2 ms·

> Do you agree or disagree that Mary constructing a red LED to experience redness is not a legitimate response to the Knowledge Argument? It depends on what yo

by pdonis 4y ago

> Do you agree or disagree that Mary constructing a red LED to experience redness is not a legitimate response to the Knowledge Argument? It depends on what you think the Knowledge Argument is supposed to prove. If you think the Knowledge Argument is supposed to prove that physicalism is false, then I disagree. To refute physicalism, it is pointless to say that some physical processes are not "knowledge". Even if the physicalist agrees, that in no way refutes physicalism. The physicalist simply says that the processes that Mary induces in her brain by constructing a red LED (or doing surgery on her optic nerve, or just imagining what seeing red would be like), even if they are not "knowledge", are still physical processes, and that those physical processes are Mary's experience of seeing red. Nothing in the Knowledge Argument refutes that. If you think the Knowledge Argument is supposed to prove that there are physical things that aren't "knowledge" (whether or not there are also non physical things is then a separate question), then I neither agree nor disagree as a matter of physics, since what we use the word "knowledge" to refer to is a matter of definitions of words, not physics. I have no problem with accepting your definition of the word "knowledge" for purposes of this discussion. I just don't think accepting that definition says anything about whether or not physicalism is true.

naasking 4y ago
> The physicalist simply says that the processes that Mary induces in her brain by constructing a red LED (or doing surgery on her optic nerve, or just imagining what seeing red would be like), even if they are not "knowledge", are still physical processes This isn't relevant. Nobody is really disputing that physical processes cause qualia. You don't see the redness of an apple until the apple actually enters your visual field. Cause=physical event, result=qualia. Even dualists agree with this. Therefore the Knowledge Argument is not about whether any physical process is causally linked to qualia, it's specifically about whether qualia can be deduced only from factual knowledge, because under physicalism, all facts are physical facts. If physicalism is true, then all facts are third-party objective physical facts. Therefore quale are physical facts. If given an understanding of all physical facts, then Mary should be able to deduce her quale. If she cannot deduce her quale (or it seems very implausible), then either some mistake has been made or physicalism is false. Where is the mistake? You cannot answer this question by saying her knowledge gives her the ability to trigger the usual physical process to cause qualia, because the question is about the deduction. The only outcomes of this thought experiment are one of: 1. denying that physicalism is true, or 2. denying that quale are facts, 3. accepting that Mary would be able to deduce her quale, 4. concluding that the thought experiment contains some inherent contradiction.
- dragonwriter 4y ago
  If Mary had (and had the capacity to conpletely analyze) all data on all physical processes in the universe, she could deduce her, and all other, qualia.
  - naasking 4y ago
    Sure, that's one opinion, but that's not a proof.
    - pdonis 4y ago
      > that's one opinion No, it's not, it's part of the explicit premise of the thought experiment.
      - naasking 4y ago
        That Mary has all factual knowledge is a premise, the conclusion that she could deduce her qualia does not necessarily follow, and you have provided no proof demonstrating that it follows
        pdonis 4y ago
        > That Mary has all factual knowledge is a premise, the conclusion that she could deduce her qualia does not necessarily follow It's not a conclusion; to a physicalist, it's part of the premise, since knowledge of her qualia is "factual knowledge". You can't just declare by fiat that this is false; that's a circular argument, as I have already said multiple times. > you have provided no proof The burden of proof is on you, not me; if you want to make an argument based on the claim that knowledge of qualia is not "factual knowledge", then you have to prove that it isn't. You can't just declare it by fiat. I understand that non-physicalists, like you and Jackson, believe that knowledge of qualia is not "factual knowledge". But physicalists, like me and Dennett, disagree. Given that disagreement, you can't make your belief a premise of an argument and expect me to accept it. All you're doing is restating your position. Fine, I understand that's your position. But it's not the same as giving an actual argument for it based on premises that I must accept.

by pdonis 4y ago

naasking 4y ago

> The physicalist simply says that the processes that Mary induces in her brain by constructing a red LED (or doing surgery on her optic nerve, or just imagining what seeing red would be like), even if they are not "knowledge", are still physical processes This isn't relevant. Nobody is really disputing that physical processes cause qualia. You don't see the redness of an apple until the apple actually enters your visual field. Cause=physical event, result=qualia. Even dualists agree with this. Therefore the Knowledge Argument is not about whether any physical process is causally linked to qualia, it's specifically about whether qualia can be deduced only from factual knowledge, because under physicalism, all facts are physical facts. If physicalism is true, then all facts are third-party objective physical facts. Therefore quale are physical facts. If given an understanding of all physical facts, then Mary should be able to deduce her quale. If she cannot deduce her quale (or it seems very implausible), then either some mistake has been made or physicalism is false. Where is the mistake? You cannot answer this question by saying her knowledge gives her the ability to trigger the usual physical process to cause qualia, because the question is about the deduction. The only outcomes of this thought experiment are one of: 1. denying that physicalism is true, or 2. denying that quale are facts, 3. accepting that Mary would be able to deduce her quale, 4. concluding that the thought experiment contains some inherent contradiction.

dragonwriter 4y ago
If Mary had (and had the capacity to conpletely analyze) all data on all physical processes in the universe, she could deduce her, and all other, qualia.
- naasking 4y ago
  Sure, that's one opinion, but that's not a proof.
  - pdonis 4y ago
    > that's one opinion No, it's not, it's part of the explicit premise of the thought experiment.
    - naasking 4y ago
      That Mary has all factual knowledge is a premise, the conclusion that she could deduce her qualia does not necessarily follow, and you have provided no proof demonstrating that it follows
      - pdonis 4y ago
        > That Mary has all factual knowledge is a premise, the conclusion that she could deduce her qualia does not necessarily follow It's not a conclusion; to a physicalist, it's part of the premise, since knowledge of her qualia is "factual knowledge". You can't just declare by fiat that this is false; that's a circular argument, as I have already said multiple times. > you have provided no proof The burden of proof is on you, not me; if you want to make an argument based on the claim that knowledge of qualia is not "factual knowledge", then you have to prove that it isn't. You can't just declare it by fiat. I understand that non-physicalists, like you and Jackson, believe that knowledge of qualia is not "factual knowledge". But physicalists, like me and Dennett, disagree. Given that disagreement, you can't make your belief a premise of an argument and expect me to accept it. All you're doing is restating your position. Fine, I understand that's your position. But it's not the same as giving an actual argument for it based on premises that I must accept.