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There is something ironic about the FOSS projects these days embracing attestation rather than standing up for user rights by vehemently rejecting it.
by stevewatson301 4y ago
There is something ironic about the FOSS projects these days embracing attestation rather than standing up for user rights by vehemently rejecting it.
- pilif 4y agoIf you were responsible for the security of your enterprise network, would you vehemently fight for your user's rights to run the ransomware executable they just get sent over email?
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- bakugo 4y agoThis may come as a shock to you, but computers exist outside of a corporate context.
- pilif 4y agoI'm aware of that and those computers do not need to use any of these features. But if you're a FOSS project, why should you be advocating for security features to not exist if they provide value for a significant part of their user-base?
- fazfq 4y agoWhy is attestation against user rights?
- stevewatson301 4y agoIn addition to replies to my original comment, see [1] and [2] for the perils that attestation poses against user rights. [1] https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/loyal-computers.en.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/loyal-computers.en.html [2] https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html
- Arch-TK 4y agoI know my reasons for feeling worried about it but I wonder why you also dislike the idea of end user operating systems making it trivial for applications to take advantage of remote attestation?
- no_time 4y agoBecause it can snowball from "you may not access Widevine content on an unapproved device", which is of little significance to "you may not connect to the internet on a non government approved device" which is extremely dangerous.
- Arch-TK 4y agoIt's good to know that other people can see the writing on the wall too. I've told people that this is being made possible. While it is not a guarantee that the availability of the technology will lead to the use of the technology in such a manner, the fact that it will be possible means it's just a matter of time before someone insists on doing this under the pretext of security. The saving grace is that attestations can be forwarded but I'm sure even this will eventually get solved. (And the sheer fact they can be forwarded doesn't diminish the dangers of this use of the technology.)
- no_time 4y ago>The saving grace is that attestations can be forwarded That would require you to have root on a "trusted" device so you can extract the challenge-response that proves you are indeed "trusted". Which is becoming increasingly harder with each iteration.
- TeMPOraL 4y agoTo preempt the "but slippery slope!" counters, where we're currently at is "you may not use your bank's mobile app on a phone that isn't running genuine, unmodded, unrooted version of the hardware and OS it came with". This is the reality of modern Android devices. And it's not worse only because, like with any API, adoption of new-and-improved Safenet / Play $forgot-the-name APIs takes time. The slippery slope is not a fallacy if the slope is, in fact, slippery.
- bitwize 4y agoIt's called "defense in depth". A signed, attestable boot path is how you get defense in depth against malware attacks. Period. All computing is headed this way.