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The level of surprise does seem overblown. This bit stuck out to me: > ... access to this data is so accessible remotely that physically visiting an internet p

The level of surprise does seem overblown. This bit stuck out to me: > ... access to this data is so accessible remotely that physically visiting an internet provider’s premises is no longer required for government agencies. They were expecting government agents to have to physically visit the ISP's offices? Were they perhaps going to get their data on a floppy disk?

Lealen 4y ago
They weren't asking for floppy disks, they were sending their people to connect directly to infrastructure. One of examples: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A
- quietbritishjim 4y ago
  Ah ok that does make a bit more sense.
yardstick 4y ago
Just because data can be made accessible remotely doesn’t mean it should be. Airgapped systems are also still a thing. On-site access would also make it harder to abuse the data at scale. I’m not surprised that the data is accessed remotely. But I can also understand scenarios where it makes sense to require physical access, and not because of long gone floppy disk drives or other ancient hardware.
- mdp2021 4y ago
  On the other hand, if your purpose is automated analysis of data, you will probably create an automated update of the records - a direct connection.
- nix23 4y ago
  Data diods are also a thing (physical oneway traffic) but that so many are unaware of it is mindblowing. https://owlcyberdefense.com/learn-about-data-diodes/ https://owlcyberdefense.com/learn-about-data-diodes/
stevewatson301 4y ago
The model where law enforcement officers have to visit ISP facilities reduces the duration and scope of surveillance. Throw in a process where you need to get court approval into the mix, and this provides some level of oversight into the surveillance machinery. (Though abuses are certainly possible with this model, see [1]). [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/05/foriegn-intelligence-surveillance-court-rubber-stamps-mass-surveillance-under https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/05/foriegn-intelligence-s...

Lealen 4y ago

They weren't asking for floppy disks, they were sending their people to connect directly to infrastructure. One of examples: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A

quietbritishjim 4y ago
Ah ok that does make a bit more sense.

yardstick 4y ago

Just because data can be made accessible remotely doesn’t mean it should be. Airgapped systems are also still a thing. On-site access would also make it harder to abuse the data at scale. I’m not surprised that the data is accessed remotely. But I can also understand scenarios where it makes sense to require physical access, and not because of long gone floppy disk drives or other ancient hardware.

mdp2021 4y ago
On the other hand, if your purpose is automated analysis of data, you will probably create an automated update of the records - a direct connection.
nix23 4y ago
Data diods are also a thing (physical oneway traffic) but that so many are unaware of it is mindblowing. https://owlcyberdefense.com/learn-about-data-diodes/ https://owlcyberdefense.com/learn-about-data-diodes/

stevewatson301 4y ago

The model where law enforcement officers have to visit ISP facilities reduces the duration and scope of surveillance. Throw in a process where you need to get court approval into the mix, and this provides some level of oversight into the surveillance machinery. (Though abuses are certainly possible with this model, see [1]). [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/05/foriegn-intelligence-surveillance-court-rubber-stamps-mass-surveillance-under https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/05/foriegn-intelligence-s...