4 ms·
This incident shows why CT is a poor model to recognize one-off attacks against persons of interest. A better model was the 2010-era Perspectives Project[1], wh
by stevewatson301 4y ago
This incident shows why CT is a poor model to recognize one-off attacks against persons of interest. A better model was the 2010-era Perspectives Project[1], which requires browsers to report the certificate fingerprints and CA to a notary server, which can then issue an alert if the certificate hasn't been widely seen.
[1] http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/firefox_help.html http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/firefox_help.html
- p-e-w 4y ago> which requires browsers to report the certificate fingerprints and CA to a notary server Browsers sending each certificate fingerprint (which can easily be translated to a hostname by building a database of certificates) to a server on the Internet has got to be one of the worst ideas in the history of information security. Yet more institutions knowing every domain you connect to is the absolute last thing we need.
- stevewatson301 4y agoYou could do stuff like k-anonimity and onion routing (where every layer is run by a different company, similar to Apple Private Relay) to mitigate some of it, although it wasn't there in the initial implementation of the Perspectives project.