I agree that utilities between people aren’t really commensurate in a way that allows adding them to be particularly well-defined/meaningful, and that therefore

I agree that utilities between people aren’t really commensurate in a way that allows adding them to be particularly well-defined/meaningful, and that therefore utilitarianism is not the actual full truth of morality, However, I don’t think that precludes using a kind of utilitarianism where you just kinda fudge over that “there isn’t a canonical way of adding these” bit, in order to produce something which can be a rather good heuristic for “does this provide more or less help to people than that?”. Like, yes, you can’t really add utilities, but if you value helping people, you can consider how much you value different people getting different amounts of different kinds of help, and if you pretend that this is the same thing as “the utility you provide them”, then you can add up how much you value the individual things and assume that how much you value the stuff adds linearly. And, in some cases, morality should presumably impose some constraints regarding how much you should value providing one sort of help in some quantity to some person or persons, compared to how much you value providing some other kind of help in some quantity to some other person(s). And so, while I don’t think utilitarianism is true exactly, I think it likely that morality probably demands something which in some ways looks at least a little bit like utilitarianism? Though there are still cases where it is important to recognize that utilitarianism can lead one astray.