3 ms·
So, back in early 2000's, it was common knowledge that some US gov't agency (NSA?) had managed to get a saboteur in to the SSL standardization committee. Once
by hedora 4y ago
So, back in early 2000's, it was common knowledge that some US gov't agency (NSA?) had managed to get a saboteur in to the SSL standardization committee.
Once they were outed, it was clear that all they did was push as much complexity as possible into the spec, ensuring a steady stream of vulnerabilities like this.
For instance, instead of hardcoding things that are definitely fine, they would push through a configuration knob, or champion obscure extensions to the wire protocol in the name of "generality". Whenever someone else proposed a compliciation, they would fast track it as much as possible, and simplifications were black holed.
I can't find a reference anywhere. Does anyone know what I'm (mis)remembering?
- codys 4y agoThere is this on IPSEC: https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12325.html https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12...
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- _jal 4y agoCould be most any of this activity: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/06/on-nsa/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/06/on-nsa/
- mkj 4y agoThere's some more discussion of ipsec in the thread https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2020-July/036077.html https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2020-July/03... I'd be interested to see references to SSL too (from a historical perspective)