3 ms·

I am in China and aware of the Apple risk. But I don't think Apple is indiscriminately recording the keys people enter for each app and providing them to the go

• t-3 4y ago
  Discriminatory access is more than enough for your security to be compromised by state actors. If your endpoint device can be accessed by government decree, end-to-end encryption is useless. Encrypted drives and files can be another layer of security, but can easily be made ineffective if your endpoint can be compromised by the OS vendor in conjunction with the government. Even if you succeed in technologically hardening yourself and performing all data access with exceptional opsec discipline, actually going to such lengths could draw unwanted attention from automated analysis tools. That's why criminals almost always favor pseudo-steganographical methods such as slang dialects and gang symbols - simple codes which are obvious to the initiated and easily misinterpretated by others. Cloud data is vulnerable to attack by insiders and hackers. Local storage is vulnerable to theft and physical damage. Networked devices running proprietary applications are hard to secure and impossible to fully trust. You will have to come to a compromise with the risks and benefits of each to make an appropriate choice for keeping your data.
  • tianqi 4y ago
    >> "actually going to such lengths could draw unwanted attention from automated analysis tools. That's why criminals almost always favor pseudo-steganographical methods such as slang dialects and gang symbols" Thank you. This is inspired.