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> But the teacher is not really giving you a gurantee that x is a random variable from the set {1,2,3,4,5}. Why? Even if X is always 1, it is a random variable
by ajuc 15y ago
> But the teacher is not really giving you a gurantee that x is a random variable from the set {1,2,3,4,5}.
Why? Even if X is always 1, it is a random variable from {1,2,3,4,5}, with distribution {1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0}, which I don't know so it is unknown for me.
For me teachers method of choice is not important - he can throw the dices, he can set it to 1. For me it's still random variable, because I don't know the result.
If the real space is {1,2}, because teacher will throw a coin, I can still think about it as variable on {1,2,3,4,5}, because it's all the same, when the probabilities are {0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0}.
- its_so_on 15y agoajuc: thank you for your answer. Let's look through this in pseudocode. #teacher picks day DayOfTest = "Monday"; #now go through the week. for today in (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday): print "It's ", today, " today." if student_is_sure_test_today(today) == true: if today == DayOfTest: print "PARADOX!! TEACHER GUARANTEED SURPRISE but student knew test today.." else: print "STUDENT ERROR!! Was 'sure' test today, but there is no test today." else: if today == DayOfTest: print "TEST today. Student surprised. No paradox." exit else: print "Day ", today, " over without a test." Now you run this program 1,000,000 times. If instead of DayOfTest = Monday we made it random monday through friday, then on the Fridays, the student would know it's that day, and we would trip the PARADOX!!! error message. In other words, we would only have an 80% guarantee. In 20% of cases we would trip a paradox. (since STUDENT ERROR!! is never tripped, it's a true paradox and not a mistaken student algorithm.). But if you run the pseudocode as-is above a million times, the student would NEVER get to say, on a Friday, that they are sure it's that day. You would not print a single PARADOX!!!! error message. Because you don't print a single paradox, we don't have to remove that day (reducing the possible spaces from five to four) to avoid it. Do you see? If the pseudocode has the teacher giving the day as random monday through friday, then he can only give an 80% guarantee of not tripping a paradox. but if the teacher can have a secret algorithm (giving the test on Monday) then the student's very first line of reasoning fails: they do not get to trip any paradox error messages or, in order to remove these error messages, remove any possible days from the space.
- ajuc 15y agoWe differ in interpretations. For me, even if student correctly guessed, that the test will be on Monday, if he couldn't deduce this from the assumptions, he will be surprised. Like when you roll the dice - you can guess that the dice will roll 6, sometimes you'll be right, but you'll still be surprised if it rolls 6. If someone told you before the roll, that this dice always rolls 6 - you'll know that, and then you won't be surprised. The dice is the same, your guess is the same, what changed is your knowledge. In our example teacher provided us with knowledge that is contradictory. You can deduce anything you want from 0=1, so the whole exercise is futile.
- its_so_on 15y agoajuc. There's not much room to interpret here. We could program this as a betting game. on every day from monday to friday, the student may place a bet of $1000 at even odds, that the test is on that day. "Sure" means the bet has a 100% chance of being paid off. At even odds, the $1000 has an expected value of $2000. It doesn't really matter 'why' they placed that bet. If the expected value of the $1000 bet is $2000 then the details don't really matter. The student wins, and there is a paradox. The definition of the paradox thus shifts from something vague about 'sure' to something concrete: a bet that has 100% chance of being paid off, made with this intention. Now, you are saying that student argues thusly. If the teacher is making a guarantee that I will be given no sure-bet (bet at 100% chance to win that the test is on that day), then that is a guarantee that I will not be in a position to place that bet on Friday. This is true. What is false is the step: "THEREFORE, if on Friday..." (i.e. if I get to Friday) That is not a warranted beginning of a sentence. If a test day of Monday is hard-coded into the algorithm, then saying "THEREFORE, if on Friday.." (if I get to Friday) is as spurious as saying "THEREFORE, if Friday afternoon I still haven't been given a test..." This is a subtle point. One sounds OK, one sounds like it contradicts what we already know: 1) If I haven't been given a test by Friday (and it's friday morning now, the test can still be given) 2) If I haven't been given a test by Friday afternoon (and it's friday afternoon, the test can't be given today anymore...) It sounds to you like #2 contradicts your guarantee to be given a test on a weekday next week. But in fact, it doesn't CONTRADICT anything, because it's an "if" about something that has 0.0 chance of happening. You can legitimately say : "If I haven't been given a test by Friday afternoon" (i.e. no test at all week), but you can't DEDUCE anything from that, since it has 0.0 chance of happening. It doesn't matter what the second half of the sentence is. Now. Perhaps the first statement (1) is similar. Perhaps it also has 0.0 chance of happening. Therefore, perhaps it is no better to say: If I haven't been given a test by Friday morning... than If I haven't been given a test by Friday afternoon... they both have 0.0 chances of happening. A die that will always fall on 5. Reasoning "If it falls on six" is no better than reasoning "If it falls on 7" UNLESS you have been given some guarantee that there is a nonzero chance it falls on a six!!! The whole "paradox" hinges on people thinking that by saying "the test will be given on a monday, tuesday, wednesday, thursday, or friday" means that none of these days has the same probability as "the test is not given at all." But in fact, one or more of these days could have that exact same probability: 0.0. When it's 0.0 due to the stochastic process involved, "reasoning" with it is no better than "reasoning with" the case that the test isn't given at all. You can see all this very easily with the pseudocode. If the students are not given any guarantee that there is a non-zero chance the test is given on Friday or on Thursday, it is a mistake to reason anything at all about Friday or Thursday. Here is the logical fallacy. You assume that if there is probability 1 that the day is 1,2,3,4, or 5, then it follows that for each of 1,2,3,4,5 there is probability >0.0. That's a mistake. It's a fallacy. You haven't really been told that. We can invalidate all assertions of a paradox very easily with two parallel universes. Suppose the teacher is a mad physicist. He splits (forks) his universe in two, preceding as follows. In one parallel universe the teacher always gives the test on Monday. In another parallel universe the teacher always gives the test on Tuesday. In both cases, the students are told: I guarantee you will be surprised by the test. I guarantee that it will be given next week, and on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday. If the students DON'T KNOW about his mad experiment... how can they possibly be SURE of being tested (and being correct in this deduction) on either Monday or on Tuesday? None of these students could possibly be sure on any of these days. They are simply mistaken when they begin to argue: "If we make it to Friday, the test must be Friday". This is no better than arguing "If we are not tested at all, then the test must be Friday". Both of those are equally valid arguments. They're both wrong in this scenario. The scenario where they're NOT both wrong, where "if we make it to Friday, the test must be Friday" is OK (not violating the guarantee to have a test during the week) whereas "if we are not tested at all, then the test must be Friday" is not okay, is if the students know for a fact htat there isn't a 0.0 chance of having a test on a friday. you simply can't deduce from something that is false. THe student is (in the case of the scenario just outlined, where the test day is monday or tuesday) arguing from false premises when they say "If we haven't had a test by Friday..." That's an argument from a false premise (in this scenario) and is invalid for that reason. The question is: are the students given enough information to know that the premise is NOT false ("if we make it to Friday")? If the teacher guarantees them a stochastic process with a nonzero chance of a test on Friday, then they have enough information to know that the premise is NOT false. since htis is not stipulated, however, the teacher can meet his commitments.
- its_so_on 15y agoAlso, I just realized what makes the envelope example particularly clear. If I say "even if you open four envelopes first and find them empty" (I still guarantee you will be surprised on the fifth) I'm in a way implying that that has a non-zero probability. The way to formalize this is to say so. "This is a stochastic process, there is a non-zero chance that you will go through four days without a test (have it on the fifth day". Obviously, you cannot make this guarantee, while guaranteeing surprise in 100% of cases. So basically, the only intuitive problem this puzzle poses is that it sounds like the teacher is giving you some kind of guarantee that there is a case where you open four empty envelopes before opening the fifth with the heart in it. In fact there is no such guarantee. So, really, my cases A and B can be summarized as follows. A) In case the teacher makes any guarantee that there is a non-zero chance of a test on Friday and that this chance is assured by a stochastic process, he CANNOT 100% guarantee surprise. This was my original, knee-jerk interpretation. Of course, the teacher does not ACTUALLY make any such guarantee!!! By saying "test-day = Monday" he has gone back on his word that there is a non-zero chance the test is on Friday: in fact there is a zero chance of that. Version B, in which he does not guaranteee a non-zero chance on any day of the week, leaves the teacher able to fulfill both his obligations (surprise and test on a weekday) without a paradox. Really, this is INSANELY clear and simple when you view it clearly. We think he's giving a guarantee that there's a chance the test will be on Friday and a stochastic process determines this. But he's giving no such guarantee.
- its_so_on 15y agoYou say: "Why? Even if X is always 1, it is a random variable from {1,2,3,4,5}, with distribution {1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0}" But IF, insofar as "x is always monday", x is a 'random variable from monday,tuesday,wednesday,thursday,friday' with distribution{1.0,0,0,0,0} THEN, it is just as true to say insofar as "x is always monday", x is a 'random variable from monday,tuesday,wednesday,thursday,friday,not given at all' with distribution{1.0,0,0,0,0,0} isn't it, though? That doesn't mean there's a "chance" that it's 'not given at all'. The teacher gives you a guarantee that "not given at all" is 0.0 (by saying that it is either monday, tuesday, wednesday,thursday, or friday, and will actually be given) -- he doesn't give you a guarantee that any specific days are nonzero. In the end, "not given at all" COULD BE, depending on the algorithm the teacher uses to select days, JUST AS likely as Friday. That is, if Friday has a 0.0 chance of happening. Intuitively, it sounds like we are given some guarantee that Friday is more likely than No Test Given At All. In fact, we are given no such guarantee. Insofar as we have such a guarantee, the teacher cannot guarantee surprise. It's quite simple, really.
- ajuc 15y agoI didn't assumed Friday probabilty is > 0, nor any other day. I didn't assumed X is not random variable with other options. I just assumed all the other options for sure have probability of 0, so can be ommited, and for days 1..5 I didn't assumed anything other than teacher guaranted. But we are given guarantee that no day will have probability 1.0, if I know it wasn't any day before. From the guarantee we know it won't be Friday. From this we know it won't be Thursday, and so on. From the fact that teacher told us that there will be an exam this week, we know any other options we could add (like "not given at all", or "next monday") have probability of 0. From this all we see that teacher claims were contradictory.
- its_so_on 15y agoRight, you are given the guarantee: "that no day will have probability 1.0, if I know it wasn't any day before". The key is that "if I know it wasn't any day before" CAN'T be a false premise. If the teacher secretly fixes the day at Monday, then the first line of reasoning becomes FALSE. The student is WRONG to argue "If I make it to Friday..." because that's not possible any more than "If I make it to Saturday..." or "If I make it to next week..." All of these are false premises. Arguments from a false premise don't lead to any conclusions. "If your mother is named John, then..." is a mistaken argument, if there is a 0.0 chance your mother is named John (for some reason). It doesn't matter what the other half of the sentence is, if that premise has a 0.0 chance of being true, you can't really deduce anything from it (if it has 0.0 chance of being true). The thing that makes this thing hard is you don't KNOW how the teacher chooses the day. If the teacher always picks Monday, but nobody in the class knows it, they don't know that Friday has a 0.0 chance of happening, they begin to reason "If we make it to Friday morning without a test..." and this argument is simply FALSE. It's about something not possible. It is like saying "If 1 = 2..." The student makes a mistake (if the teacher always gives a test Monday) by saying "If we make it to Friday without a test..." just as the student makes a mistake if they finish the sentence "If 1 = 2..." I mean, I can continue making arguments: "If 1 = 2, then 2 = 4". Is that a "true" statement? Not really. You can't really deduce anything about 2 being equal to 4 or not if 1 can't equal 2. You can't really deduce anything about other days of the week, if it's not possible for the teacher to pick Friday. That is why it matters how the teacher chooses the days.