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If you wanted something like certificate transparency for a DNS PKI, you wouldn't want an exact copy of WebPKI's CT system as it exists right now. That wouldn't
by wizeman 4y ago
If you wanted something like certificate transparency for a DNS PKI, you wouldn't want an exact copy of WebPKI's CT system as it exists right now. That wouldn't work, obviously! That's not the point at all.
In fact, a certificate transparency-like system for DNS PKI would probably be a lot easier and more scalable to implement, as you'd need to store a log of at most 1 DNSKEY and/or DS records per TLD per day (as per their usual TTL), or much less actually, because those DNSKEYs don't actually change often, I believe.
You don't even need the TLDs' cooperation to do it, as those public keys are publicly available, unlike certificates issued by certificate authorities!
You'd then need a way to check that the keys match what you've got from the upstream DNS server. You could probably implement this at the DNS server and DNSSEC resolver level. You'd return an error if the keys that you've got aren't available in the log. You could discard old keys, so a locally-stored copy of the log would be really small and wouldn't keep growing indefinitely.
The point is, something like this would be doable and has nothing to do with all the other points I've been making which are a lot more important.
- tptacek 4y agoYou're trying, and failing (you don't have all the available keys, because servers can selectively change their responses) to design a transparency scheme for the DNS PKI, one that does not currently exist, which is deliberately different than Certificate Transparency, now that you've learned that Certificate Transparency won't work for DNSSEC. You've vindicated my argument.
- wizeman 4y ago> you don't have all the available keys, because servers can selectively change their responses Well, that's the entire point of the log, isn't it? To make sure that everybody is seeing the same keys. If the keys you got from the upstream link in the DNS chain doesn't match the one in the log, you reject them, because you are being spoofed. > to design a transparency scheme for the DNS PKI, one that does not currently exist, which is deliberately different than Certificate Transparency > now that you've learned that Certificate Transparency won't work for DNSSEC It wouldn't work exactly like it is, obviously, which is why I've been saying "CT-like" system, not the exact same CT incantation that exists right now which was explicitly designed for WebPKI, not a DNS PKI. Your argument is like saying in the year 2002: "electric vehicles can't possibly work because gas stations are not designed for electric vehicles". Well, not exactly a sound argument you have there, now is it? :) > You've vindicated my argument. I highly doubt that :)