3 ms·

You can just go to the text of the Opinion.[1] >The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject

You can just go to the text of the Opinion.[1] >The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts. >The example usually given by those who would punish speech is the case of one who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theatre. >This is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded with action. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 536—537, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1346, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (Douglas, J., concurring.) They are indeed inseparable and a prosecution can be launched for the overt acts actually caused. Apart from rare instances of that kind, speech is, I think, immune from prosecution. Certainly there is no constitutional line between advocacy of abstract ideas as in Yates and advocacy of political action as in Scales. The quality of advocacy turns on the depth of the conviction; and government has no power to invade that sanctuary of belief and conscience. [1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444

foldr 4y ago
The part you quote appears to say that it would be permissible to prosecute someone for the consequences of deliberately shouting ‘fire!’ when they knew that there was no fire (because it’s one of the rare cases where speech is ‘brigaded with action’). In other words, the court rejected the applicability of the analogy to the case at hand. They didn’t draw the conclusion that deliberately causing stampedes in theaters is protected by the First Amendment.
- remarkEon 4y ago
  Right, that’s my interpretation as well. I think the real point is something more simple like “you cannot falsely report a fire” (I mean, you can, but you’ll get charged with a crime). The reference to the theater seems to kind of cloud the analogy a lot - and serves to confuse the association with free speech generally.

foldr 4y ago

The part you quote appears to say that it would be permissible to prosecute someone for the consequences of deliberately shouting ‘fire!’ when they knew that there was no fire (because it’s one of the rare cases where speech is ‘brigaded with action’). In other words, the court rejected the applicability of the analogy to the case at hand. They didn’t draw the conclusion that deliberately causing stampedes in theaters is protected by the First Amendment.

remarkEon 4y ago
Right, that’s my interpretation as well. I think the real point is something more simple like “you cannot falsely report a fire” (I mean, you can, but you’ll get charged with a crime). The reference to the theater seems to kind of cloud the analogy a lot - and serves to confuse the association with free speech generally.