3 ms·

Actual paper @ https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~barisk/public/pcspoof.pdf https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~barisk/public/pcspoof.pdf about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T

Actual paper @ https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~barisk/public/pcspoof.pdf https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~barisk/public/pcspoof.pdf about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TTEthernet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TTEthernet Deliberate link-layer electrical misbehavior. Provides only a short window of disruption - far less than cable integrity or other physical attacks would provide, which require similar access. Superior protection against this class of attack would be: (1) Redundant physical routes between critical systems with independent routers/middleware infrastructure. This is literally the intended use case for IP. However, it does not match the real time expectations people are now heaping on local IP networks in these faux-real-time segments. (2) TTE-based software systems encompassing untimely multi-frame synchronization loss as a standard class of edge-case to consider. The root cause of the problem could be said to be novel expectations for special case performance being heaped upon infrastructure designed for a more general and certainly differing use case. In aggregate it performed very well regardless. Interesting that we are today building spacecraft based on 50 year old link-layer technology.

inferiorhuman 4y ago
Wouldn't moving away from copper (or at least using shielded wiring) also provide significant protection? The attack relies on electromagnetic interference being able to obfuscate a packet header.
- sohkamyung 4y ago
  Yes, that's one of the mitigations mentioned in the article: > Kasikci: We identified several different mitigations that are effective against our attack. In general, they fit into two basic categories. The first category is to block a device from conducting electromagnetic interference into your TTE switch. [...] Another option is to make it so that, even if the attacker does inject electromagnetic interference into the switch and causes this malicious protocol control frame (PCF) to go out, the system won’t be affected by it. You can do this by altering the topology of your network, so that the spoofed PCFs never follow the same path as legitimate PCFs.

inferiorhuman 4y ago

Wouldn't moving away from copper (or at least using shielded wiring) also provide significant protection? The attack relies on electromagnetic interference being able to obfuscate a packet header.

sohkamyung 4y ago
Yes, that's one of the mitigations mentioned in the article: > Kasikci: We identified several different mitigations that are effective against our attack. In general, they fit into two basic categories. The first category is to block a device from conducting electromagnetic interference into your TTE switch. [...] Another option is to make it so that, even if the attacker does inject electromagnetic interference into the switch and causes this malicious protocol control frame (PCF) to go out, the system won’t be affected by it. You can do this by altering the topology of your network, so that the spoofed PCFs never follow the same path as legitimate PCFs.