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Against DNSSEC (2015)
- nixcraft 4y agoJust checked Faang and none of them have DNSSEC enabled: for d in Amazon.com Facebook.com Apple.com Google.com Netflix.com ; do delv "$d" @1.1.1.1; done
- alwillis 4y agoThere are nearly 20 million DNSSEC-enabled zones [1], which is a drop in the bucket compared to the internet as whole obviously. But 20 million is not nothin’. [1]: https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/
- tptacek 4y agoThe problem with that 20MM number is that it's in large part the result of registrars auto-signing names (especially in Europe). There's 2 issues with that: 1. The overwhelming majority of those names are meaningless, just as it doesn't change anything about Internet security if I do or don't sign the "paulgra-ham.com" domain I bought on Hover years ago when I was drunk. 2. Registrar signatures are more or less security theater, because those customers aren't even controlling their own keys. The total adoption of DNSSEC in commercial zones is between 1-4% right now, right?
- amluto 4y agoDNSSEC has no shortage of problems, but this IMO isn’t really one of them: > 2. Registrar signatures are more or less security theater, because those customers aren't even controlling their own keys. It would be nifty if DNSSEC (or some superior technology) provided a degree of protection against a compromised registrar, but I don’t think that’s the primary benefit. Of course the registrar can change the DNS data. DNSSEC purports to secure the transfer of data from the combination of the registrar and the domain owner to the resolver. For example, the combination of DNSSEC and CAA can, in principle, prevent even an arbitrarily privileged attacker on the network from getting a bogus certificate issued. Without DNSSEC, services like Let’s Encrypt rely on a degree or network voodoo to protect against MITM attack. (Of course, a much simpler and more robust mechanism could accomplish the same goal. For example, there could be a standardized out of band mechanism by which a CA could securely ask a registry for the certificate policy for a domain. Something like this wouldn’t have the admin-screwed-up—and-the-whole-domain-is-down failure modes.) edit: It looks like RDAP is moderately close to being able to do that out-of-band verification. I wonder if anyone is working on CAA integration with RDAP.
- tptacek 4y agoI don't know that I'd call the registrar auto-signing thing a "problem" so much as a "juked stat".
- hactar_ 4y agoI know that, at least for .ch and .li, there was the plan that registrars have to pay extra for all domains that don’t have DNSSEC enabled starting some time next year. Some registrars just set up DNSSEC not because they believe it has value, but because they would have to explain a price increase to the customer.
- fmajid 4y agoThey also don’t have HSTS enabled, let alone HSTS Preload. Lots of security theater, though. https://blog.majid.info/hsts-preload/ https://blog.majid.info/hsts-preload/
- pixl97 4y agoPrevious discussion. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8894902 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8894902
- dane-pgp 4y agoThere's also another article from 2015 titled "For DNSSEC" which is sort of a response[0] to the one posted here. That article was discussed[1] on HN late last year. [0] https://easydns.com/blog/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ https://easydns.com/blog/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29381778 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29381778
- tptacek 4y agoWeird to see this here, but OK! I keep debating writing a follow-up post called "Stick A Fork In It", declaring DNSSEC finally dead and buried, and (wisely) have decided not to call it quite yet. Factors motivating "Stick A Fork In It": * The increasing salience of multi-perspective verification at CAs (LetsEncrypt won't depend on a single DNS response to domain-validate a certificate request, but will distribute that request to resolvers around the world and make sure they agree with each other). * The potential inclusion of RDAP, the successor to Whois, as a mechanism for verifying domain ownership for certificates --- instead of doing a weird DNS dance, you can just ask the registrar directly. * The design and deployment of MTA-STS, the HSTS-style TLS continuity protocol for SMTP; SMTP is basically the final use case for DNSSEC, where DNSSEC can serve as a signaling mechanism to ensure that SMTP connections actually use TLS and aren't negotiated down to plaintext by a MITM. MTA-STS was designed specifically to replace DNSSEC for this use case, by the major email providers. * The ironic increase in domain takeover attacks --- ironic because they're overwhelmingly (probably universally?) done by compromising registrar accounts rather than playing games with the DNS protocol, such that even after a forklift upgrade to enable DNSSEC, we'd still mostly have the same DNS security problem. * The mass adoption of DNS-over-HTTPS, which is "bottom-up" DNS security that (unlike DNSSEC) protects the "last mile" between browsers and the DNS servers they talk to; in a world where most users talk to just a couple trusted DNS resolvers, all of which speak DoH, DoH might be all the DNS security we need? * The rise in BGP4 takeover attacks, which completely bypass name resolution altogether; as these attacks continue to mainstream, they too strike right at the heart of the problem DNSSEC was supposed to solve. * The incredibly bad track record DNSSEC has for reliability; for instance, Slack had a multi-hour total sitewide outage earlier this year that came from attempting to turn it on. This was predicted --- it's predicted in the "Against DNSSEC" post! --- and it's come to pass: DNSSEC is easy to screw up, easier than TLS, and when you screw DNSSEC up, your site falls of the entire Internet without warnings. * The success of Certificate Transparency and CA surveillance in the WebPKI, to the point where the largest and most commercially important CAs were actually ripped out of browsers after surveillance systems detected misissuance. Also, the most trusted CA on the Internet in 2022 is... free? The WebPKI of 2022 is just not the WebPKI of 2015. Against this backdrop, the important thing to know about DNSSEC is that it is simply not widely deployed; you can quickly measure this by taking any list of the top domains (the "Moz 500" is an easy-to-download version) and then feeding it through dig: for DOMAIN in $(cat list); do dig ds $DOMAIN +short done That DNSSEC isn't widely deployed doesn't, of course, mean it never will be. But it's important to get a sense of the costs we're talking about: it would be one thing if the work of rolling DNSSEC out had already been done, the costs had been sunk, and we were just trying to extract some value of it. But the opposite is true! I see a much different (and worse) opportunity cost to DNSSEC: if we stick a fork in it, we can get to work on something better. I think we've more or less established that a top-down government-controlled PKI is not the future of Internet security. Maybe DNS is worth protecting anyways! Ending the 26-year DNSSEC boondoggle would free us up to explore alternate models with clearer, more realistic trust models. At any rate: I feel like the ~8 years since I wrote this post have pretty much totally vindicated my argument. I felt a little like I was going out on a limb when I wrote it. Now I feel like the argument is pretty banal. :)
- xfer 4y agoCan you not mitm the CA's dns lookups for http, tls-alpn challenges and make them sign the certificates for you? How does letsencrypt prevent this? Do they check with multiple resolvers around the world?
- jeroenhd 4y agoWe need a better alternative to DNSSEC. Its design is outdated and it's implementations can be very clunky. It's like HTML and Javascript in a way. However, it's the system we've got. Unless you do some kind of on-the-fly domain generation or an outdated DNS registrar, it's quite easy to enable and it helps prevent all kind of weird DNS malarkey for those that care about their internet security.
- tptacek 4y ago1. It's not the system we've got, because we don't got it. Less than 4% of .COM is signed. Virtually no important domains are signed, particularly at the companies with the largest security teams. The root DNSSEC keys could land on Pastebin tonight and nobody would need to be paged. 2. It's not quite easy to enable it. Evidence for that position: the litany of stories where companies have tried to enable it, like Slack did, and had multi-hour worldwide outages as a result.
- b112 4y agoThe worst is, computer clocks drift, and ntp's domains are signed, so if your clock drifts enough, you cannot update your time, because dnssec invaliates time server records. Good times. Seen more than one org disable dnnsec, in bind, because of this.
- wahern 4y agoYou would have the same issue with TLS or any other scheme. When OpenNTPD added TLS-authenticated constraints, I immediately began having problems on one of my PCEngines APU with a broken RTC (same model as all my other ones, but clock would always reset when power removed, no matter how many times I changed the battery). I had to disable TLS constraints. Eventually they added a special "trusted" qualifier to NTP server directives for bypassing constraint checking. Authenticated time synchronization faces intrinsic dilemmas no matter the technology.
- EricE 4y agoHmm - my discord client wasn't updating and I suspected it was something with DNS - tried all kinds of things. Turned dnssec off and BAM! discord immediatel updated. Sigh.
- jabart 4y agoDNSSEC doesn't yet support multi-provider DNS solutions and Route53 only recently (little over a year ago) started to support it. Other note is I've had exactly two people who it prevented from using a site. One was at a coffee shop and another in a hospital where I assume they both were rewriting DNS for some reason.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- IvyMike 4y agoLast time this was posted, I asked for an example of any real-world incident which would have been prevented by DNSSEC. I have never seen one, but it would be interesting. P.S. Lots of hypothetical examples were given, but I'd like to see an actual case. P.P.S. tptacek try to hold your tongue for at least a little bit before piping in with your usual response. :)
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- AndyMcConachie 4y agoRead section 2.2 on MyEtherwallet. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-121-en.pdf https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-121-en.pdf The attackers took over the authoritative DNS servers and answered queries with lies.
- nmjohn 4y agoThat example involved the attacker hijacking BGP. What protection does DNSSEC provide against that attacker?
- xtnd53 4y agoWith DNSSEC there is an authenticated chain from the root down. Without the private key materials for a delegation a hijacker wouldn't be able to provide appropriate signatures and so resolution would fail.
- wizeman 4y agoDo you mean, like all the DNS hijacking attacks listed here, occurring every single day for millions of users spanning multiple countries and including all the consumer ISPs in Indonesia, for example? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking DNSSEC gives you end-to-end protection against DNS hijacking if your local resolver does DNSSEC verification and the domain being looked up uses DNSSEC. All you have to do is install a local resolver like https://www.knot-resolver.cz https://www.knot-resolver.cz which does DNSSEC verification by default. It can be configured to talk to your upstream DNS servers or some other DNS-over-TLS servers if you want (like the Cloudflare DNS servers).
- wizeman 4y agoSorry, thread limit achieved. For tptacek: > Not with any attitude: what you and the phone sysadmins propose is, effectively, to eliminate all shared DNS caching from the Internet. A beautiful dream! But that's all it is. No, a local caching resolver (with or without DNSSEC verification enabled by default) would talk to the upstream DNS server by default, like a stub resolver, so it benefits from the upstream DNS server cache.
- tptacek 4y agoThat's not a threat limit, that's HN's software asking you to slow down a bit.
- deknos 4y agoa question on this actually: can i pin for a certain domain a key or a key at a specific date (and all successfull rollovers) in /etc/resolv.conf or with one of the popular caching dnsserver software?