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There should be more discussion about how to store value without counterparty risk. Most people think it is as easy as ordering a hardware wallet, following th

There should be more discussion about how to store value without counterparty risk. Most people think it is as easy as ordering a hardware wallet, following the process the wallet software suggests and - hurray! - your keys, your coins! But it is not that easy. You also have to cut the wallet manufacturer and the software developer out of the loop. I have yet to see a description on how to safely create a wallet that really does away with counterparty risk. The way I understand Bitcoins signatures, there could be a way. But it would involve to somehow put your secret key into multiple air gapped, RFC-6979 compliant hardware wallets. And then create addresses and sign transactions with those hardware wallets without ever connecting them to a computer. And compare the addresses and signatures between these wallets to make sure they match. Because otherwise, the wallets could taint the output in a way that signals data back to the manufacturer. I don't even know if there are fully operational air gapped hardware wallets on the market.

danielvf 4y ago
Ethereum multi-sig wallets do the trust side fantastically side very well. In addition you get ways to handle lost keys, ownership changes, and the ability to require multiple people to sign off on any action.
- JonathanBeuys 4y ago
  What is an "Ethereum multi-sig wallet"? Is that a piece of hardware? Multiple pieces of hardware? A piece of software?
  - SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago
    There's different ways to handle multi-sig, but https://gnosis-safe.io https://gnosis-safe.io is probably the current gold standard, and it's pretty easy to set up and use. It's a smart contract that you can add any type of owner to (regular wallet, hardware wallet, anything that can sign for transactions), then you specify how many of the owners need to sign for transactions.
    - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
      When you "set up and use" that Gnosis thing, how do you verify it is doing the right thing and has no backdoor built in?
      - SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago
        It's open source and you can deploy everything yourself. You don't even need to use their hosted website if you don't trust it. What more could you ask for? https://github.com/safe-global/ https://github.com/safe-global/
        JonathanBeuys 4y ago
        Open Source does not help here. You cannot read all that code you downloaded with all its dependencies and understand it. Its much too complex.
        SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago
        1. Hard disagree on open source not helping. 2. Audited[0] 3. Have you read the core contracts source? It's really not that complex. 4. If you don't trust the honesty from this project/team, then you probably don't trust any crypto at all, which is fine. To each their own. It's used by Aave, 1Inch, Sushi, Balancer, and many more. [0] https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/186a21a74b327f17fc41217a927dea7064f74604/docs/audit_1_3_0.md https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/186a21a74...
        JonathanBeuys 4y ago
        When you say "read the core contracts", do you mean this? https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/main/contracts/GnosisSafe.sol https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/main/cont...
        SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago
zen21 4y ago
https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/precursor https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/precursor This aims to address these issues. Verifiable hardware and open source OS and wallet.
- JonathanBeuys 4y ago
  There is no way a user can verify hardware and software. The only solution is to use multiple air gapped wallets from different manufacturers which use a deterministic algorithm for signatures.
  - zen21 4y ago
    Did you look at the precursor? They explicit address user verification of the hardware, right down to using simplified translucent PCBs for the keyboard etc. so you can see it hasn’t been tampered, and using an FPGA for the CPU so you know what the processor is doing.
    - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
      Translucent material is a smokescreen. No user can verify if the wallet is really doing what it is supposed to do by looking at it.
      - zen21 4y ago
        What are you talking about? You can inspect both the hardware and software. If you can verify a ‘deterministic algorithm’, you can verify this.
        JonathanBeuys 4y ago
        You verify the deterministic algorithm in a wallet by comparing its output to the output of a wallet by a different manufacturer. It does not need any technical expertise.
smeej 4y ago
Multisig, with hardware from different companies, no one of which could constitute a quorum of your keys. If you have even just a 2-of-3 keyset with one Ledger, one Trezor, and a Coldcard, none of those companies can screw you by itself. If you go up to 3-of-5, it's even more robust. You can set it up yourself using FOSS like Electrum. Or you can hire somebody like Casa[0] to get it all set up and set up the infrastructure to verify Casa App is doing exactly what it says it's doing. [0] https://keys.casa https://keys.casa ETA: There are lots of airgapped wallets. Coldcard, Keystone, and Passport all work airgapped.
- JonathanBeuys 4y ago
  How do you create the Multisig?
  - brianvli 4y ago
    Smart contract storing a vector of signer addresses, vector of votes and a staged transaction. Each signer has to vote yes before the smart contract executes the staged transaction.
    - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
      And you do that with pencil and paper? If you use software by a 3rd party, we are back to squear one.
      - brianvli 4y ago
        Write the smart contract yourself and deploy it to the blockchain
      - sanjayio 4y ago
        OP explained this, if the signing is required by multiple 3rd parties then you’re good. You can do this with pencil and paper btw and write down keys. It’s not far fetched.
partloyaldemon 4y ago
I'd recommend a PNC checking account. Solves a lot of issues related to storing value without counterparty risk.
- brianvli 4y ago
  What if you’re not a US citizen?
  - Gwypaas 4y ago
    Pretty much all developed countries have similar mechanisms. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deposit_insurance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deposit_insurance
- JonathanBeuys 4y ago
  - Gwypaas 4y ago
    FDIC insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the government of the United States of America, and since its start in 1933 no depositor has ever lost a penny of FDIC-insured funds. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Deposit_Insurance_Corporation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Deposit_Insurance_Corp...
    - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
      Many things happen that have not happened since 1933. You know what also was backed by the full faith and credit of the government of the United States of America? That you can get the value of your dollar in gold. That "backing" was also in place for over a hundred years. Until the government decided to just say "Sorry, we decided otherwise. You cannot get your gold out anymore.".
      - Gwypaas 4y ago
salawat 4y ago
>But it is not that easy. You also have to cut the wallet manufacturer and the software developer out of the loop. Better get computer literate, and better yet, cryptographically savvy. Oh, but wait, all those microprocessors have closed blob firmware, closed source designs, and you have no idea what type of higher level industry collusion (be it with regulators you disagree with, or just within themselves to ensure they maintain a niche) they have going on. Guess you'll have to bootstrap your own hardware/firmware/software stack, and maintain it yourself. ...No, there is no /s. I'm dead serious. That's what you're proposing shakes out like. Look, it ain't an unfamiliar sight to me. I've also seen it exploited in the other direction (industry doing everything they can to maintain their relevance to the detriment of everyone else) too many times. What I guess I'm trying to say is: no one (in power, or to an extent abstractly) actually wants to empower people to be able to financially self-service.
323 4y ago
It's about 200 lines of Python code to implement a Bitcoin HD (Hierarchical Deterministic) wallet using just the standard library and old-style addresses. This will give you a 256-bit integer as the private key. You can process this further with whatever additional method you want (Shamir Secret Sharing, ...). Obviously not for everybody, but the underlying cryptography is pretty simple.
- lottin 4y ago
  This method doesn't eliminate counter-party risk does it? You'd need to use open-source hardware, write your own C compiler in assembler, then write a Python interpreter, along with the standard library and cryptographic functions, and finally the actual wallet, while making sure your code isn't compromised during the entire process. I forgot the OS, which also needs to be written from scratch.
  - 323 4y ago
    Nobody wrote their own C compiler, OS, for bitcoin, yet no such wide-spread attacks happened. BTW, this logic also applies to everything else - all websites in the world are hackable if the website owner doesn't write their own compilers, OSes, ...
Majromax 4y ago
> There should be more discussion about how to store value without counterparty risk. > Most people think it is as easy as ordering a hardware wallet, following the process the wallet software suggests and - hurray! - your keys, your coins! What exactly is the threat model here? To my knowledge, there's been no general compromise of truly air-gapped hardware that could only exfiltrate data by a back channel in an otherwise valid cryptographic transaction. This scenario seems to therefore imagine a targeted attack. However, if you're storing enough value to be the subject of a targeted attack, then it would also be unwise to have the assets so concentrated in cryptocurrencies. Diversification reduces overall risk. With cryptocurrencies as just one asset among many, the "storage" answer becomes obvious: use a law firm or financial institution that holds enough liability insurance to cover any losses arising from bad storage practices. Use the legal system, rather than evade it.
- JonathanBeuys 4y ago
  Not targeted. The typical way of handling bitcoin is flawed in multiple ways. Lets look at the simplest way a hardware manufacturer could get your private key: They make the hardware wallet create the private key in a way the manufacturer can guess. But there are more elaborate ones. For another one, take a look at this discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32181462 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32181462
  - redox99 4y ago
    Some hardware wallets recommend you to generate your key with dice.
    - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
      Yes, that would be part of a solution. Another part has to be multiple air gapped hardware wallets from different manufacturers that all are RFC-6979 compliant. And here it already ends AFAIC. I don't know of any air gapped wallets. The ones that call themselfes "air gapped" just connect to the computer via different means like display->camera.
bananapub 4y ago
what? as always, the biggest risk to your cryptocurrency at an exchange is ... the exchange actively or passively stealing all your money. this has been the case for the entire history of cryptocurrency exchanges.
grey-area 4y ago
You’re ignoring the largest risk - that your coins become valueless because nobody wants them. This is entirely beyond your control.
- JonathanBeuys 4y ago
  That's not counterparty risk.
  - arcticbull 4y ago
    Depends on which coins. Asset-backed coins like USDC and USDT (lol) do carry counterparty risk which can cause them to become valueless. Some would say the latter already is. And since of course the majority of crypto is priced in USDT not USD, that becoming valueless due to counterparts risk will likely nuke prices across the board. Still almost $70B of funny money floating around the ecosystem.
  - grey-area 4y ago
    I just said risk; depends on your definition of counterparty risk I suppose, but it’s a much greater risk than those you discuss if you’re attempting to store value in cryptocurrencies. Stated another way: if you can’t find a counterparty, does the risk you’re talking about matter?
    - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
      No matter which asset you use to store value, the bet is that there will be demand for this asset in the future. That is pretty much the definition of value. How to avoid counterparty risk is a topic for every asset. For self-custodial crypto, it is about how to handle private keys. Asset picking which you bring up is a different topic. But hey, we can go there if you like. You make a bold claim: That in crypto, demand risk is higher than counterparty risk. Can you back that up somehow? Historically, nobody who held crypto for more than a few years faced lower demand. But many faced loss of their crypto due to counterparty risk. And which asset class do you see as less risky?
wongarsu 4y ago
Any guide on how to do that would expose you to counterparty risk from the guide maker, so I'm afraid you have to figure it out on your own. But code for making paper wallets is easy enough to validate or write on your own. Just bring your own air gapped computer, bought from a random supplier at least 20 miles away from your home.
idlewords 4y ago
Isn't an index card a fully operational air-gapped hardware wallet?
jmcqk6 4y ago
>There should be more discussion about how to store value without counterparty risk. Due to the social nature of money, this is impossible.
rasz 4y ago
>There should be more discussion about how to store value What value? All crypto is people trading checksum numbers.
jasmer 4y ago
You cannot 'store value' without some counterparty risk because ultimately the value you store, has to be 'valuable' to some other person, likely many of them. Money/Credit is a social construct; not objectively separate from the system in which it's 'useful'. If you really want to - you can store Gold in safe. How hard is that? It's relatively easy. A bit annoying, but plausible. Of course, you have to be sure that others will value Gold in the future. There's no formal 'counterparty' in the specific sense you're alluding to (if the gold is under your bed) but the inherent value of the stored good depends on a 'counterparty'. You can buy Real Estate, a bit of a pain and dependent on a bunch of laws, but that's an option. Or any other thing. All of it ultimately depends on 'counter party' and 'contextual' issues. I think that this is a serious problem among the 'Self Sovereign' thinking - in pragmatic reality - there is no such thing. At least not in the sense of things like 'currency' or even 'stores of value' to be deployed commercially. (You can 'store' things like fuel for your own future consumption, but that's a different story)
landemva 4y ago
> Most people think it is as easy as ordering a hardware wallet ... I also don't understand why some folks are so attracted to a custom hardware device. It's straight-forward to grab Bitcoin software from Github, put it on an air-gapped laptop via USB stick, run it and generate a new pubkey, write down recovery info and bury in backyard, send btc to that pubkey, and done. https://github.com/bitcoin https://github.com/bitcoin
- JonathanBeuys 4y ago
  The pubkey is only secure if the software you downloaded from GitHub, all its dependencies, GitHub itself and all its dependencies, your Browser and all its dependencies and your OS and all its dependencies were neither faulty or malicious at the time you created it. Otherwise the pubkey might have been created in a way that makes it easy to guess for someone in your supply chain.

danielvf 4y ago

Ethereum multi-sig wallets do the trust side fantastically side very well. In addition you get ways to handle lost keys, ownership changes, and the ability to require multiple people to sign off on any action.

JonathanBeuys 4y ago
What is an "Ethereum multi-sig wallet"? Is that a piece of hardware? Multiple pieces of hardware? A piece of software?
- SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago
  There's different ways to handle multi-sig, but https://gnosis-safe.io https://gnosis-safe.io is probably the current gold standard, and it's pretty easy to set up and use. It's a smart contract that you can add any type of owner to (regular wallet, hardware wallet, anything that can sign for transactions), then you specify how many of the owners need to sign for transactions.
  - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
    When you "set up and use" that Gnosis thing, how do you verify it is doing the right thing and has no backdoor built in?
    - SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago
      It's open source and you can deploy everything yourself. You don't even need to use their hosted website if you don't trust it. What more could you ask for? https://github.com/safe-global/ https://github.com/safe-global/
      - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
        Open Source does not help here. You cannot read all that code you downloaded with all its dependencies and understand it. Its much too complex.
        SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago
        1. Hard disagree on open source not helping. 2. Audited[0] 3. Have you read the core contracts source? It's really not that complex. 4. If you don't trust the honesty from this project/team, then you probably don't trust any crypto at all, which is fine. To each their own. It's used by Aave, 1Inch, Sushi, Balancer, and many more. [0] https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/186a21a74b327f17fc41217a927dea7064f74604/docs/audit_1_3_0.md https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/186a21a74...
        JonathanBeuys 4y ago
        When you say "read the core contracts", do you mean this? https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/main/contracts/GnosisSafe.sol https://github.com/safe-global/safe-contracts/blob/main/cont...
        SparkyMcUnicorn 4y ago

zen21 4y ago

https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/precursor https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/precursor This aims to address these issues. Verifiable hardware and open source OS and wallet.

JonathanBeuys 4y ago
There is no way a user can verify hardware and software. The only solution is to use multiple air gapped wallets from different manufacturers which use a deterministic algorithm for signatures.
- zen21 4y ago
  Did you look at the precursor? They explicit address user verification of the hardware, right down to using simplified translucent PCBs for the keyboard etc. so you can see it hasn’t been tampered, and using an FPGA for the CPU so you know what the processor is doing.
  - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
    Translucent material is a smokescreen. No user can verify if the wallet is really doing what it is supposed to do by looking at it.
    - zen21 4y ago
      What are you talking about? You can inspect both the hardware and software. If you can verify a ‘deterministic algorithm’, you can verify this.
      - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
        You verify the deterministic algorithm in a wallet by comparing its output to the output of a wallet by a different manufacturer. It does not need any technical expertise.

smeej 4y ago

Multisig, with hardware from different companies, no one of which could constitute a quorum of your keys. If you have even just a 2-of-3 keyset with one Ledger, one Trezor, and a Coldcard, none of those companies can screw you by itself. If you go up to 3-of-5, it's even more robust. You can set it up yourself using FOSS like Electrum. Or you can hire somebody like Casa[0] to get it all set up and set up the infrastructure to verify Casa App is doing exactly what it says it's doing. [0] https://keys.casa https://keys.casa ETA: There are lots of airgapped wallets. Coldcard, Keystone, and Passport all work airgapped.

JonathanBeuys 4y ago
How do you create the Multisig?
- brianvli 4y ago
  Smart contract storing a vector of signer addresses, vector of votes and a staged transaction. Each signer has to vote yes before the smart contract executes the staged transaction.
  - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
    And you do that with pencil and paper? If you use software by a 3rd party, we are back to squear one.
    - brianvli 4y ago
      Write the smart contract yourself and deploy it to the blockchain
    - sanjayio 4y ago
      OP explained this, if the signing is required by multiple 3rd parties then you’re good. You can do this with pencil and paper btw and write down keys. It’s not far fetched.

partloyaldemon 4y ago

I'd recommend a PNC checking account. Solves a lot of issues related to storing value without counterparty risk.

brianvli 4y ago
What if you’re not a US citizen?
- Gwypaas 4y ago
  Pretty much all developed countries have similar mechanisms. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deposit_insurance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deposit_insurance
JonathanBeuys 4y ago
- Gwypaas 4y ago
  FDIC insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the government of the United States of America, and since its start in 1933 no depositor has ever lost a penny of FDIC-insured funds. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Deposit_Insurance_Corporation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Deposit_Insurance_Corp...
  - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
    Many things happen that have not happened since 1933. You know what also was backed by the full faith and credit of the government of the United States of America? That you can get the value of your dollar in gold. That "backing" was also in place for over a hundred years. Until the government decided to just say "Sorry, we decided otherwise. You cannot get your gold out anymore.".
    - Gwypaas 4y ago

salawat 4y ago

>But it is not that easy. You also have to cut the wallet manufacturer and the software developer out of the loop. Better get computer literate, and better yet, cryptographically savvy. Oh, but wait, all those microprocessors have closed blob firmware, closed source designs, and you have no idea what type of higher level industry collusion (be it with regulators you disagree with, or just within themselves to ensure they maintain a niche) they have going on. Guess you'll have to bootstrap your own hardware/firmware/software stack, and maintain it yourself. ...No, there is no /s. I'm dead serious. That's what you're proposing shakes out like. Look, it ain't an unfamiliar sight to me. I've also seen it exploited in the other direction (industry doing everything they can to maintain their relevance to the detriment of everyone else) too many times. What I guess I'm trying to say is: no one (in power, or to an extent abstractly) actually wants to empower people to be able to financially self-service.

323 4y ago

It's about 200 lines of Python code to implement a Bitcoin HD (Hierarchical Deterministic) wallet using just the standard library and old-style addresses. This will give you a 256-bit integer as the private key. You can process this further with whatever additional method you want (Shamir Secret Sharing, ...). Obviously not for everybody, but the underlying cryptography is pretty simple.

lottin 4y ago
This method doesn't eliminate counter-party risk does it? You'd need to use open-source hardware, write your own C compiler in assembler, then write a Python interpreter, along with the standard library and cryptographic functions, and finally the actual wallet, while making sure your code isn't compromised during the entire process. I forgot the OS, which also needs to be written from scratch.
- 323 4y ago
  Nobody wrote their own C compiler, OS, for bitcoin, yet no such wide-spread attacks happened. BTW, this logic also applies to everything else - all websites in the world are hackable if the website owner doesn't write their own compilers, OSes, ...

Majromax 4y ago

> There should be more discussion about how to store value without counterparty risk. > Most people think it is as easy as ordering a hardware wallet, following the process the wallet software suggests and - hurray! - your keys, your coins! What exactly is the threat model here? To my knowledge, there's been no general compromise of truly air-gapped hardware that could only exfiltrate data by a back channel in an otherwise valid cryptographic transaction. This scenario seems to therefore imagine a targeted attack. However, if you're storing enough value to be the subject of a targeted attack, then it would also be unwise to have the assets so concentrated in cryptocurrencies. Diversification reduces overall risk. With cryptocurrencies as just one asset among many, the "storage" answer becomes obvious: use a law firm or financial institution that holds enough liability insurance to cover any losses arising from bad storage practices. Use the legal system, rather than evade it.

JonathanBeuys 4y ago
Not targeted. The typical way of handling bitcoin is flawed in multiple ways. Lets look at the simplest way a hardware manufacturer could get your private key: They make the hardware wallet create the private key in a way the manufacturer can guess. But there are more elaborate ones. For another one, take a look at this discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32181462 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32181462
- redox99 4y ago
  Some hardware wallets recommend you to generate your key with dice.
  - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
    Yes, that would be part of a solution. Another part has to be multiple air gapped hardware wallets from different manufacturers that all are RFC-6979 compliant. And here it already ends AFAIC. I don't know of any air gapped wallets. The ones that call themselfes "air gapped" just connect to the computer via different means like display->camera.

bananapub 4y ago

what? as always, the biggest risk to your cryptocurrency at an exchange is ... the exchange actively or passively stealing all your money. this has been the case for the entire history of cryptocurrency exchanges.

grey-area 4y ago

You’re ignoring the largest risk - that your coins become valueless because nobody wants them. This is entirely beyond your control.

JonathanBeuys 4y ago
That's not counterparty risk.
- arcticbull 4y ago
  Depends on which coins. Asset-backed coins like USDC and USDT (lol) do carry counterparty risk which can cause them to become valueless. Some would say the latter already is. And since of course the majority of crypto is priced in USDT not USD, that becoming valueless due to counterparts risk will likely nuke prices across the board. Still almost $70B of funny money floating around the ecosystem.
- grey-area 4y ago
  I just said risk; depends on your definition of counterparty risk I suppose, but it’s a much greater risk than those you discuss if you’re attempting to store value in cryptocurrencies. Stated another way: if you can’t find a counterparty, does the risk you’re talking about matter?
  - JonathanBeuys 4y ago
    No matter which asset you use to store value, the bet is that there will be demand for this asset in the future. That is pretty much the definition of value. How to avoid counterparty risk is a topic for every asset. For self-custodial crypto, it is about how to handle private keys. Asset picking which you bring up is a different topic. But hey, we can go there if you like. You make a bold claim: That in crypto, demand risk is higher than counterparty risk. Can you back that up somehow? Historically, nobody who held crypto for more than a few years faced lower demand. But many faced loss of their crypto due to counterparty risk. And which asset class do you see as less risky?

wongarsu 4y ago

Any guide on how to do that would expose you to counterparty risk from the guide maker, so I'm afraid you have to figure it out on your own. But code for making paper wallets is easy enough to validate or write on your own. Just bring your own air gapped computer, bought from a random supplier at least 20 miles away from your home.

idlewords 4y ago

Isn't an index card a fully operational air-gapped hardware wallet?

jmcqk6 4y ago

>There should be more discussion about how to store value without counterparty risk. Due to the social nature of money, this is impossible.

rasz 4y ago

>There should be more discussion about how to store value What value? All crypto is people trading checksum numbers.

jasmer 4y ago

You cannot 'store value' without some counterparty risk because ultimately the value you store, has to be 'valuable' to some other person, likely many of them. Money/Credit is a social construct; not objectively separate from the system in which it's 'useful'. If you really want to - you can store Gold in safe. How hard is that? It's relatively easy. A bit annoying, but plausible. Of course, you have to be sure that others will value Gold in the future. There's no formal 'counterparty' in the specific sense you're alluding to (if the gold is under your bed) but the inherent value of the stored good depends on a 'counterparty'. You can buy Real Estate, a bit of a pain and dependent on a bunch of laws, but that's an option. Or any other thing. All of it ultimately depends on 'counter party' and 'contextual' issues. I think that this is a serious problem among the 'Self Sovereign' thinking - in pragmatic reality - there is no such thing. At least not in the sense of things like 'currency' or even 'stores of value' to be deployed commercially. (You can 'store' things like fuel for your own future consumption, but that's a different story)

landemva 4y ago

> Most people think it is as easy as ordering a hardware wallet ... I also don't understand why some folks are so attracted to a custom hardware device. It's straight-forward to grab Bitcoin software from Github, put it on an air-gapped laptop via USB stick, run it and generate a new pubkey, write down recovery info and bury in backyard, send btc to that pubkey, and done. https://github.com/bitcoin https://github.com/bitcoin

JonathanBeuys 4y ago
The pubkey is only secure if the software you downloaded from GitHub, all its dependencies, GitHub itself and all its dependencies, your Browser and all its dependencies and your OS and all its dependencies were neither faulty or malicious at the time you created it. Otherwise the pubkey might have been created in a way that makes it easy to guess for someone in your supply chain.