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There are a variety of different approaches to counter the ABM and ragged second strike scenario, China is investing in several. * Just build more nukes. Addin

There are a variety of different approaches to counter the ABM and ragged second strike scenario, China is investing in several. * Just build more nukes. Adding more warheads, especially ground-launched ones, is cheaper than adding more interceptors to the ABM shield, so it's always a losing game. Thankfully, no one seems to be pursuing this route, since that is massively destabilizing. * Make it harder to take out all of your missiles in a first strike. Your link is an excellent example of this. Building additional silos is even cheaper than building additional missiles, and then you can play a shell game where you don't know which silo houses a missile and which does not so you have to strike at them all. There are other basing options available, like road-mobile launchers, which China and Russia have both invested in, though this is easier with shorter range ballistic missiles. And of course there are ballistic missile submarines, which give most survivable second-strike capability, but are much more expensive to operate. * Use a delivery system that is harder to intercept, which I mentioned before. China has tested using both hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment, in fact both at the same time (https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1213655/a-fractional-orbital-bombardment-system-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/ https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1213655/a-fractional... ).

chipsa 4y ago
> Adding more warheads, especially ground-launched ones, is cheaper than adding more interceptors to the ABM shield Assumes facts not in evidence. An accidental ICBM launch is catastrophic. An accidental ABM launch is merely expensive. This drives anything associated with ICBMs to a much higher cost, just to assure that it will launch when commanded, and won't launch when not commanded. Interceptors are generally smaller (due to the smaller kill vehicle), which also helps with the cost. GBI, last I looked, was about $90M per missile. GBSD is currently looking at about $660M per missile ($264B for 400 missiles). This doesn't actually compare how much a Russian ICBM would cost, but that's irrelevant, in a sense, since they wouldn't be paying the same for an ABM interceptor either. > hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment These both have severe penalties to the actual number of warheads launched on a given missile. Now instead of having 6 missiles, for example, to hit a given set of targets, you might need 18 missiles. Which drives up the cost of ICBM system. Both of them can also be defended against (GBI can't manage against FOB with the current single defense site, but a potential expansion could bring the radars and launchers required to be able to defend against a southern approach). Hypersonics are very fast in the atmosphere, which helps limit their radar visibility, but the same thing makes it impossible to deploy effective decoys, and makes them extremely bright in IR, which is something we already look at from space. I don't think we have anything that can currently do it, but it's definitely on the list of things we're looking at.
- openasocket 4y ago
  Your math is a little off on the prices. Recall that the GBSD will release 10-12 MIRVs, which means the ABM shield has to intercept 10-12 targets, not one, for every ICBM. And standard operating procedure is to fire 4 interceptors at each target to ensure a hit. That means for each GBSD we need 40 interceptors, making it over 5 times more expensive to intercept a GBSD than the GBSD itself. Of course, just comparing missile costs isn't the best, they do not operate on their own. Each interceptor needs a silo, ground crew, intercept radars, etc. ICBMs need silos and ground crews also. The cost to operate an ICBM or ABM shield over its lifetime will dominate the total costs compared to the initial missile price.
  - chipsa 4y ago
    GBSD is currently programmed to be a single warhead missile [0]. The fire plan for GBI is "shoot-shoot-look-shoot-shoot". There's no requirement for the second "shoot-shoot" to actually occur, and in case of a mass launch, wouldn't occur because we'd run out of GBIs first. GBIs and GBSD do both need silos and ground crews, but the state of them is to a different degree. GBI needs a silo to protect it from weather, but it doesn't necessarily need to be a nuclear hardened silo, because if it comes to that, the silo should already be empty. The ICBM silo does need to be hardened against nuclear weapons. Similarly, the ground crew for the entire ABM field can be centralized, because you don't need them to be multiply survivable to launch after the end of the world, but you do need for an ICBM launch control center to be redundant and nuclear hardened. Each interceptor shares radars, however, so you don't need more with more interceptors. It's a fixed cost for the entire system, given the region you're looking at. This is semi-irrelevant, as our opposition doesn't pay US prices, and their ability to afford more ICBMs is not related to US prices. The only countries which do pay US prices are the US and UK. Also, this assumes the ABM shield needs perfection. If you're trying merely to save as many lives as possible, then the existence of the ABM system requires the opponent to prioritize which targets they want to hit. The high priority targets will need to have many warheads targeted on them, while the lower priority targets won't have any, because they don't have the budget for that. And the more warheads we can intercept, the more warheads they have to drop on their high priority targets, because they don't know which ones will actually get intercepted. If we can intercept on average 15 warheads (75% effectiveness with "shoot-shoot"), then they have to drop 16 warheads on each high priority target. If we double the number of warheads we can intercept, then they need to double the warheads they drop on their high priority target. This is why the UK strategic deterrent is roughly targeted only on Moscow, according to open-source knowledge, instead of the early 60s version that hit most of Russia. [0]: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11681 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11681 > The Air Force plans to deploy the GBSD (Sentinel) with one warhead per missile
_0w8t 4y ago
The problem with nukes is that one cannot make them small while there no corresponding limits on downsizing of sensors to detect them. While we are still some way of mosquito-size device to detect presence of a nuclear warhead, the path is there. So ultimately one must assumes that all warhead decoys or empty silos will be detected and real warheads will be tracked. Which unfortunately leaves production of massive number of warheads the only sure path of deterrence.

chipsa 4y ago

> Adding more warheads, especially ground-launched ones, is cheaper than adding more interceptors to the ABM shield Assumes facts not in evidence. An accidental ICBM launch is catastrophic. An accidental ABM launch is merely expensive. This drives anything associated with ICBMs to a much higher cost, just to assure that it will launch when commanded, and won't launch when not commanded. Interceptors are generally smaller (due to the smaller kill vehicle), which also helps with the cost. GBI, last I looked, was about $90M per missile. GBSD is currently looking at about $660M per missile ($264B for 400 missiles). This doesn't actually compare how much a Russian ICBM would cost, but that's irrelevant, in a sense, since they wouldn't be paying the same for an ABM interceptor either. > hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment These both have severe penalties to the actual number of warheads launched on a given missile. Now instead of having 6 missiles, for example, to hit a given set of targets, you might need 18 missiles. Which drives up the cost of ICBM system. Both of them can also be defended against (GBI can't manage against FOB with the current single defense site, but a potential expansion could bring the radars and launchers required to be able to defend against a southern approach). Hypersonics are very fast in the atmosphere, which helps limit their radar visibility, but the same thing makes it impossible to deploy effective decoys, and makes them extremely bright in IR, which is something we already look at from space. I don't think we have anything that can currently do it, but it's definitely on the list of things we're looking at.

openasocket 4y ago
Your math is a little off on the prices. Recall that the GBSD will release 10-12 MIRVs, which means the ABM shield has to intercept 10-12 targets, not one, for every ICBM. And standard operating procedure is to fire 4 interceptors at each target to ensure a hit. That means for each GBSD we need 40 interceptors, making it over 5 times more expensive to intercept a GBSD than the GBSD itself. Of course, just comparing missile costs isn't the best, they do not operate on their own. Each interceptor needs a silo, ground crew, intercept radars, etc. ICBMs need silos and ground crews also. The cost to operate an ICBM or ABM shield over its lifetime will dominate the total costs compared to the initial missile price.
- chipsa 4y ago
  GBSD is currently programmed to be a single warhead missile [0]. The fire plan for GBI is "shoot-shoot-look-shoot-shoot". There's no requirement for the second "shoot-shoot" to actually occur, and in case of a mass launch, wouldn't occur because we'd run out of GBIs first. GBIs and GBSD do both need silos and ground crews, but the state of them is to a different degree. GBI needs a silo to protect it from weather, but it doesn't necessarily need to be a nuclear hardened silo, because if it comes to that, the silo should already be empty. The ICBM silo does need to be hardened against nuclear weapons. Similarly, the ground crew for the entire ABM field can be centralized, because you don't need them to be multiply survivable to launch after the end of the world, but you do need for an ICBM launch control center to be redundant and nuclear hardened. Each interceptor shares radars, however, so you don't need more with more interceptors. It's a fixed cost for the entire system, given the region you're looking at. This is semi-irrelevant, as our opposition doesn't pay US prices, and their ability to afford more ICBMs is not related to US prices. The only countries which do pay US prices are the US and UK. Also, this assumes the ABM shield needs perfection. If you're trying merely to save as many lives as possible, then the existence of the ABM system requires the opponent to prioritize which targets they want to hit. The high priority targets will need to have many warheads targeted on them, while the lower priority targets won't have any, because they don't have the budget for that. And the more warheads we can intercept, the more warheads they have to drop on their high priority targets, because they don't know which ones will actually get intercepted. If we can intercept on average 15 warheads (75% effectiveness with "shoot-shoot"), then they have to drop 16 warheads on each high priority target. If we double the number of warheads we can intercept, then they need to double the warheads they drop on their high priority target. This is why the UK strategic deterrent is roughly targeted only on Moscow, according to open-source knowledge, instead of the early 60s version that hit most of Russia. [0]: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11681 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11681 > The Air Force plans to deploy the GBSD (Sentinel) with one warhead per missile

_0w8t 4y ago

The problem with nukes is that one cannot make them small while there no corresponding limits on downsizing of sensors to detect them. While we are still some way of mosquito-size device to detect presence of a nuclear warhead, the path is there. So ultimately one must assumes that all warhead decoys or empty silos will be detected and real warheads will be tracked. Which unfortunately leaves production of massive number of warheads the only sure path of deterrence.