3 ms·
Always the first question is: what's your threat model? For personal stuff, I can't do much about sophisticated attackers, pretty much only about random physic
by neilv 4y ago
Always the first question is: what's your threat model?
For personal stuff, I can't do much about sophisticated attackers, pretty much only about random physical thieves who mostly just want the hardware.
Most likely scenario involving encryption: a laptop is lost/stolen, and some random thief/fence/buyer snoops around the drive to see if there's anything worth stealing. There isn't, but I'd feel violated to have some thief sifting through my personal stuff.
So, on laptops, I just use Linux LUKS.
On my custom Coreboot laptops, I have even the boot partition encrypted for LUKS, which seemed like a good idea at the time (I was peeved about Intel ME, and on a roll), but it's overkill for the random laptop thief threat. It also means I can't just move the drive to a system that doesn't have Coreboot with that feature set up.
Also, in general, try not to deny yourself access to your own data when you need it, in the process of denying it to others.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]