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The article touches on this in an off-hand dismissive line, but anti-missile technology is destabilizing. If the anti-missile system is effective, then it allo

The article touches on this in an off-hand dismissive line, but anti-missile technology is destabilizing. If the anti-missile system is effective, then it allows for a first strike without retaliation. I.e., anti-missile systems are offensive weapons. The largest constraint against using nuclear weapons in a first strike is removed for the party with the effective anti-missile system. Even if it doesn't work well, or at all, you now need your adversary to believe that you spent billions on an ineffective weapons system. If your adversary is not convinced of this, then they have every incentive to react to (possibly false) alarms sooner. Incidents like the following might have ended differently: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alar... https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-03-16/false-warnings-soviet-missile-attacks-during-1979-80-led-alert-actions-us-strategic-forces https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-0... https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/false-alarm-missile-alerts.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/false-alarm-missile-al...

ceejayoz 4y ago
> If the anti-missile system is effective, then it allows for a first strike without retaliation. That's a big if. Current and near-future ABM systems can take out a handful; great if Iran or North Korea decide to take a potshot, but those are opponents the US can essentially take out in a first strike without nukes if they don't mind the massive blowback. The US has no hope of intercepting all of Russia's or China's nukes anytime soon.
- sudosysgen 4y ago
  There is nothing inherently stopping Iran or North Korea to build a few dozen MIRV-capable missiles.
  - chipsa 4y ago
    Aside from the fact that releasing more than one thing from a space launch vehicle accurately is actually a fair hard thing to do. Which is why multiple satellite buses are considered dual use technology, and export of them is prohibited. Release of said tech to China back in the 90s is considered to be a large player in why they have MIRV ICBMs.
jjk166 4y ago
> If the anti-missile system is effective, then it allows for a first strike without retaliation. I.e., anti-missile systems are offensive weapons. This is simply false. An effective missile defense system is not necessarily capable of defeating an entire nuclear arsenal of a peer power - easily verified if the number of interceptors is substantially smaller than that power's inventory. The nuclear defense triad extends beyond just ground launched ballistic missiles - bombers, cruise missiles, and submarine launched missiles all offer means to retaliate which a missile defense system alone can not defend against. And finally, the adversary can also develop an antiballistic missile system for exactly the same protection. Of course in the real world such a perfect missile defense system is not possible - realistically there's always going to be too big a risk of some nukes getting through for any rational actor to seriously consider a nuclear exchange. As for the irrational actor, they can not be trusted to avoid mutually assured destruction. It's like saying a city wall is an offensive weapon because the one city with a wall can attack others without being attacked. Yeah, maybe the very first city to build a wall had a bit of an advantage before everybody else built a wall, but anyone can have a wall without putting anybody in danger. > If your adversary is not convinced of this, then they have every incentive to react to (possibly false) alarms sooner. Without a missile defense system, your only hope of surviving nuclear war is taking out your adversary's retaliatory capability - this means a first strike is primarily going to be tasked with doing just that and thus makes launching quickly in response to an incoming strike a necessity. Even if there is a chance it's a false alarm, a limited retaliation might be seen as a more survivable option than waiting to confirm. If on the other hand your opponent has an effective missile defense system, then they have far less incentive to try and suckerpunch you, and thus an unexpected strike can be much more safely labelled a false alarm. Certainly there is no incentive to retaliate faster - what is that going to do but waste missiles? You don't overwhelm a missile defense system with quick retaliation but with massive retaliation. While nowadays some military commanders might entertain the notion of a limited nuclear conflict where a small strike warrants only a proportional retaliation, with missile defenses it's unambiguous that once nuclear war is triggered people will launch everything they've got in an effort to guarantee at least some warheads make it through, and thus reinforces mutually assured destruction.
- gpderetta 4y ago
baybal2 4y ago
chipsa 4y ago
The US doesn't conduct a nuclear first strike, not because it fears getting nuked in return, but because it doesn't want to be seen as the bad guy. The presence or absence of a missile defense system doesn't change this. Also, there's an entire paragraph on why even an effective system won't change this, so long as it's not perfectly effective (which it can't be), because we still end up with one or more nukes landing in the US, and the acceptable number for that is politically 0.
- w0de0 4y ago
  Though I agree with you that the US would not do such a thing, such assertions - even if written into state policy - cannot reassure an adversary. The US is, in fact, the only state which has used nuclear weapons in combat - it was the very first strike.
  - chipsa 4y ago
    True, but the change in US attitudes towards being willing to conduct a first strike, and/or being willing to lose a city to a nuke, won't come quickly or secretly.
  - to11mtm 4y ago
    > it was the very first strike ... 'very first strike' sounds a bit too loaded in the context of Hiroshima/Nagasaki and WW2 as a whole. It may have been a rash action, perhaps a 'first nuclear strike'. 'very first strike' sounds loaded to the extreme when we consider it was one of the last actions in a multi-year contracted conflict.
- gpderetta 4y ago
  If you ever do a first strike, the world the next will changed in such a profound way that would it even matter if you are seeing as the bad guy? Any leftover sense of moral and sanity is probably more likely to be relevant. Tactical use of nukes, as opposed to a strategic first strike, is different of course.

ceejayoz 4y ago

> If the anti-missile system is effective, then it allows for a first strike without retaliation. That's a big if. Current and near-future ABM systems can take out a handful; great if Iran or North Korea decide to take a potshot, but those are opponents the US can essentially take out in a first strike without nukes if they don't mind the massive blowback. The US has no hope of intercepting all of Russia's or China's nukes anytime soon.

sudosysgen 4y ago
There is nothing inherently stopping Iran or North Korea to build a few dozen MIRV-capable missiles.
- chipsa 4y ago
  Aside from the fact that releasing more than one thing from a space launch vehicle accurately is actually a fair hard thing to do. Which is why multiple satellite buses are considered dual use technology, and export of them is prohibited. Release of said tech to China back in the 90s is considered to be a large player in why they have MIRV ICBMs.

jjk166 4y ago

> If the anti-missile system is effective, then it allows for a first strike without retaliation. I.e., anti-missile systems are offensive weapons. This is simply false. An effective missile defense system is not necessarily capable of defeating an entire nuclear arsenal of a peer power - easily verified if the number of interceptors is substantially smaller than that power's inventory. The nuclear defense triad extends beyond just ground launched ballistic missiles - bombers, cruise missiles, and submarine launched missiles all offer means to retaliate which a missile defense system alone can not defend against. And finally, the adversary can also develop an antiballistic missile system for exactly the same protection. Of course in the real world such a perfect missile defense system is not possible - realistically there's always going to be too big a risk of some nukes getting through for any rational actor to seriously consider a nuclear exchange. As for the irrational actor, they can not be trusted to avoid mutually assured destruction. It's like saying a city wall is an offensive weapon because the one city with a wall can attack others without being attacked. Yeah, maybe the very first city to build a wall had a bit of an advantage before everybody else built a wall, but anyone can have a wall without putting anybody in danger. > If your adversary is not convinced of this, then they have every incentive to react to (possibly false) alarms sooner. Without a missile defense system, your only hope of surviving nuclear war is taking out your adversary's retaliatory capability - this means a first strike is primarily going to be tasked with doing just that and thus makes launching quickly in response to an incoming strike a necessity. Even if there is a chance it's a false alarm, a limited retaliation might be seen as a more survivable option than waiting to confirm. If on the other hand your opponent has an effective missile defense system, then they have far less incentive to try and suckerpunch you, and thus an unexpected strike can be much more safely labelled a false alarm. Certainly there is no incentive to retaliate faster - what is that going to do but waste missiles? You don't overwhelm a missile defense system with quick retaliation but with massive retaliation. While nowadays some military commanders might entertain the notion of a limited nuclear conflict where a small strike warrants only a proportional retaliation, with missile defenses it's unambiguous that once nuclear war is triggered people will launch everything they've got in an effort to guarantee at least some warheads make it through, and thus reinforces mutually assured destruction.

gpderetta 4y ago

baybal2 4y ago

chipsa 4y ago

The US doesn't conduct a nuclear first strike, not because it fears getting nuked in return, but because it doesn't want to be seen as the bad guy. The presence or absence of a missile defense system doesn't change this. Also, there's an entire paragraph on why even an effective system won't change this, so long as it's not perfectly effective (which it can't be), because we still end up with one or more nukes landing in the US, and the acceptable number for that is politically 0.

w0de0 4y ago
Though I agree with you that the US would not do such a thing, such assertions - even if written into state policy - cannot reassure an adversary. The US is, in fact, the only state which has used nuclear weapons in combat - it was the very first strike.
- chipsa 4y ago
  True, but the change in US attitudes towards being willing to conduct a first strike, and/or being willing to lose a city to a nuke, won't come quickly or secretly.
- to11mtm 4y ago
  > it was the very first strike ... 'very first strike' sounds a bit too loaded in the context of Hiroshima/Nagasaki and WW2 as a whole. It may have been a rash action, perhaps a 'first nuclear strike'. 'very first strike' sounds loaded to the extreme when we consider it was one of the last actions in a multi-year contracted conflict.
gpderetta 4y ago
If you ever do a first strike, the world the next will changed in such a profound way that would it even matter if you are seeing as the bad guy? Any leftover sense of moral and sanity is probably more likely to be relevant. Tactical use of nukes, as opposed to a strategic first strike, is different of course.