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There's no reason why you couldn't use certificate transparency with DNS PKI? Why do you seem to always be talking like if DNSSEC is incompatible with other se

There's no reason why you couldn't use certificate transparency with DNS PKI? Why do you seem to always be talking like if DNSSEC is incompatible with other security technologies? DNSSEC isn't incompatible with DoH either, but you also seem to be implying that we need to only use one or the other?

tptacek 4y ago
By all means, do show me the crt.sh equivalent for DNSSEC. Easy way to win this leg of the argument!
- wizeman 4y ago
  I'm not saying it exists right now, I'm saying it could be created for a DNS PKI system if it was found to be necessary (like you seem to be implying)?
  - tptacek 4y ago
    Will it have blackjack, and hookers? :) I'm not trying to be a jerk, I'm just saying, this thing you're talking about doesn't exist. Moreover: it's unlikely ever to exist. CT didn't get rolled out because the CA's wanted CT; I assume they actively detest it (other than LetsEncrypt). CT got rolled out because the browsers required it. The browsers have no leverage to make the DNS PKI do anything, because, once again, they can't revoke .COM.
    - wizeman 4y ago
      If your attacker is .COM then you already lost, with or without DNSSEC, with or without the current CA PKI system.
      - tptacek 4y ago
        Then you've already lost, because your attacker controls .COM.
      - pornel 4y ago
        Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. With WebPKI we have multiple mutually-distrusting parties keeping each other in check. It has become a better system.
        wizeman 4y ago
        > Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. It's not more power, it's the same power it already has! This too-big-to-fail monopolist you're talking about can already hijack your domain, regardless of whatever WebPKI does. > CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. Sorry, but I don't follow. Given DANE, CAs wouldn't even exist. Unless you're talking about the transition period, which would be strictly better than what we have now, because the not-yet-transitioned domains would use WebPKI like today, while the already-transitioned domains would use DANE which has superior guarantees.
        pornel 4y ago
        Currently Verisign can't sell certs directly, and would be caught by a CT log/report if they hijacked DNS to do this. If DANE was used, they could do whatever they want. I don't think the fact that Verisign has already too much power is a good reason to lean on them even more. I'm not talking about transition period. DANE makes TLD owners effectively a CAs. The technical details are different, but the role of root-trust-anchored private-key-holding ownership-attesting authority is the same. And unlike WebPKI CAs, browsers can't remove DNSSEC roots for abuse of trust. DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. This isn't just a technical problem of a protocol for securing packets. It's also a meta problem of ensuring the organizations involved behave in a trustworthy way, even when it would be profitable to cheat, even when NSA and other 3-letter agencies put pressure on them.
        4y ago

tptacek 4y ago

By all means, do show me the crt.sh equivalent for DNSSEC. Easy way to win this leg of the argument!

wizeman 4y ago
I'm not saying it exists right now, I'm saying it could be created for a DNS PKI system if it was found to be necessary (like you seem to be implying)?
- tptacek 4y ago
  Will it have blackjack, and hookers? :) I'm not trying to be a jerk, I'm just saying, this thing you're talking about doesn't exist. Moreover: it's unlikely ever to exist. CT didn't get rolled out because the CA's wanted CT; I assume they actively detest it (other than LetsEncrypt). CT got rolled out because the browsers required it. The browsers have no leverage to make the DNS PKI do anything, because, once again, they can't revoke .COM.
  - wizeman 4y ago
    If your attacker is .COM then you already lost, with or without DNSSEC, with or without the current CA PKI system.
    - tptacek 4y ago
      Then you've already lost, because your attacker controls .COM.
    - pornel 4y ago
      Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. With WebPKI we have multiple mutually-distrusting parties keeping each other in check. It has become a better system.
      - wizeman 4y ago
        > Giving more power to a too-big-too-fail monopolist and hoping it will behave well is not a sensible system. It's not more power, it's the same power it already has! This too-big-to-fail monopolist you're talking about can already hijack your domain, regardless of whatever WebPKI does. > CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE. Sorry, but I don't follow. Given DANE, CAs wouldn't even exist. Unless you're talking about the transition period, which would be strictly better than what we have now, because the not-yet-transitioned domains would use WebPKI like today, while the already-transitioned domains would use DANE which has superior guarantees.
        pornel 4y ago
        Currently Verisign can't sell certs directly, and would be caught by a CT log/report if they hijacked DNS to do this. If DANE was used, they could do whatever they want. I don't think the fact that Verisign has already too much power is a good reason to lean on them even more. I'm not talking about transition period. DANE makes TLD owners effectively a CAs. The technical details are different, but the role of root-trust-anchored private-key-holding ownership-attesting authority is the same. And unlike WebPKI CAs, browsers can't remove DNSSEC roots for abuse of trust. DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. This isn't just a technical problem of a protocol for securing packets. It's also a meta problem of ensuring the organizations involved behave in a trustworthy way, even when it would be profitable to cheat, even when NSA and other 3-letter agencies put pressure on them.
        4y ago