few nop nops where needed and boom. The really bad ones were the companies that failed to comprehend what the pdb file was and shipped that with releases in debug mode - OOPS, there goes the i.p.