>If you look at a topographic map of Taiwan, it's not so obvious Assessments of TW's defensibility gets dimmer and dimmer with increasingly modern PLA capabili

>If you look at a topographic map of Taiwan, it's not so obvious Assessments of TW's defensibility gets dimmer and dimmer with increasingly modern PLA capabilities. If you actually look at topo map of Taiwan: https://i.imgur.com/Ds6hz2e.png https://i.imgur.com/Ds6hz2e.png Island a series of plains with no depth fragmented by rivers from rain + high mountains. Essentially a series of sequential turkey shooting galleries from air. PRC will be the ones blowing up bridges and infra to cut island into piece meal bastions to further restrict operation space of TW. The mountains themselves are incredibly tall, which is a nightmare for defenders limited to light arms against attackers who'll be droning them with relative impunity. The foliage helps, but SAR / sensors tech filling that gap fast. Before/if PLA even bother with landing, they're going to shape conditions to be as uncontested as possible. Which likely means embarassing one sided bloodbath as PLA drone operators in air conditioned mainland offices glassing 100,000s of relatively soft ROCA defenders in plains with no rear except rough mountains rougher than what Vietcon / Taliban operated from. Meanwhile, rest of island - the home front - will have critical infra distrupted, after calories and clean water runs out, they'll be inviting PLA to resupply island vias sea and air. Capabilities of attacker determine whether geography is blessing or curse to defenders. For TW, it's increasingly curse.