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> with TLS/SSL inspection built in (you'd need some OS API to enable that). I'm not sure of that. Provided you can add a cert to your OS, you should be able to
by 3pt14159 4y ago
> with TLS/SSL inspection built in (you'd need some OS API to enable that).
I'm not sure of that. Provided you can add a cert to your OS, you should be able to get away with a piece of protocol downgrade network gear that you can then pipe to a different (ideally, offline other than UDP receive) computer for analysis.
You'd need to disable HSTS, but other than that I think it should be the solution you're looking for. Oh, and for good measure, ethernet cable instead of wifi.
- Acinyx 4y agoAny application that uses certificate pinning would fail in this situation as that's specifically what it is trying to prevent.
- moviuro 4y agoYou "just" need the key to the encrypted traffic. You don't have to change the handshake/negotiation, you just want a copy of the key so you can decrypt the traffic. In TLS, the client authenticates server, then they both agree to use a key for the session; the OS can get a hold of this key (this is usually a bad move because then any captured traffic frames could be later decrypted).
- kccqzy 4y agoA well-designed OS API doesn't need to do MitM and therefore would work with HSTS or cert pinning enabled. Of course for obvious reasons, few commercial apps would actually use this API unless they have some other incentive.
- 3pt14159 4y agoWell, the original article was about Microsoft. Since they're the OS vendor too, I discounted that as being reliable for this use-case.