4 ms·
> The mass adoption of DNS-over-HTTPS, which is "bottom-up" DNS security that (unlike DNSSEC) protects the "last mile" between browsers and the DNS servers they
by tialaramex 4y ago
> The mass adoption of DNS-over-HTTPS, which is "bottom-up" DNS security that (unlike DNSSEC) protects the "last mile" between browsers and the DNS servers they talk to; in a world where most users talk to just a couple trusted DNS resolvers, all of which speak DoH, DoH might be all the DNS security we need?
Of course those "couple trusted DNS resolvers" (and all the ones operated by enthusiastic "Home labs" types) need to know whether the answers are trustworthy, otherwise we're just centralising the problem not fixing it.
You're a smart person so I'm sure you guessed what the canonical solution is, it's DNSSEC.
> The potential inclusion of RDAP, the successor to Whois, as a mechanism for verifying domain ownership for certificates
This is technology, wishful thinking won't move the bar. ACME RDAP isn't a thing, doesn't appear to have even a draft, don't think it was even discussed. So this "potential" seems rather nebulous. RDAP is a cute trick, it'd be nice if it someday displaces WHOIS properly but it doesn't really have great applicability to this problem.
> explore alternate models with clearer, more realistic trust models.
I have experience with the "Surely anything would be better than this" crowd, they voted for Brexit. You presumably don't need to ask how that's going since I believe in your country they voted for Trump.
- tptacek 4y agoThis is just begging the question. There's a top-down security model for DNS, where you deploy a global PKI, and there's a bottom-up security model where you protect all the links. If the top-down approach reaches all the leaves, so all lookups are signed and verified, it can succeed. Likewise, if the bottom-up model reaches the roots, it too succeeds: if every link DNS uses is protected, then the only avenues for compromise are outside the scope of the DNS anyways --- in the same way that registrar compromise today, the primary vector for DNS takeovers, is out of scope for DNSSEC. What you're saying here is, "if you do bottom-up DNS security, all you know is that the links were secure; you still don't know if the data was authentic". Sure, but that's not dispositive, because: (a) Bottom-up DNS security can continue to succeed to the point where it links resolvers and caches to authority servers (b) Regardless of whether it does, the costs attackers incur against DoH-protected hosts might be wildly higher than the benefits (the risk-of-failure-adjusted value of a misissuance via a DNS attack). So, I guess what I'm saying is that it's clear on it's face that there's no "canonical solution" to this problem; there's a solution space. DNSSEC advocates have been telling us for (checks notes) 27-28 years that DNSSEC is "the canonical solution" to DNS security. The information security field has ignored the DNSSEC advocates, and, I'd argue, largely vindicated themselves in that approach. Britain, for what it's worth, was already a member of the EU when they voted for Brexit. The circumstances of DNSSEC are not similar. It's a weird, inapposite emotional appeal either way, but the premise fails, too.
- wizeman 4y ago> (a) Bottom-up DNS security can continue to succeed to the point where it links resolvers and caches to authority servers Even if that would happen, the client would have no way to know if all the links were indeed secured. And even it would know it, it would have no way to know if any of the resolvers in those links forged a DNS response. With DNSSEC the client can verify that the response is indeed authentic. > (b) Regardless of whether it does, the costs attackers incur against DoH-protected hosts might be wildly higher than the benefits (the risk-of-failure-adjusted value of a misissuance via a DNS attack). Actually, it can be profitable for the DoH-protected hosts themselves to forge DNS responses, no attacker is needed. There are many consumer ISPs that do that already to display advertisements, collect statistics or straight up hijack domain names (e.g. due to piracy laws). DoH does nothing to prevent that, while a client resolver with DNSSEC support does protect against that. In fact, DNSSEC can work just as well with DoH, which is what I do on my laptop. These two technologies are not mutually exclusive and I see no reason why we can't use both at the same time.
- tptacek 4y agoWhat does it matter if the client knows or doesn't know the whole chain from the resolver to all its peers? There's nothing the client can do about it. DNS data is either hard to spoof (even now, that's the case) or it isn't. This idea that bottom-up DNS security is suspect because the client can't verify the whole chain would be easier to take if it wasn't for the fact that all of DNSSEC security collapses down to a single, resolver-controlled header bit on the link between your browser and your DNS server. This just isn't a real problem.
- wizeman 4y ago> What does it matter if the client knows or doesn't know the whole chain from the resolver to all its peers? There's nothing the client can do about it. If the client expected all the links to be secured (which is what you propose with a bottom-up security model) and if it would know whether they are or not, then it could fail to resolve if any link is not currently secured, if the user so desired. In your bottom-up security model proposal, this would protect against any external man-in-the-middle attack in the entire chain (but not an attacker within the chain). If the client doesn't know if all links are secured, then it is vulnerable as long as any link in the chain can be attacked (except for its own link), not to mention of course, by attackers within the chain as well. Since it has no way to know whether it was attacked or not, it has no way to prevent forged responses. > DNS data is either hard to spoof (even now, that's the case) It's really not hard. Otherwise, this page wouldn't list ongoing cases that affect millions of users right now, every single day: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking > if it wasn't for the fact that all of DNSSEC security collapses down to a single, resolver-controlled header bit on the link between your browser and your DNS server. Maybe on your system, not mine. If you use a local caching resolver with DNSSEC support (and why wouldn't you, unless you're using a microcontroller with close to zero resources?) then no application on your local system will get a forged response from domains with DNSSEC support (unless it was attacked at the source, origin DNS server or at the TLD level, of course, no way to prevent that), regardless of what your DNS server does or pretends to be doing, or any other DNS server in the chain, or even an external attacker that tries to attack any link in the chain, for that matter. You could also implement a DNS resolver with DNSSEC support on your browser, if you really wanted. But a local caching resolver is an even more generic solution, as it protects all local applications, not just your browser.