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You are talking about the "mere addition paradox" [1] (aka the "repugnant conclusion" mentioned in the article). The point, as I understand it, is that whenever

You are talking about the "mere addition paradox" [1] (aka the "repugnant conclusion" mentioned in the article). The point, as I understand it, is that whenever you maximize a metric it ceases to be a good metric, and optimizing for "people living" you reach a bunch of bad conclusions such as the one you mention where the more lives the better. You say that you wouldn't do something like that, but the core of the question is "why?": what would be the utilitarian argument against going that way? You could argue that "happiness" should be a measure, at which point you need to contend with the problem of an "utility monster" [2]: what if it turns out that (say) Americans enjoy a dollar more than shell-shocked Ukranian refugees? Should we optimize the happiness of the Americans? How about those people with negative happiness, should we simply euthanize them? The fault, according to the interview, is that you can't treat happiness and well-being as a matter of sums and averages. If you kill a man to open an ice-cream factory, no amount of happy children should absolve you of that crime. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mere_addition_paradox https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mere_addition_paradox [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_monster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_monster

refurb 4y ago
This is probably the best summary in this entire thread. The argument is basically effective altruism, taken to its conclusion, leads to some pretty morally questionable actions. It's not arguing being altruistic is bad. It's just that effective altruism has a bunch of pretty big holes in it. Another good example is the framework used to determine cost-effectiveness of drugs. At first glance it makes sense - just calculate [benefit]/[cost]. But then you realize that for some diseases, the cost baseline is really low because, well, people die when they are babies. So the model falls apart for some real life situations where the model says the ideal outcome is to just let people die because it's "cost effective"
lupire 4y ago
That's just the result of bad math and bad utility models.
- wnkrshm 4y ago
  That there can be a good utility model remains a postulate. How can you know that your choice of utility or trying to aim for utility at all does not have catastrophic consequences, sowing more misery through unintended consequences? How can you factor that in? [0] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law

refurb 4y ago

This is probably the best summary in this entire thread. The argument is basically effective altruism, taken to its conclusion, leads to some pretty morally questionable actions. It's not arguing being altruistic is bad. It's just that effective altruism has a bunch of pretty big holes in it. Another good example is the framework used to determine cost-effectiveness of drugs. At first glance it makes sense - just calculate [benefit]/[cost]. But then you realize that for some diseases, the cost baseline is really low because, well, people die when they are babies. So the model falls apart for some real life situations where the model says the ideal outcome is to just let people die because it's "cost effective"

lupire 4y ago

That's just the result of bad math and bad utility models.

wnkrshm 4y ago
That there can be a good utility model remains a postulate. How can you know that your choice of utility or trying to aim for utility at all does not have catastrophic consequences, sowing more misery through unintended consequences? How can you factor that in? [0] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law