Roger Penrose doesn’t think the universe is computable or a computation. For now, we can’t reconcile general relativity and quantum mechanics, so I really don’t

Roger Penrose doesn’t think the universe is computable or a computation. For now, we can’t reconcile general relativity and quantum mechanics, so I really don’t feel we have very strong evidence that it is—thinking it computable seems like an article of faith as well. We also have Godel’s incompleteness theorem—even if it appears we can model the universe as something computable, I think there’s going to be room for mystery, and human consciousness seems like just the sort of strange self-referentiality eddy where that kind of thing would come in to play. I think a lack of free will be unfalsifiable--you'd have to measure all aspects of a brain, including the quantum state, which would change what you observed--so maybe then you can predict it, but you also had a hand in determining it, which undermines what you want to know, that it was determinable. On the other hand, free will seems to just refer to the feeling you could’ve made a different choice. But you didn’t. I don’t see why people get so defensive about a junk concept. At some level, it doesn’t really seem like there are separate things, and I don’t feel like there’s a need to invoke some kind of separate individual free will aside from the operation of a universal stoicism type logos/the totality of natural law operating as something like a universal “will”