4 ms·
Certainly possible, but also relies on the assumption that this was done on company equipment. When leaking info under a vindictive boss I would think opsec rul
by rurp 4y ago
Certainly possible, but also relies on the assumption that this was done on company equipment. When leaking info under a vindictive boss I would think opsec rule #1 is avoid company equipment as much as possible. Even without a printer at home, it's quite easy to send a print job to a local office or shipping store.
- zdragnar 4y agoData exfiltration is an extremely dangerous risk in the world of corporate espionage, especially for a company like Tesla that is trying to be first to market with something as massive as FSD. There is no way I would send anything to an external print shop from company equipment; they are almost certainly on top of that as well.
- rurp 4y agoThis has gotten me genuinely curious, I wonder what the safest way to get a document like that onto your own device is. Printing it on a work printer doesn't seem ideal, but I don't really know what the best approach is. Maybe emailing it to an outside address or sharing it as a document via Dropbox or similar? Copying to physical storage? All of those seem fairly easy to monitor as well though. If any infosec experts feel like chiming in I'd love to learn more.
- Sohcahtoa82 4y ago> Maybe emailing it to an outside address Easily detected. > sharing it as a document via Dropbox or similar If you use a TLS-inspecting proxy/VPN, this will be detected. Otherwise, it depends on how much monitoring is going on, but at best they could suspect it. > Copying to physical storage? At my work, USB drives are disabled by MDM. You could use transfer the files over SSH. Even if you have an MitM SSH-inspecting VPN, once the SSH channel is established, you could tunnel a second SSH connection through the established insecure SSH session. Even then, with enough logging, you could detect that all local files were accessed sequentially which would raise a red flag. There's nothing you can do to prevent insider espionage that wouldn't raise false positives and block legitimate work, but you could at least detect it.
- zdragnar 4y agoIt will always be a game of cat and mouse. Your protections for leaking are limited to legal whistleblower protections against retaliation, so odds are anything suggested here will potentially be traceable or suspicious, which may invite further scrutiny.
- OkayPhysicist 4y agoAnything done on a corporate machine needs to be assumed monitored. The paranoid approach would be to fully power off the machine, take the hard drive out, then use an independent machine to mount and read the data off that. Now, if they suspect that approach, or they suspect you personally, there will likely be evidence of your hardware tampering. But it would thwart automated mass-surveillance solutions.
- Sohcahtoa82 4y agoHard drive encryption makes this difficult.
- brookst 4y agoTake photo of screen with phone camera, carry it home, OCR. If you're really paranoid you don't want to send the document's bytes off your system or use any unusual program (e.g. steganography) to edit them.
- B1FF_PSUVM 4y agoSheesh, Tesla FSD would be even worse than the "secret Coca-Cola formula", no one would even want to be in the same computer with it. Now, production cost figures and schedules ...
- zakki 4y agoOr take A picture of the letter Or retype the letter using leaker’s own smartphone.
- jstarfish 4y agoIronically, we had an employee appear to exfiltrate data through a print shop. They almost got away with it unnoticed. The USB stick they used to make the transfer contracted ransomware from the public terminal, which put everyone on high alert when it was next introduced into the corporate network.