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Some of the key people behind ECH (Encrypted Client Hello, work to hide SNI and other potentially sensitive information from the Client Hello in TLS) work for o
by tialaramex 4y ago
Some of the key people behind ECH (Encrypted Client Hello, work to hide SNI and other potentially sensitive information from the Client Hello in TLS) work for outfits which would be delivering basically the same functionality via ECH, such as Cloud companies and CDNs. Of course it is possible they don't intend to ever deploy this (but then they've wasted months of work which seems strange) or that their employers won't allow it (but then they're wasting some fraction of productive effort by an employee) but it's also possible their explanation is real. Lets see what the difference is between ECH and Domain Fronting:
Consider two clients, Alice and Bob, they are both connecting to some IP 10.20.30.40 using TLS or QUIC.
Alice wants to access naughty.thing.example and Bob wants to access bland.stuff.example. Perhaps Mallory is trying to prevent Alice from accessing naughty.thing.example (but they don't mind bland.stuff.example) or perhaps Alice just doesn't want Eve to know what she's accessing. Mallory and Eve are both on the network, able to interpose between Alice and Bob and 10.20.30.40 and neither Alice nor Bob can easily prevent that.
Under domain fronting, Bob is just honest, he tells the server I want bland.stuff.example, and then he uses bland.stuff.example as usual and everything works. This means for technical operations it's OK if the 10.20.30.40 server cares what Bob said during connection. For example maybe once Bob says bland.stuff.example, the server spins up an IPC to a Python server which only knows about bland.stuff.example and splices Bob's connection to the IPC.
Under domain fronting, Alice's situation is tricky. Alice says she wants bland.stuff.example but she actually uses naughty.thing.example and expects that to work. Technical ops people who've arranged that bland.stuff.example connections get spliced are faced with bug reports - why didn't naughty.thing.example work, 10.20.30.40 was the right server ???
Under ECH, both Alice and Bob are presenting a visible name (which might be bland.stuff.example or some other value entirely) which Mallory and Eve can easily read, but they're also providing an encrypted destination, Alice can encrypt naughty.thing.example while Bob encrypts bland.stuff.example† The 10.20.30.40 server can decrypt the name, and thus it knows which service Alice and Bob actually intend to access.
† If you thought "What about padding? Those names are different lengths" congratulations, you're now at step 1 of a long process which is why this was not trivial to design and implement.
- jesprenj 4y agoHow would this work? How is the name encrypted before the pubkey is known? I've seen that it uses DNS to fetch another pubkey, but there is no encrypted DNS (DNSSEC is signed DNS). DNS-over-HTTPS is only used in the last-mile --- recursive resolver to client, not NS to NS, so the request is still sent in plain. Besides, DNS-over-HTTPS still requires ... TLS ...
- teddyh 4y agoI believe that the new “HTTPS” record in DNS will help with that (and other issues): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https...
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- cimnine 4y agoAs I understand, the public key that is used for authenticity is not the same as the one being used for encryption — at least since TLS 1.3, before it depends. The scheme is known as forward secrecy. For the encryption, an ephemeral key pair is used on both sides. These pairs are only used for the Diffie-Helman (or similar) key exchange. Therefore an encrypted connection can be established, then SNI can be exchanged over the encrypted connection, and then the remote can provide the signed nonce together with it's PKI public key, with which it establishes trust respective to the SNI.
- RulerOf 4y agoSo the encrypted connection used to exchange SNI isn't authenticated? This hides the SNI from passive eavesdroppers but not from an active MITM, no?
- cimnine 4y agoGood point. So there is more to it, which I didn't consider before. As I understand [1], the client uses the public key of the key pair used by the SNI to encrypt the SNI value, additionally to any TLS encryption. Only the actual SNI has the private key to decrypt the SNI value. The client must look up the public key in the DNS (I guess at least if it doesn't know the key already, which it could have in the cache). This whole thing is still a draft RFC [2] and currently called encrypted client hello. What I don't get: The client will have to disclose, which public key it used to encrypt the client hello / SNI value. But don't we know "all" the public keys from the certificate transparency logs? Usually a public key is only valid for a limited set of domains, so it would be easy to associate the public key used for encrypting the SNI value with the relevant service. Just look up the public key, read it's SAN or CN, and you pretty much know the SNI value. Or at least the service, which might be good enough. What am I missing? [1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-sni https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-sni [2] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-esni-15.html https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-esni-15.html