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> In a trusted boot world, the two file systems for the ESP and the /boot/ partition should be considered untrusted: any code or essential data read from them m

by effie 4y ago

> In a trusted boot world, the two file systems for the ESP and the /boot/ partition should be considered untrusted: any code or essential data read from them must be authenticated cryptographically before use. In the real world, my ESP and boot partition are trusted, since I've installed them and control them and can check them for malware, and the firmware is not trusted since there is no possibility of control, it's vendor blobs. Mr. Poettering is clearly arguing for interests of the secure boot/DRM complex, not competent owners/users.

theandrewbailey 4y ago
How often do you check your unauthenticated ESP and /boot for malware? Only when you suspect malware is already there? If so, it's too late. Locking them down as suggested helps to prevent the issue altogether. Yes, firmware should not be trusted, but reducing attack surfaces is a good thing. As far as your last point, the vast majority of people aren't competent computer owners or users. They don't know what to do on a technical level with malware in their boot process.
- effie 4y ago
  > How often do you check your unauthenticated ESP and /boot for malware? I don't, because it's not something I so far cared about. But if I started caring about these sorts of attacks, I would not rely on board firmware to check software on my disks:) > vast majority of people aren't competent computer owners or users. Vast majority of people don't read HN and are not interested in the boot process. Those that do are more relevant, and I suspect many of them don't welcome Mr. Poettering's agenda. > They don't know what to do on a technical level with malware in their boot process. I'm not suggesting they should. But Mr. Poettering does not discuss origins and possible ways to solve this problem, e.g. using free software from reliable sources only and auditing software and hardware we use. He presents his (an the secure boot complex's) preferred solution to a problem that is complex and probably will try to "gently push it" on distributions like he did with systemd (his words).

by effie 4y ago

theandrewbailey 4y ago

How often do you check your unauthenticated ESP and /boot for malware? Only when you suspect malware is already there? If so, it's too late. Locking them down as suggested helps to prevent the issue altogether. Yes, firmware should not be trusted, but reducing attack surfaces is a good thing. As far as your last point, the vast majority of people aren't competent computer owners or users. They don't know what to do on a technical level with malware in their boot process.

effie 4y ago
> How often do you check your unauthenticated ESP and /boot for malware? I don't, because it's not something I so far cared about. But if I started caring about these sorts of attacks, I would not rely on board firmware to check software on my disks:) > vast majority of people aren't competent computer owners or users. Vast majority of people don't read HN and are not interested in the boot process. Those that do are more relevant, and I suspect many of them don't welcome Mr. Poettering's agenda. > They don't know what to do on a technical level with malware in their boot process. I'm not suggesting they should. But Mr. Poettering does not discuss origins and possible ways to solve this problem, e.g. using free software from reliable sources only and auditing software and hardware we use. He presents his (an the secure boot complex's) preferred solution to a problem that is complex and probably will try to "gently push it" on distributions like he did with systemd (his words).