Looking at how complex Twitter's internal systems appear to be based on Mudge's report [1], I doubt informed developers would dare certify things they do not fu

Looking at how complex Twitter's internal systems appear to be based on Mudge's report [1], I doubt informed developers would dare certify things they do not fully understand. Depends a bit on what entity (system, service, environment) they have to certify. > In January 2022, Mudge determined and reported to the executive team that (because of poor engineering architecture decisions that preceded Mudge's employment) Twitter had over 300 corporate systems and upwards of 10,000 services that might still be affected, but Twitter was unable to thoroughly assess its exposure to Log4j and did not have capacity, if pressed in a formal investigation, to show to the FTC that the company had properly remediated the problem. > Mudge knew that the actual underlying data showed that at the end of 2021, 51 % of the ~ 11 thousand full-time employees had privileged access to Twitter's production systems, a 5% increase from the 46% of total employees in February of 2021 that Mudge had shared in his initial findings delivered to the Board in early 2021 1. https://techpolicy.press/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/whistleblower_disclosure.pdf https://techpolicy.press/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/whistleb...