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Why the Afghan Government Collapsed [pdf]

rossdavidh 4y ago
Interesting reading. A comparison of the situations in Afghanistan just before and after the American withdrawal, and Ukraine just before and after the Russian invasion, would be interesting. From my outside, uninformed perspective, the Taliban had a lot fewer resources than Russia, and the U.S. had been helping, equipping, and training Afghanistan's military for a lot longer. Clearly, the Afghanistan people have a history of warfare which refutes any idea that they cannot fight, so it would be interesting to see an informed analysis of why the Afghan government did so much worse at fighting an enemy that was not nearly so powerful.
- wahern 4y ago
  The problem wasn't the government; the problem is the society. For [reasons], the Taliban have been the only indigenous (or quasi-indigenous) force capable of holding Afghanistan together as something approximating a functioning state, at least since the wars with the Soviets. Sheer brutality is one of the reasons they've succeeded, and their ability to minimize crime was one reason they saw wide--if tepid--support in the 1990s. Moreover, they've figured out how to build stable social institutions out of violence: > The Taliban have mastered social performances of power using a language which is visual and visceral. They bring together shared narratives and beliefs from Afghan history and culture in the Muslim period to create new stories about who they are and the state they intend to create. https://theconversation.com/what-my-20-years-in-afghanistan-taught-me-about-the-taliban-and-how-the-west-consistently-underestimates-them-167927 https://theconversation.com/what-my-20-years-in-afghanistan-... But the real question, for which I haven't found a satisfactory answer, is why chaos reigns, otherwise. The demographic and cultural collapse in the wake of the Soviet-era conflicts are obvious culprits, but too broad and not necessarily uncommon; ditto for observations regarding it's traditional tribal culture and ethnic conflicts. A proper answer, IMO, would tell us about the particular factors which resulted in the evaporation of the social trust required to sustain national governance (if even just a traditional strong-man state), and therefore how they might be restored--or at least what to watch for as a sign of the viability of national social institutions. For all the problems with social trust some Western societies are having, we're still unfathomably distant from where Afghan society lies. The vast majority of countries are quite distant. Even Somalia is better off, or at least the half of Somalia which has been able to revive and sustain their ancient clan-based social institutions.
alephnerd 4y ago
I live in an area of SF that has seen a number of Pakhtun refugees and ex-ANA servicemembers in the aftermath of the collapse. Listening to some of their first hand stories it's also pretty clear the Americans stopped supporting them towards the tail end of the conflict (late 2020-21). A common complaint I heard from them was a lack of access to ammunition along with the lack of air cover (which was essential for keeping the Talibs at bay). Also, the Amreekis didn't really seem to cultivate the right people or even really try to understand on-the-ground realities that other factions (Iran, CIS, Turkey, Pakistan, India) tended to understand.
selfmodruntime 4y ago
I think the report mentions important issues, but I‘m not seeing one important thing. To defend a nation, you need to have a functioning military. Anyone I‘ve asked who served mentioned to me that the Afghan military and by extension their trainees were made up of a few patriotic people who had an intense focus on defending against the Taliban. The rest seemed to be made up of those who were just there to cash their check, or far worse, those who shared common values with the Taliban. Wether I watch documentaries or talk to those involved, I always get a feeling of defeatism, as if the program was deemed to be unsuccessful from the start.
- alephnerd 4y ago
  Were the people you talked to ex-NATO or ex-ANA. The ex-ANA people I've chatted with had a bit of derision for the NATO forces.
Haga 4y ago

Interesting reading. A comparison of the situations in Afghanistan just before and after the American withdrawal, and Ukraine just before and after the Russian invasion, would be interesting. From my outside, uninformed perspective, the Taliban had a lot fewer resources than Russia, and the U.S. had been helping, equipping, and training Afghanistan's military for a lot longer. Clearly, the Afghanistan people have a history of warfare which refutes any idea that they cannot fight, so it would be interesting to see an informed analysis of why the Afghan government did so much worse at fighting an enemy that was not nearly so powerful.

wahern 4y ago
The problem wasn't the government; the problem is the society. For [reasons], the Taliban have been the only indigenous (or quasi-indigenous) force capable of holding Afghanistan together as something approximating a functioning state, at least since the wars with the Soviets. Sheer brutality is one of the reasons they've succeeded, and their ability to minimize crime was one reason they saw wide--if tepid--support in the 1990s. Moreover, they've figured out how to build stable social institutions out of violence: > The Taliban have mastered social performances of power using a language which is visual and visceral. They bring together shared narratives and beliefs from Afghan history and culture in the Muslim period to create new stories about who they are and the state they intend to create. https://theconversation.com/what-my-20-years-in-afghanistan-taught-me-about-the-taliban-and-how-the-west-consistently-underestimates-them-167927 https://theconversation.com/what-my-20-years-in-afghanistan-... But the real question, for which I haven't found a satisfactory answer, is why chaos reigns, otherwise. The demographic and cultural collapse in the wake of the Soviet-era conflicts are obvious culprits, but too broad and not necessarily uncommon; ditto for observations regarding it's traditional tribal culture and ethnic conflicts. A proper answer, IMO, would tell us about the particular factors which resulted in the evaporation of the social trust required to sustain national governance (if even just a traditional strong-man state), and therefore how they might be restored--or at least what to watch for as a sign of the viability of national social institutions. For all the problems with social trust some Western societies are having, we're still unfathomably distant from where Afghan society lies. The vast majority of countries are quite distant. Even Somalia is better off, or at least the half of Somalia which has been able to revive and sustain their ancient clan-based social institutions.

alephnerd 4y ago

I live in an area of SF that has seen a number of Pakhtun refugees and ex-ANA servicemembers in the aftermath of the collapse. Listening to some of their first hand stories it's also pretty clear the Americans stopped supporting them towards the tail end of the conflict (late 2020-21). A common complaint I heard from them was a lack of access to ammunition along with the lack of air cover (which was essential for keeping the Talibs at bay). Also, the Amreekis didn't really seem to cultivate the right people or even really try to understand on-the-ground realities that other factions (Iran, CIS, Turkey, Pakistan, India) tended to understand.

selfmodruntime 4y ago

I think the report mentions important issues, but I‘m not seeing one important thing. To defend a nation, you need to have a functioning military. Anyone I‘ve asked who served mentioned to me that the Afghan military and by extension their trainees were made up of a few patriotic people who had an intense focus on defending against the Taliban. The rest seemed to be made up of those who were just there to cash their check, or far worse, those who shared common values with the Taliban. Wether I watch documentaries or talk to those involved, I always get a feeling of defeatism, as if the program was deemed to be unsuccessful from the start.

alephnerd 4y ago
Were the people you talked to ex-NATO or ex-ANA. The ex-ANA people I've chatted with had a bit of derision for the NATO forces.

Haga 4y ago