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> The russians decided to send in mechanized units because... Because that is their doctrine, the rest is inconsequential. It's how they train to fight, how th

> The russians decided to send in mechanized units because... Because that is their doctrine, the rest is inconsequential. It's how they train to fight, how they are supposed to fight, what they produced to fight. There is no infantry push in Russia doctrine, it is developed around crossing Europe in debilitating strikes. You push gaps with mechanized units, filtrate deep and leave town behind you, keeping the front moving and causing the enemy line to fragment, while infantryman behind deliver the siege to the cities as needed. It's built around being the aggressor, stocks deep and then consolidate. What people see happening here it's just their doctrine playing out exactly as written. It is quite outdated and it's receiving lot of attrition, but still.

jjk166 4y ago
> Because that is their doctrine, the rest is inconsequential. The rest is the logic behind why they chose that doctrine.
- avereveard 4y ago
  I seriously doubt that russia planned this doctrine against ukraine, as this doctrine has lineage back from the soviet union, and they wouldn't plan for a ukraine war - ukraine would have been the staging point - and the doctrine matched the plan to cross the fulda gap as fast as possible irregardless of losses to capture strategic locations. the russian aggression of ukraine is not the war that the soviet doctrine was built for, and the logic for why they pick the doctrine cannot be the logic by which this war is waged, because the loop goes strategy > doctrine > production > training and not the other way around. they always had a mechanized force, it's not something contingent to this war and not even emergent in this century, bmps and btrs are 60s designs. I can make as concession that their doctrine mutated in the 00s, incorporating parts of the full spectrum warfare system of battle, even if it's a partial adoption since there doesn't appear to be a full loop between the different corps, and it that they aimed at superior firepower integration with other corps. but while the operations are planned and executed in cooperation with differnt systems of weapons but without the flexibility of a closed loop between the infantry advancing and the other supporting weapons system that russia planned it's doctrine around not being able to support logistic is, well, wrong. their doctrine focus on aggressive pushes to keep enemy weapons systems away from the major cities, which all are westward of it's territory, and aim to push away the front line so that russian defensive lines can advance and have time to intercept whichever threat the enemy launches. they don't have the luxury of oceans, so the idea is push aggressively irregardless of attrition, occupy with reservist and deploy forward defences, because otherwise the cities, along with the infrastructure and factories needed for the war effort would be at risk. their doctrinal documents are available, btw, so one just need to find a traduction and read it.

jjk166 4y ago

> Because that is their doctrine, the rest is inconsequential. The rest is the logic behind why they chose that doctrine.

avereveard 4y ago
I seriously doubt that russia planned this doctrine against ukraine, as this doctrine has lineage back from the soviet union, and they wouldn't plan for a ukraine war - ukraine would have been the staging point - and the doctrine matched the plan to cross the fulda gap as fast as possible irregardless of losses to capture strategic locations. the russian aggression of ukraine is not the war that the soviet doctrine was built for, and the logic for why they pick the doctrine cannot be the logic by which this war is waged, because the loop goes strategy > doctrine > production > training and not the other way around. they always had a mechanized force, it's not something contingent to this war and not even emergent in this century, bmps and btrs are 60s designs. I can make as concession that their doctrine mutated in the 00s, incorporating parts of the full spectrum warfare system of battle, even if it's a partial adoption since there doesn't appear to be a full loop between the different corps, and it that they aimed at superior firepower integration with other corps. but while the operations are planned and executed in cooperation with differnt systems of weapons but without the flexibility of a closed loop between the infantry advancing and the other supporting weapons system that russia planned it's doctrine around not being able to support logistic is, well, wrong. their doctrine focus on aggressive pushes to keep enemy weapons systems away from the major cities, which all are westward of it's territory, and aim to push away the front line so that russian defensive lines can advance and have time to intercept whichever threat the enemy launches. they don't have the luxury of oceans, so the idea is push aggressively irregardless of attrition, occupy with reservist and deploy forward defences, because otherwise the cities, along with the infrastructure and factories needed for the war effort would be at risk. their doctrinal documents are available, btw, so one just need to find a traduction and read it.