>it is almost axiomatic to the intelligence/security world that a machine that could break much known encryption in human relevant timeframes would obviously be

>it is almost axiomatic to the intelligence/security world that a machine that could break much known encryption in human relevant timeframes would obviously be being developed under a shroud of secrecy at the bleeding edge I'm unconvinced of this. Any government agency (say the NSA) is a tiny subset of the whole world, and can't be expected to outdo it. Especially if they have some disadvantages like, say, not being able to hire people who've ever smoked pot. >It is far too important to be able to manage the implications of any significant breakthroughs But that's what keeping breakthrough tech secret would do - prevent managing the implications. Keeping it secret means not sharing it with allies. That means if someone else discovers the same thing or steals it via espionage, now your adversary has it and your allies don't.