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I've mentioned before how loud an argument we got into with a guy who aspired to being a hacker, and yet didn't understand that the magnetic domains on a HDD we
by hinkley 4y ago
I've mentioned before how loud an argument we got into with a guy who aspired to being a hacker, and yet didn't understand that the magnetic domains on a HDD were essentially analog. Even after we asked him why, if hard drives were truly binary, that secure disk erase tools were so complex and slow he still insisted that everything was binary, soup to nuts.
Even the simplest things are a fiction. Or maybe I should say especially the simplest things are a fiction.
- coldtea 4y ago>Even after we asked him why, if hard drives were truly binary, that secure disk erase tools were so complex and slow he still insisted that everything was binary Well, the argument was bad though: whether hard drives are analog is orthogonal to why "secure disk erase tools are so complex and slow". I see what you meant ("if they were digital you could just tell them to flip to zero and that would be easy and fast"). Sure, but there are many other reasons why secure disk erase tools could be complex and slow even in an imagined all-digital disk (and of course the imaginary digital substrate operations could just be a slow tech, the way RAM is slower than Lx caches, etc.). And while for delete you just need to change some directory entries to mark as none, for "secure erase" you'd also want to "reset" every bit, so at least similar time to the work you do when you write a file of same size.
- charcircuit 4y ago>that secure disk erase tools were so complex It's security theater. All you have to do is write 0s to the entire HDD.
- yellowapple 4y agoIt depends on the value of your data. It's theoretically possible to use specialized equipment to find remnants of the data even after having been zero'd out (by taking out the platters and very carefully poring over the ever-so-slight analog-induced discrepancies in what "0" and "1" look like), but unless your attacker is the NSA you probably don't have to worry about that (and if your attacker is the NSA, you're probably already using full-disk encryption anyway, which largely renders disk erasure a moot point).
- charcircuit 4y ago>It's theoretically possible to use specialized equipment to find remnants of the data even after having been zero'd out No, this is not possible neither in theory nor in practice. >by taking out the platters and very carefully poring over the ever-so-slight analog-induced discrepancies in what "0" and "1" look like Even doing this is not enough to recover the data. What 0 and 1 look like isn't even constant. There is variability in what the current value is set to and their is variability in what the previous value was set to. There is too much randomness to recover the original data. >which largely renders disk erasure a moot point Disk erasure in this case can still be useful. In this case you only have to overwrite the master key. The idea that overwritten data can be recovered is an urban legend that is not based off reality, and simply wastes people's time and contributes to ewaste from people destroying harddrives. For just wiping data overwriting it with anything is fine. If you plan on using the disk for FDE you should overwrite the drive with random bytes so that you don't leak the size of the used disk space.
- yellowapple 4y ago> No, this is not possible neither in theory nor in practice. Then go tell that to Peter Gutmann: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/publications/library/proceedings/sec96/full_papers/gutmann/index.html https://www.usenix.org/legacy/publications/library/proceedin... The saving grace here is that newer drives are a lot denser than the ones in common use back then, so data recovery in this fashion is prohibitively expensive for anything manufactured in the last decade or so. You basically need to be more precise in your reads than hard drives themselves - and that's a pretty tall order. Still, technology does march on; there remains a risk that recovery techniques could catch up, and there are indeed folks who need absolute guarantees of erasure - and there ain't much more absolute than physical destruction. > What 0 and 1 look like isn't even constant. There is variability in what the current value is set to and their is variability in what the previous value was set to. It's exactly that variability that makes data recovery possible. > simply wastes people's time and contributes to ewaste from people destroying harddrives. It doesn't really do either. Again: this is really only relevant if you're being targeted by the sorts of nation-state-level intelligence agencies that have the time, resources, and expertise for this sort of thing - and when you're such a target, guaranteed data destruction matters a lot more than the amount of e-waste you generate. > If you plan on using the disk for FDE you should overwrite the drive with random bytes so that you don't leak the size of the used disk space. This doesn't always work - for example, if you want to use TRIM on SSDs, since unused blocks are zero'd out instead of left as-is. The usual recommendation there for maximum security is "just don't use TRIM", with the SSD performance and longevity implications that entails.