I think I'm confused about whether you're rejecting the proposition about the investor all on its own, or if it's the broader argument from the Aaronson post th

I think I'm confused about whether you're rejecting the proposition about the investor all on its own, or if it's the broader argument from the Aaronson post that you're rejecting. Your parenthetical makes me think we're not talking about the charitable-investor-propsition anymore; we're now talking about a specific investor who did something that appears to have been very risky and possibly very unethical. My interpretation of Aaronson is that he thinks the hypothetical charitable investor is a good example of a very moral person, and we can use that example to imagine how we might have felt about SBF in an alternate universe where his bets paid off. But Aaronson also concludes: > At any rate, I’d try to impress on him, as I do on anyone reading now, that the choice between linear and concave utilities, between risk-neutrality and risk-aversion, is not bloodless or technical—that it’s essential to make a choice that’s not only in reflective equilibrium with your highest values, but that you’ll still consider to be such regardless of which possible universe you end up in. This isn't a post lionizing SBF. He is compared to but also contrasted with the "charitable traditional investor". The contrast is the degree of risk which, as you say, could be considered fraud. I don't come away from this thinking that Aaronson believes that SBF in particular is "way ahead of most of us morally".