Taking this opportunity to sell my idea about how to "fix" part of the TLS cert trust process... CAs can all issue certs for any domain, right? I mean, there's

Taking this opportunity to sell my idea about how to "fix" part of the TLS cert trust process... CAs can all issue certs for any domain, right? I mean, there's these hacks that are supposed to restrict that, but it's optional. The browser trusts any cert that a CA has signed. And in order for a CA to let you create a cert, they have hokey, problematic methods to allow you to prove that you, temporarily, at the moment, control the IP space that is pointed to by whatever DNS server a given CA trusts, and hope that BGP and DNS do not lie to the CA. So 1) BGP has to be trusted, 2) the DNS has to be trusted, 3) the CA has to be trusted, and 4) a temporary check of an IP address needs to show something to the CA that they think is valid (among other hokey validation methods, like an e-mail to some predetermined address at a domain, or an HTTP GET to the aforementioned IP). That's a lot of stuff that we hope is all valid and not been tampered with! (In fact, these things [and more] do get tampered with, and have been exploited in the past to generate certs illicitly) So how can we make things a little more consistent and secure? Well all of this trades on the idea that the CA is trying to verify that you, the person asking for a cert, really own and control the domain name that you are asking for a cert for. That's tricky, because the registrar and the nameserver are the only entities that can authoritatively say who owns and controls the doman. So... why don't we just confirm, cryptographically, with the registrar and the nameserver, that the requestor of the cert is who they say they are? If the registrar keeps a key that the domain owner has uploaded [or signed], and the nameserver keeps a key the nameserver owner has uploaded [or signed], and you create a CSR (including what CA should generate your cert), get it signed by both the registrar and nameserver, and send it to the CA, the CA can verify it with the registrar and the nameserver, and the cert can include the CSR signature from the registrar and nameserver. So now anyone who gets the cert can confirm 1) who was supposed to issue it, 2) that the real domain owner signed the request, 3) that the CA confirmed all this when it issued the cert, without depending on BGP or DNS or HTTP. .....this will never happen, of course, because there are vested interests, and it would take a lot of hand-wringing and agreements and modifications to policies and new software and all kinds of stuff to make that happen. So we will continue relying on BGP, DNS, and the integrity of a couple hundred CAs, to make sure nobody ever 'exceeds their authority' and issues a cert they shouldn't have.