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> My self is whatever is making decisions. If some scientist somewhere chops words and slices definitions and does some measurements and declares that my "self"

> My self is whatever is making decisions. If some scientist somewhere chops words and slices definitions and does some measurements and declares that my "self" isn't what is "making decisions", then they've been misled by bad philosophy into making stupid statements. And I use the word "stupid" carefully. I think you’re missing the point. If you just define away “self” as whatever turns out to be making decisions, then sure, you can claim to never be surprised by anything. If we literally discovered that all your decisions are being made by a physical computer in a laboratory and instructions are sent to your body with radio waves, you could just say “well that’s what my ‘self’ is by definition, so this isn’t surprising at all.”

jerf 4y ago
No, that is my point, and you are correct. Discovering that things didn't work the way you thought are not a challenge to the fact that I am conscious. Of course, when I phrase it so baldly, you might be inclined to say "Well, of course", in which I would suggest, apparently you are agreeing with me. But this slight-of-hand occurs a lot, when you aren't so clear with the statements. This is only a challenge to "anyone who places a lot of importance on that feeling of identity" if they placed all their importance on secondary opinions of what that identity is. Don't do that. Your identity should not be tied up in "I'm a conscious being because my neurons in my hemidimi cortex fires and directs my globocampus to plan how to start moving my finger", because then you have an identity crisis when it turns out "hemidimi" and "globocampus" are just made up concepts with no referents in reality. But there's a lot of people who will get very excited or try to get you very excited when it turns out they disprove the existence of hemidimis and globocampuses and declare this is all deep and profound and stuff. It's not. It was an error in the identity, that's all, but you're still a conscious being. So, yes, I'm disagreeing. This isn't profound at all. Or at least, it shouldn't be, if you aren't making fundamental category errors, if not outright reveling in fuzziness and uncertainty.
- tshaddox 4y ago
  The thing is, if nothing you learn about reality can possibly cause you to change your mind about how you describe the nature of yourself, then your description of yourself doesn't seem very useful. If your claims like "I am conscious," "I have free will," etc. are compatible with all realities, then the claims don't really seem to have any epistemological status whatsoever.

jerf 4y ago

No, that is my point, and you are correct. Discovering that things didn't work the way you thought are not a challenge to the fact that I am conscious. Of course, when I phrase it so baldly, you might be inclined to say "Well, of course", in which I would suggest, apparently you are agreeing with me. But this slight-of-hand occurs a lot, when you aren't so clear with the statements. This is only a challenge to "anyone who places a lot of importance on that feeling of identity" if they placed all their importance on secondary opinions of what that identity is. Don't do that. Your identity should not be tied up in "I'm a conscious being because my neurons in my hemidimi cortex fires and directs my globocampus to plan how to start moving my finger", because then you have an identity crisis when it turns out "hemidimi" and "globocampus" are just made up concepts with no referents in reality. But there's a lot of people who will get very excited or try to get you very excited when it turns out they disprove the existence of hemidimis and globocampuses and declare this is all deep and profound and stuff. It's not. It was an error in the identity, that's all, but you're still a conscious being. So, yes, I'm disagreeing. This isn't profound at all. Or at least, it shouldn't be, if you aren't making fundamental category errors, if not outright reveling in fuzziness and uncertainty.

tshaddox 4y ago
The thing is, if nothing you learn about reality can possibly cause you to change your mind about how you describe the nature of yourself, then your description of yourself doesn't seem very useful. If your claims like "I am conscious," "I have free will," etc. are compatible with all realities, then the claims don't really seem to have any epistemological status whatsoever.