7 ms·

I'm not saying it exists right now, I'm saying it could be created for a DNS PKI system if it was found to be necessary (like you seem to be implying)?

tptacek 4y ago
Will it have blackjack, and hookers? :) I'm not trying to be a jerk, I'm just saying, this thing you're talking about doesn't exist. Moreover: it's unlikely ever to exist. CT didn't get rolled out because the CA's wanted CT; I assume they actively detest it (other than LetsEncrypt). CT got rolled out because the browsers required it. The browsers have no leverage to make the DNS PKI do anything, because, once again, they can't revoke .COM.
- wizeman 4y ago
  If your attacker is .COM then you already lost, with or without DNSSEC, with or without the current CA PKI system.
  - tptacek 4y ago
    Then you've already lost, because your attacker controls .COM.
  - pornel 4y ago
    Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. With WebPKI we have multiple mutually-distrusting parties keeping each other in check. It has become a better system.
    - wizeman 4y ago
      > Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. It's not more power, it's the same power it already has! This too-big-to-fail monopolist you're talking about can already hijack your domain, regardless of whatever WebPKI does. > CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. Sorry, but I don't follow. Given DANE, CAs wouldn't even exist. Unless you're talking about the transition period, which would be strictly better than what we have now, because the not-yet-transitioned domains would use WebPKI like today, while the already-transitioned domains would use DANE which has superior guarantees.
      - pornel 4y ago
        Currently Verisign can't sell certs directly, and would be caught by a CT log/report if they hijacked DNS to do this. If DANE was used, they could do whatever they want. I don't think the fact that Verisign has already too much power is a good reason to lean on them even more. I'm not talking about transition period. DANE makes TLD owners effectively a CAs. The technical details are different, but the role of root-trust-anchored private-key-holding ownership-attesting authority is the same. And unlike WebPKI CAs, browsers can't remove DNSSEC roots for abuse of trust. DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. This isn't just a technical problem of a protocol for securing packets. It's also a meta problem of ensuring the organizations involved behave in a trustworthy way, even when it would be profitable to cheat, even when NSA and other 3-letter agencies put pressure on them.
        wizeman 4y ago
        > Currently Verisign can't sell certs directly, and would be caught by a CT log/report if they hijacked DNS to do this. And then what? Like you said, browsers can't remove Verisign for abuse of trust, because Verisign isn't part of their roots of trust. And they can't remove the certificate authority who issued the certificate because 1) the certificate authority is not at fault in that scenario, and 2) Verisign could just use another one to issue a new certificate. Whatever answer you give here would apply to DANE as well. > If DANE was used, they could do whatever they want See above: they can already do whatever they want, so you wouldn't be leaning on them more than you are right now. > DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. We already have a centralized system of trust, called the DNS system. It's just that currently it is still relatively insecure (DNSSEC is not widely deployed yet), so we have another fake security layer on top of it (the CA PKI system) which, because it's backed by Google and other organizations that people like so much, for some reason people trust that layer even though its security depends on the security of DNS and is actually even more flawed (since it has even more points of attack). > DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. You can implement a CT-like system on top of it which would give you more transparency regarding what certificates are being used (where clients, rather than certificate authorities, would publish new certificate fingerprints to CT logs or even directly to some server managed by the domain owner). But of course, the real issue is how to deal with Verisign if it starts hijacking domains, but this is already exactly the same problem we have today with the CA PKI system.

tptacek 4y ago

Will it have blackjack, and hookers? :) I'm not trying to be a jerk, I'm just saying, this thing you're talking about doesn't exist. Moreover: it's unlikely ever to exist. CT didn't get rolled out because the CA's wanted CT; I assume they actively detest it (other than LetsEncrypt). CT got rolled out because the browsers required it. The browsers have no leverage to make the DNS PKI do anything, because, once again, they can't revoke .COM.

wizeman 4y ago
If your attacker is .COM then you already lost, with or without DNSSEC, with or without the current CA PKI system.
- tptacek 4y ago
  Then you've already lost, because your attacker controls .COM.
- pornel 4y ago
  Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. With WebPKI we have multiple mutually-distrusting parties keeping each other in check. It has become a better system.
  - wizeman 4y ago
    > Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. It's not more power, it's the same power it already has! This too-big-to-fail monopolist you're talking about can already hijack your domain, regardless of whatever WebPKI does. > CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. Sorry, but I don't follow. Given DANE, CAs wouldn't even exist. Unless you're talking about the transition period, which would be strictly better than what we have now, because the not-yet-transitioned domains would use WebPKI like today, while the already-transitioned domains would use DANE which has superior guarantees.
    - pornel 4y ago
      Currently Verisign can't sell certs directly, and would be caught by a CT log/report if they hijacked DNS to do this. If DANE was used, they could do whatever they want. I don't think the fact that Verisign has already too much power is a good reason to lean on them even more. I'm not talking about transition period. DANE makes TLD owners effectively a CAs. The technical details are different, but the role of root-trust-anchored private-key-holding ownership-attesting authority is the same. And unlike WebPKI CAs, browsers can't remove DNSSEC roots for abuse of trust. DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. This isn't just a technical problem of a protocol for securing packets. It's also a meta problem of ensuring the organizations involved behave in a trustworthy way, even when it would be profitable to cheat, even when NSA and other 3-letter agencies put pressure on them.
      - wizeman 4y ago
        > Currently Verisign can't sell certs directly, and would be caught by a CT log/report if they hijacked DNS to do this. And then what? Like you said, browsers can't remove Verisign for abuse of trust, because Verisign isn't part of their roots of trust. And they can't remove the certificate authority who issued the certificate because 1) the certificate authority is not at fault in that scenario, and 2) Verisign could just use another one to issue a new certificate. Whatever answer you give here would apply to DANE as well. > If DANE was used, they could do whatever they want See above: they can already do whatever they want, so you wouldn't be leaning on them more than you are right now. > DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. We already have a centralized system of trust, called the DNS system. It's just that currently it is still relatively insecure (DNSSEC is not widely deployed yet), so we have another fake security layer on top of it (the CA PKI system) which, because it's backed by Google and other organizations that people like so much, for some reason people trust that layer even though its security depends on the security of DNS and is actually even more flawed (since it has even more points of attack). > DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. You can implement a CT-like system on top of it which would give you more transparency regarding what certificates are being used (where clients, rather than certificate authorities, would publish new certificate fingerprints to CT logs or even directly to some server managed by the domain owner). But of course, the real issue is how to deal with Verisign if it starts hijacking domains, but this is already exactly the same problem we have today with the CA PKI system.