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I'm familiar with Duverger's law, but it's almost completely irrelevant here. "why would they get money from people who don't vote for them?" Please, think ab

by leot 15y ago

I'm familiar with Duverger's law, but it's almost completely irrelevant here. "why would they get money from people who don't vote for them?" Please, think about this statement a little more deeply. Elections are, usually, winner-take-all. Donations assuredly are not. A vote for the Bloomberg party might definitely be a vote thrown away. A donation to this party does not suffer the same fate.

JoshTriplett 15y ago
Donations to a campaign, presumably, try to support a candidate trying to win an election. With winner-take-all elections, if the candidate does not win, the donation does not magically get un-spent. Or do you suggest that donations to a campaign should get spent on something other than that campaign? Donating to a party has the effect of donating to one or more of their campaigns, so the same problem applies.
- leot 15y ago
  No, the donations need not be for a particular election. They're donated to parties or individuals to use as they see fit, allowing year-on-year cumulative effects. Imagine three candidates A, B, and C. A and B are from major political parties that almost always win. C is is a new third party candidate who is very viable, but for all the reasons Duverger's law is true is (all else equal) never going to win. Vouchers, however, make all else not equal, especially over multiple election cycles. If some significant proportion of the population supports C, they might know their votes will be wasted on C, but voucher money allocated to C will not be allocated to A or B, and will serve to increase C's prominence for the next election. When something big about a system changes, there is some burden of proof on those claiming it will have no effect (there is also a burden of proof on those claiming it will have a particular effect, but we've not really gotten there yet).
  - JoshTriplett 15y ago
    > No, the donations need not be for a particular election. They're donated to parties or individuals to use as they see fit, allowing year-on-year cumulative effects. In that case it seems even less likely that this proposal will work. The major political parties will receive such a large proportion of the funds that they need only spend a fraction of those funds to get elected, and can accumulate much of those funds for future elections. Meanwhile, the third parties need all the money they can get just to get anyone to remember their name. > When something big about a system changes, there is some burden of proof on those claiming it will have no effect (there is also a burden of proof on those claiming it will have a particular effect, but we've not really gotten there yet). I'd argue that as in any other instance of a proposed solution to a problem, the default assumption remains "this will have no effect", and it falls to the proposers of the solution to argue convincingly why it will work.

by leot 15y ago

JoshTriplett 15y ago

Donations to a campaign, presumably, try to support a candidate trying to win an election. With winner-take-all elections, if the candidate does not win, the donation does not magically get un-spent. Or do you suggest that donations to a campaign should get spent on something other than that campaign? Donating to a party has the effect of donating to one or more of their campaigns, so the same problem applies.

leot 15y ago
No, the donations need not be for a particular election. They're donated to parties or individuals to use as they see fit, allowing year-on-year cumulative effects. Imagine three candidates A, B, and C. A and B are from major political parties that almost always win. C is is a new third party candidate who is very viable, but for all the reasons Duverger's law is true is (all else equal) never going to win. Vouchers, however, make all else not equal, especially over multiple election cycles. If some significant proportion of the population supports C, they might know their votes will be wasted on C, but voucher money allocated to C will not be allocated to A or B, and will serve to increase C's prominence for the next election. When something big about a system changes, there is some burden of proof on those claiming it will have no effect (there is also a burden of proof on those claiming it will have a particular effect, but we've not really gotten there yet).
- JoshTriplett 15y ago
  > No, the donations need not be for a particular election. They're donated to parties or individuals to use as they see fit, allowing year-on-year cumulative effects. In that case it seems even less likely that this proposal will work. The major political parties will receive such a large proportion of the funds that they need only spend a fraction of those funds to get elected, and can accumulate much of those funds for future elections. Meanwhile, the third parties need all the money they can get just to get anyone to remember their name. > When something big about a system changes, there is some burden of proof on those claiming it will have no effect (there is also a burden of proof on those claiming it will have a particular effect, but we've not really gotten there yet). I'd argue that as in any other instance of a proposed solution to a problem, the default assumption remains "this will have no effect", and it falls to the proposers of the solution to argue convincingly why it will work.