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The way that the author is describing the Overton window as it relates to investing and finding alpha is very similar to a theme that has been talked about for
by hn_throwaway_99 4y ago
The way that the author is describing the Overton window as it relates to investing and finding alpha is very similar to a theme that has been talked about for a couple decades now by Jeremy Grantham, which he dubs "career risk".
That is, if you are an exec or money manager, being wrong when the rest of the crowd is wrong isn't that bad career-wise. But being even temporarily wrong when the rest of the crowd is making money is a guaranteed way to get canned.
Good example: in the mid 00s housing bubble, there were plenty of people who knew that mortgage lending standards were insanely low. But if you were head of a mortgage lender and said "This practice of giving a loan to anyone who can fog a mirror is crazy, we're raising our lending standards" then you would have vastly underperformed your peers for literally years before being proven right, and, most importantly, you probably would have been canned by your board long before the world got to see that your foresight was correct.
More recently, I think this is why you saw so much overinvestment during the pandemic and why now you are seeing all these tech layoffs. It always seemed like a huge stretch that pandemic conditions would continue for a long time - my favorite example is Peloton, where if you did the math of "OK, half the country owns a Peloton", it still didn't work out to their valuation or level of investment. But a greater fear for many execs was "missing the boat" if there was a more permanent shift in people's behaviors, and that if you had underinvested that your competitors would take business from you.
IMO career risk is the concept that has been the most helpful to my understanding of the "madness of crowds".