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> He asked to join NATO (as equals) and rather than leaping on the opportunity NATO told him to join the back of the queue. It is a little more nuanced than th

> He asked to join NATO (as equals) and rather than leaping on the opportunity NATO told him to join the back of the queue. It is a little more nuanced than that [1]. "Join the back of the queue" is an uncharitable way to express "treated equally to all potential partner nations". There is no queue to apply to NATO other than logistical limitations. Putin sought deferential treatment to affirm Russia's greatness and assuage the wounded national pride. He didn't get it, and the ensuing delay for a diplomatic solution soured into suspicions that opened divisions that deepened into today's chasm. There was a very intriguing article [2] now behind a paywall that described Eastern European intelligence agencies warning their Western counterparts for decades that rapprochement with Russia shall always founder upon a deep, dark cruelty within Russian national character until that stain is removed by Russians. I don't know if that is true as I've never seen that first-hand in the Russians I've befriended in the West (perhaps I fell victim to the same Western naivete the article describes of the West) but if so, then perhaps joining NATO back then was needed to gradually draw out that poison. Personally with the layman's perspective upon international affairs I have, I didn't see the harm in the symbolic gesture of inviting Russia to join NATO in a diplomatic manner that didn't slight the nations already underway in their application process. There must have been some pretty compelling inside baseball to have switched Clinton from a "sure, why not" off the cuff response to no follow up, though. History would certainly have taken an interesting twist if a Jerry Pournelle'sh "Quad-Dominium" emerged with a CN, EU, RU, and US unipolar alliance. [1] https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/russia-could-have-joined-nato-but-why-didn-t-they-do-it-55561 https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/russia-could-have-joined-n... [2] https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/120084966 https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/120084966

pydry 4y ago
>Join the back of the queue" is an uncharitable way to express "treated equally to all potential partner nations" Member nations in NATO are not equal. Never have been never will be. In not so many words, it meant that Russia would have to join the transnational gang as a foot soldier (Estonia) rather than a capo (UK) let alone a boss (US). Were peace with Russia a primary goal we would have started negotiations rather than rebuffing. It never was. America would have liked to bring Russia into NATO but as a client state or a group of balkanized client states, not as a partner. >Eastern European intelligence agencies warning their Western counterparts for decades that rapprochement with Russia shall always founder upon a deep, dark cruelty within Russian national character until that stain is removed by Russians. I don't know if that is true There is similar German commentary on the character of minority groups in their country from 1939.
- yourapostasy 4y ago
  > Member nations in NATO are not equal. Never have been never will be. Member nations are certainly not. Potential partner/member nations are equal with extremely rare realpolitik exceptions like Turkey. > In not so many words, it meant that Russia would have to join the transnational gang as a foot soldier (Estonia) rather than a capo (UK) let alone a boss (US). Explain a diplomatic sequence that sees Russia after the dissolution of the USSR immediately accede to the NATO informal equivalent of the UNSC. IMHO it was on Russia to counter-offer the NATO suspicion and initiate MOU working sessions to create a trust building framework to demonstrate good faith over an agreed upon period of years instead of demanding "capo" or "boss" status along with being read into the military secrets such status entails. > There is similar German commentary on the character of minority groups in their country from 1939. That's an unnecessarily inflammatory response. I get it, this is a heated topic, but I'm looking to shed light without heat here. What else explains the predictive power of multiple former Warsaw Bloc nations' intelligence and diplomatic warnings to their Western counterparts, full decades before they happened, based upon not much beyond this national character defect assessment (at least with publicly-available information)? I can easily buy that such a defect assessment is wrong, but what other analyses were those agencies using? What explains the difference between the restructuring outcomes of Japan and that of the USSR? How much substance is there to Zeihan's thesis that if Russia does not secure various chokepoints in Eastern Europe it will be invaded in the 21st century and how does that square with its situation along the shared border with the PRC? So many fertile topics to explore and I'm sure someone is hanging around here that can point us to the extant literature that attempts to probe these areas and more, without such heated, non-substantive contributions to the discussion. I will plainly state I know functionally nothing about what is going on in Russia-West relations other than what I see in the mainstream, and I invite anyone including you to contribute your knowledge to the discussion to learn.
- hbrn 4y ago
  > In not so many words, it meant that Russia would have to join the transnational gang as a foot soldier (Estonia) rather than a capo (UK) let alone a boss (US). And what do you think makes US and UK above others? Here's a hint: US and UK are two highest NATO spenders. What NATO expenses was Russia able to afford in the early 2000s? Sounds like they wanted to be treated as a boss while chipping in as a foot soldier.

pydry 4y ago

>Join the back of the queue" is an uncharitable way to express "treated equally to all potential partner nations" Member nations in NATO are not equal. Never have been never will be. In not so many words, it meant that Russia would have to join the transnational gang as a foot soldier (Estonia) rather than a capo (UK) let alone a boss (US). Were peace with Russia a primary goal we would have started negotiations rather than rebuffing. It never was. America would have liked to bring Russia into NATO but as a client state or a group of balkanized client states, not as a partner. >Eastern European intelligence agencies warning their Western counterparts for decades that rapprochement with Russia shall always founder upon a deep, dark cruelty within Russian national character until that stain is removed by Russians. I don't know if that is true There is similar German commentary on the character of minority groups in their country from 1939.

yourapostasy 4y ago
> Member nations in NATO are not equal. Never have been never will be. Member nations are certainly not. Potential partner/member nations are equal with extremely rare realpolitik exceptions like Turkey. > In not so many words, it meant that Russia would have to join the transnational gang as a foot soldier (Estonia) rather than a capo (UK) let alone a boss (US). Explain a diplomatic sequence that sees Russia after the dissolution of the USSR immediately accede to the NATO informal equivalent of the UNSC. IMHO it was on Russia to counter-offer the NATO suspicion and initiate MOU working sessions to create a trust building framework to demonstrate good faith over an agreed upon period of years instead of demanding "capo" or "boss" status along with being read into the military secrets such status entails. > There is similar German commentary on the character of minority groups in their country from 1939. That's an unnecessarily inflammatory response. I get it, this is a heated topic, but I'm looking to shed light without heat here. What else explains the predictive power of multiple former Warsaw Bloc nations' intelligence and diplomatic warnings to their Western counterparts, full decades before they happened, based upon not much beyond this national character defect assessment (at least with publicly-available information)? I can easily buy that such a defect assessment is wrong, but what other analyses were those agencies using? What explains the difference between the restructuring outcomes of Japan and that of the USSR? How much substance is there to Zeihan's thesis that if Russia does not secure various chokepoints in Eastern Europe it will be invaded in the 21st century and how does that square with its situation along the shared border with the PRC? So many fertile topics to explore and I'm sure someone is hanging around here that can point us to the extant literature that attempts to probe these areas and more, without such heated, non-substantive contributions to the discussion. I will plainly state I know functionally nothing about what is going on in Russia-West relations other than what I see in the mainstream, and I invite anyone including you to contribute your knowledge to the discussion to learn.
hbrn 4y ago
> In not so many words, it meant that Russia would have to join the transnational gang as a foot soldier (Estonia) rather than a capo (UK) let alone a boss (US). And what do you think makes US and UK above others? Here's a hint: US and UK are two highest NATO spenders. What NATO expenses was Russia able to afford in the early 2000s? Sounds like they wanted to be treated as a boss while chipping in as a foot soldier.