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Signal is the most secure messaging app out there.
by cpach 4y ago
Signal is the most secure messaging app out there.
- Markoff 4y agoROFL Signal uses centralized server with closed source (they hidden code for one year until they finally gave up when users nagged them, nobody knows what they did during that year), Signal requires your phone number, Signal doesn't allow third party apps officially and tried to push some shady crypto, I mean how many red flags you need to avoid such POS app?
- rvz 4y agoThis. As Signal is on a centralized Google Cloud instance, it can easily be shut down by the providers and that is that. > nobody knows what they did during that year). They (and Moxie) were too busy shoving their private cryptocurrency scam project in Signal to later get as many users using it as possible to then pump and dump the coins on exchanges. Signal is a complete joke.
- yoavm 4y agoThe fact that it can be shut down easily has nothing to do with how secure it is. I too dislike the fact that it is centralized, and the cryptocurrency thing, but from this to say that Signal is "complete joke" - it's not just a long way, it's non-sense.
- vore 4y agoThe Signal client has always been open source: you can inspect precisely what the client is sending to the server (if you trust the source). If you're not sending undesirable information from the client to the server, no amount of closed source-ness of the server is going to get that from you. Signal has always been transparent about what information get sent to the server: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ Even if some adversary is doing some kind of correlation to glean metadata from your traffic, they are definitely doing the table stakes here to preserve privacy and not just send your information off willy-nilly.
- yieldcrv 4y agoyes, we can transparently see that it is a failure of a solution due to having our phone number and check this out: Signal's application isn't the only participant in Signal's application we don't want having that speaking of dense exotic matter https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_dwarf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_dwarf
- _8j50 4y agoBackdoors are funny that way, sometimes the client operates correctly but a weakness in implementation can be abused by the server. Not that i know or think this is happening but they do insist on that phone number at all costs which these days is more identifying than a finger print which allows targeted exploitation if the server facilitating connectivity was hostile for whatever reason.
- cpach 4y ago“Signal doesn't allow third party apps officially” Feel free to explain how that affects message integrity/message confidentiality in a negative way.
- 2Gkashmiri 4y agoas i said, the MOBILE NUMBER IS A PII and the government needs just that bit to extract you from your home and subject you to anything they deem necessary in order to silence you. this is not a fairy tale i am larping about. "sealed sender" or whatever BS tech you throw at the wall doesnt make you secure. if your number can be found out, your goose is cooked.
- cpach 4y agoFeel free to explain your threat model. We are quite many where the threat model does not depend on hiding our phone number from the government.
- 2Gkashmiri 4y agoyeah.... let me present some material https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/kashmir-lockdown-arrest-of-activist-whatsapp-spying-is-india-headed-from-democracy-to-police-state-1.1572768275031 https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/kashmir-lockdown-arres... https://thenextweb.com/news/kashmirs-police-want-people-to-register-their-whatsapp-groups https://thenextweb.com/news/kashmirs-police-want-people-to-r... >Kashmir’s police want people to ‘register’ their WhatsApp groups https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/police-crackdown-keypad-jehadis/ https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/police-crackdown-keypad-jehad... >Police crackdown on ‘keypad jehadis’ https://kashmirobserver.net/2022/01/11/jk-police-launches-crackdown-on-people-misusing-social-media/ https://kashmirobserver.net/2022/01/11/jk-police-launches-cr... >J&K Police Launches Crackdown On People ‘Misusing’ Social Media "misuing" means writing material that is critical to the ruling party. https://www.greaterkashmir.com/chenab-valley/authorities-in-kishtwar-crackdown-on-whatsapp-groups-spreading-rumours https://www.greaterkashmir.com/chenab-valley/authorities-in-... here, the police simply take your name/number and pick you up from the street. open and shut case in an hour. Why should whatsapp/facebook/twitter help them? 1. they have business interests in india and they NEED to please the government if they want to survive in india so there are no court orders or anything needed. the police have carte blanche to demand any information and for them, name/number is good enough because the data is available with them. an example from my own home. A family member was active on twitter last year and would get into "twitter debates" and that nonsense. they would use their own name because of the websites ask for "firstname/last name" and normally people don't care about that. anyway, during one such online fight, a random opponent apparently told them "you wont listen to me so i will have police explain it to you" or something to that end. 3 days later the police comes home "enquiring" about them. we had a hard time "explaining" the situation and some money exchanged hands after which we were off the hook. "never again they said, later"... afterwards, i did a checkup of their account and they had 2FA activated on their number which i strongly suspect was passed on to the police. again, no "evidence" but my own anecdata. >Feel free to explain your threat model. i am "living" this threat model so the techniques used in iran for example used by dissidents or anti-government protestors or in china by anti-ccp protestors for example, i am going through that myself and PII in any form is dangerous. sure, lets say i don't use my real name in twitter or use 2fa and twitter gives my "ip address" or something. they would have to corelate that information with a separate demand with ISP.... not low hanging fruit as much. mobile numbers, well they have dumps and mobile numbers dont change hands a lot. OTOH, if i use my selfhosted matrix for example, the provider, some random DMCA ignore ones would laugh at them. even if they asked for payment, i pay from crypto so what will they get? and its not like the webmaster of my own server(read me) would not give any details to any demand from even PM of india so short of blocking my server IP,what can they do?
- codedokode 4y agoSignal requires a phone number which is linked to identity and precise location.
- cpach 4y agoTrue. That does not affect the message integrity and message confidentiality though. So let me ask you this: What’s your threat model? Does your threat model require you to hide your location from the Five Eyes?
- codedokode 4y agoIn my opinion "secure messenger" should protect from any actor. If we start making exceptions then it cannot be called secure anymore. Signal requires extra information that is not necessary for exchanging messages. That is at least suspicious. If you are fine with giving away your number you can just use WhatsApp or Telegram.
- cpach 4y ago“If you are fine with giving away your number you can just use WhatsApp or Telegram.” Those projects do not have the same high standards as Signal has. Especially not Telegram. I use Whatsapp for convenience/social reasons, but I definitely prefer Signal for the additional security. Telegram I don’t use at all. I don’t believe it’s reasonable to throw out the baby with bath water, just because Signal requires a phone number for registration. Protection from “any actor” would of course be nice – but do you really believe that threat model is reasonable? Would using Session, Matrix or OMEMO protect against any actor whatsoever? If we want to base our discussion in reality, I do believe we need to talk about threat models in more detail than “I want protection from any threat actor”. Let’s take an example: If I send a message to a friend I don’t want any script kiddies, ISP, cloud provider or advertising agency to be able to read it. I don’t want any passive eavesdropper to be able to read it e.g. by slurping up all traffic from my nearest IXP (i.e. dragnet surveillance). However, if Five Eyes/Mossad/MUST/FSB really wanted some intel on me, they would probably be able to retrieve it if they were willing to spend some resources. But probably not by decrypting my Signal messages. There would be other, far cheaper ways to retreive the info.
- _8j50 4y agoIt is not. Session and Matrix alone use the same protocol Signal uses without needing your phone number or google play services.
- cpach 4y agoYou might want to read up on how Matrix works and what the spec says. (I won’t comment on Session, I’m not familiar with the finer details there.)
- _8j50 4y agoI don't use it these days but please enlighten me or show me the specific section you are talking about. Specifically, I was referring to libolm.
- cpach 4y agoThis is a starting point: https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/ https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/
- _8j50 4y agoLooks like they were addressed: https://matrix.org/blog/category/security https://matrix.org/blog/category/security Glad it had nothing to do with libolm itself but how it is used/not-used. I thought they had 3rd party audits for this.
- chopin 4y agoI run Signal just fine without Google Play Services. I am using e/OS which doesn't have it bundled.
- _8j50 4y agoI disabled it, it complained a lot and images/media wouldn't load.