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If the encryption is good, shouldn't it be fine to say that you use it? E.g. I need to share my public PGP key, but it does not make me particularly vulnerable,
by palata 4y ago
If the encryption is good, shouldn't it be fine to say that you use it? E.g. I need to share my public PGP key, but it does not make me particularly vulnerable, does it?
- hatware 4y agoOpSec (Operational Security) is a huge part of the game. If you want to reduce attack surface you probably want to give adversaries as little to go off of as possible.
- mentis22 4y ago
- Sohcahtoa82 4y agoI remain unconvinced. Just look at TLS. Anybody who can sniff a TLS connection can tell exactly what encryption is being used, yet we consider TLS to be quite secure other than potential concerns with PKI. That said, I'd be slightly surprised if there wasn't metadata on the drive that could be used to determine which brand of disk encryption is in use, but it'd still be worthless. If the knowledge that I'm using X to encrypt my drive actually leads to them decrypting my drive, then X was terrible and never should have been used to begin with.
- nl 4y agoExplain exactly what attack vector not posting what encryption software you use is supposed to protect against? * If you are attacked by an adversary with access to your hardware they can tell what encryption you are using. * If you are attacked by an adversary without access to your hardware then knowing what you use doesn't given them any advantage. On the other hand, telling people they shouldn't provide recommendations for encryption software is just the kind of thing an adversary might do...
- Arainach 4y agoThe folks who are using hidden volumes and going full paranoid aren't the ones responding here. Most methods are fairly obvious. My backup hard drive has the Veracrypt installer and a file that ends in .hc. I wonder what setup I'm using? If I went a degree more obtuse and just had a 200GB file consisting of a header and a bunch of cryptographically random data, it wouldn't take the NSA to understand what was going on. The same applies to Bitlocker/LUKS. My encryption setup isn't designed to stop state-level actors. It's designed to stop anyone who has access to one of my backups or who steals one of my machines. Bitlocker (with the key backed up to the cloud) and Veracrypt (for offline backups) fit those needs purposely. If a government agent asked me for the key to decrypt my backup drive I would surrender it without a fuss.