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It's a consideration for: > things turn ugly PRC's leverage start after shooting starts (like TSMC), when PRC closes air and maritime space and specifies repa

It's a consideration for: > things turn ugly PRC's leverage start after shooting starts (like TSMC), when PRC closes air and maritime space and specifies repatriation corridors will stop first on mainland for processing. International community sees all the cratered TW runways and entire TW coast except some West locations are saturated with mines and conclude, there's no other choice - can't airlift or merchant fleet into what's not accessbile. The process will be an abbreviated shitshow done as quickly as possible (Dunkirk style) because foreign nationals are already trapped in a warzone (like in openning of UKR war). Countries take repatrioting thier citizens seriously, and since PRC has ultimate veto over entry/egress to island, they have leverage, especially if there is a timer ticking down to when the island will run out of water and food. No one wants their nationals trapped and dying on hunger game island. Unless TW starts holding foreign nationals hostage, they maybe compelled by international pressure to agree to PRC coordinated evacuation points, which may include beach heads under PRC occupation (or relunctantly surrendered to PLA), where every ship that arrives to pickup evacuees is going be loaded with PLA. It's an undertaking that will require thousands of ships over weeks of intensive activity that will make the strait not engagable to defenders or outside meddlers due to intermiggling of civilian and military activies. Imagine fallout if a TW / US missile sinks a boat full of Philippinos (or imagine if PRC engineers false flag of that). Maybe international community can also convince PRC not to do this, but what incentive is there for PRC to listen? The one's that will sanction will sanction anyways and get last dibs and buy PRC some time, the ones who cooperate will get priority. Of course all speculation, but there are many exploitable dynamics inherent in TW being an island with unrecognized sovereignty.

Apocryphon 4y ago
> can't airlift or merchant fleet into what's not accessbile Couldn't the U.S. planes drop aid packages, as in other conflicts? > Countries take repatrioting thier citizens seriously, and since PRC has ultimate veto over entry/egress to island, they have leverage, especially if there is a timer ticking down to when the island will run out of water and food. Are you talking about foreign nationals unrelated to China and Taiwan? Your prior post makes it sound like there were 750k Chinese nationals working for the ROC. One would that expect that even in the event of a blockade, the PRC would give them ample time prior to evacuate the island beforehand. Or otherwise, risk an extremely delicate diplomatic situations with dozens upon dozens of nations. > Imagine fallout if a TW / US missile sinks a boat full of Philippinos (or imagine if PRC engineers false flag of that). Any such fallout would fall upon the PRC as well, as it would be seen that they started the blockade and created the situation in the first place. Actually, that raises an interesting point as well- how would TW attempts at fighting back at the blockade with force be received by the PRC? What if that missile strike sinks an actual PLAN vessel? Would that be seen as a casualty of war, or a dangerous escalation? What would the retaliation be? > Maybe international community can also convince PRC not to do this, but what incentive is there for PRC to listen? Undoing everything that past decades of soft power diplomacy has achieved?
- dirtyid 4y ago
  Airlift (airdrop even less) isn't remotely enough to sustain 24M people, that requires maritime bulk cargo and available port infra. > unrelated to China and Taiwan Yes. Foreign nationals operating on what PRC considers to be Chinese territory under rival governemnt without CCP assent. Many of whom working in NGOs/agencies specifically to undermine PRC interests. I don't how international law will categorizes them, but PRC has good argument for "not civilians". > give them ample time prior ... > sinks an actual PLAN vessel There's going to be time/opportunites assuming graduated escalation process, but TBH I presume chance of inciting spark that pushes things to 100% more likely and preferrable for PRC. Even in a blockade scenario I think PRC will preemptively destroy major TW military targets that could threaten back, which PRC can do so without much telegraphing via air/rocketry. Lesson from RU/UKR is no half measures. Blockade = PRC is starving the island and not invading, but doesn't mean it won't defang TW first, PRC won't give TW the chance for fair fight or maintain ability fight back. As far as taking hits, it would be resumption of civil war and losses would be expected including mainland strikes by TW missiles. > delicate diplomatic situations ... > undoing diplomacy Look at RU vs LIO relations now, it's unsalvageable regardless of how mild the war started. And with respect to PRC/TW the countries that plan to sanction PRC are simultaneously trying to increase TW cooperation to undermine PRC interests while their genpop perception of PRC is already in gutters, so even less reason the cooperate, regardless of why shitshow started (i.e. LIO MSM will fault PRC even if PRC responding to provocations). And third parties that cultivate relationship with TW inspite of PRC warnings are in better position to compel TW into concessions anyway. IMO another lesson from RU/UKR war is just how little diplomacy is possible between active belligerants when strong outside actors are involved, i.e. RU isn't going to convince UKR to talk, but US might.

Apocryphon 4y ago

> can't airlift or merchant fleet into what's not accessbile Couldn't the U.S. planes drop aid packages, as in other conflicts? > Countries take repatrioting thier citizens seriously, and since PRC has ultimate veto over entry/egress to island, they have leverage, especially if there is a timer ticking down to when the island will run out of water and food. Are you talking about foreign nationals unrelated to China and Taiwan? Your prior post makes it sound like there were 750k Chinese nationals working for the ROC. One would that expect that even in the event of a blockade, the PRC would give them ample time prior to evacuate the island beforehand. Or otherwise, risk an extremely delicate diplomatic situations with dozens upon dozens of nations. > Imagine fallout if a TW / US missile sinks a boat full of Philippinos (or imagine if PRC engineers false flag of that). Any such fallout would fall upon the PRC as well, as it would be seen that they started the blockade and created the situation in the first place. Actually, that raises an interesting point as well- how would TW attempts at fighting back at the blockade with force be received by the PRC? What if that missile strike sinks an actual PLAN vessel? Would that be seen as a casualty of war, or a dangerous escalation? What would the retaliation be? > Maybe international community can also convince PRC not to do this, but what incentive is there for PRC to listen? Undoing everything that past decades of soft power diplomacy has achieved?

dirtyid 4y ago
Airlift (airdrop even less) isn't remotely enough to sustain 24M people, that requires maritime bulk cargo and available port infra. > unrelated to China and Taiwan Yes. Foreign nationals operating on what PRC considers to be Chinese territory under rival governemnt without CCP assent. Many of whom working in NGOs/agencies specifically to undermine PRC interests. I don't how international law will categorizes them, but PRC has good argument for "not civilians". > give them ample time prior ... > sinks an actual PLAN vessel There's going to be time/opportunites assuming graduated escalation process, but TBH I presume chance of inciting spark that pushes things to 100% more likely and preferrable for PRC. Even in a blockade scenario I think PRC will preemptively destroy major TW military targets that could threaten back, which PRC can do so without much telegraphing via air/rocketry. Lesson from RU/UKR is no half measures. Blockade = PRC is starving the island and not invading, but doesn't mean it won't defang TW first, PRC won't give TW the chance for fair fight or maintain ability fight back. As far as taking hits, it would be resumption of civil war and losses would be expected including mainland strikes by TW missiles. > delicate diplomatic situations ... > undoing diplomacy Look at RU vs LIO relations now, it's unsalvageable regardless of how mild the war started. And with respect to PRC/TW the countries that plan to sanction PRC are simultaneously trying to increase TW cooperation to undermine PRC interests while their genpop perception of PRC is already in gutters, so even less reason the cooperate, regardless of why shitshow started (i.e. LIO MSM will fault PRC even if PRC responding to provocations). And third parties that cultivate relationship with TW inspite of PRC warnings are in better position to compel TW into concessions anyway. IMO another lesson from RU/UKR war is just how little diplomacy is possible between active belligerants when strong outside actors are involved, i.e. RU isn't going to convince UKR to talk, but US might.